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A B S T R A C T 
The object ive of t h i s -checis i s an analysis of 
Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s during the period 1977-1S9 2. 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t aims ac an e::ploration of the 
condi t ions of conflic-c and cooperation bet\;een the t.-zo 
coi in t r ies . 
The period se lec ted for study i s s ign i f i can t 
for many reasons. U r s t , during the period under r e -
view no war took place between the ti7o count r ies occa-
sional border skirmishes notv.dthsranding. Yet many new 
b i l a t e r a l i s sues cropped up and some ne;; s i t ua t i ons 
developed in t h i s region v/hich adversely affected b i l a -
t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . Moreover, ex remal involvement during 
the period in t h i s region conrinued as before. Secondly, 
the period se lec ted i s also s ign i f i can t for the forma-
t ion of Janata governm.ent i n New Delhi v;hich veered to 
a l i b e r a l and accommodative approach to the norm.aliza-
t ion of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . Thirdly, the second Indira 
regime witnessed the signing of an agreement to s e t up 
a Jo in t Indo-Pak Commission to boost b i l a t e r a l coopera-
t ion in economic and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s . 
In the past much v/ork has been done in both 
the countr ies on Indo-Fakiotcni r e l a t i o n s but nobody 
has appreciated the s igni f icance of post-Simla Indo-Fak 
arms race and the ensirLng cold war which l e d the two 
countr ies to the brink of a hot war (probably nuclear) 
during the l a t e r pa r t of 1991, This study has , there-
fore, taken specia l no t ice of the s t r a t e g i c dimension. 
The subject has been s tudied in an independent, impart ial 
and unbiased way free from na-cionalist b i a s and pro-
c l i v i t i e s . In the course of "chis analys is I have given 
a balanced view of the approaches, viev/points and 
po l i c i e s of both the coun t r i e s . 
This d i s s e r t a t i o n i s organized under three 
Pa r t s . Part I (Chapters I - IV) deals with Indo-
Pakistani r e l a t i o n s i n the his-corical perspec t ive . 
Chapter I deals v;i-ch the i n i t i a l phase of Indo-
Pakistani r e l a t i o n s . The major i s sues such as the 
question of minori t ies ' , evacuee p r o p e r t i e s , d ivis ion 
of mi l i t a ry s t o r e s , demarcation of borders , currency 
problems', and problems of refugees are e:cplained in 
d e t a i l , and how these problems v;ere by and large over-
come by the two countr ies through t a l k s and meetings. 
But the pr incely s t a t e s p a r t i c u l a r l y Kaslimir 
and Hyderabad became g rea t problems for both count r ies . 
Eventually the l a t t e r tx'jo acceded to Ind ia . But 
Pakistan disputed Kashmir's accession to India and 
Kashmir i s s t i l l the stijmbling block i n the v/ay of 
normalization of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
Chapter I I deals v/ith the ro l e of external 
factors i n d i s rup t ing Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s . 
Pakistan was and s t i l l i n f e r i o r to India i n each and 
everi"" field," So/ Pakistan, in order "co come on equal 
level with India , began to manure her con tac t v/ith 
Islamic and Western count r ies for a l l kind of help. 
In the ear ly f i f t i e s , Pakistan could look only to che 
United S ta tes for t h i s kind of he lp . U.S.A., in -cum 
was seeking a l l i e s in Asia "co counter -che growing 
influence of communists countr ies p a r t i c u l a r l y of China 
and U,'S,S,R. Pakistan, l a t e r on, received a l o t of arms 
and militar\'- equipments. This acceptance of mi l i ta ry 
aid of United S ta tes by Pakis-can c rea ted two problems 
espec ia l ly Pakistan had no her own p o l i c i e s and was 
cont ro l led by the other pov/ers because Pakistan became 
an Amirican stooge and was moving according to the 
d i rec t ion of U.S. Secondly, Pakis tan ' s a l l i a n c e -..ith 
western count r ies dis turbed the balance of pov;er in th i s 
region and India became bound to have an a l l i ance with 
some one for her own defence. Thus, Inciia joined U.S.S.R 
and a new wave of cold war again created i n the region. 
For fur ther help i n mili tari^ and economic f ie ld , 
Pakistan joined some regional organisa t ion such as South 
East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact 
( l a t e r named CENTO). After j o in ing these Organisp.cions, 
Pakistan got chance to r a i s e b i l a t e r a l i s sues par t icular-
l y Kashmir i s sue in the above Organisations and received 
supjfort on t h i s i s s u e . At t h i s junc ture , Pakistan also 
took much i n t e r e s t to solve the Kashru.r i s sue through 
United Nation because- most of the perr?.anent members of 
Secur i ty Council were in favour of Pakistan. Thus, 
Pakistan ra i sed Kashmir i s sue i n U.N. :nany times but the 
e f fo r t s of U.N, as well as of super-powers ended with no 
r e s u l t . 
The Farakha barrage i s sue and the Indus v;ater 
d ispute v^ere another t^/o problems betireen India and 
Pakistan. Many meetings for resolving these issues 
were taken place between the two coxintries. Regarding 
Farakha Barrage, both th@ count r ies got success in 
i roning out some of the d i f f e r ences . But regarding 
Indus water d i sputes , both the coun t r i e s , af ter the 
continuous e ight years d iscuss ion and negot ia t ions , 
reached a t the conclusion of Indus waters Treaty through 
the mediation of World Bank. The t rea ty recognises the 
need for f ixing the de l imi t a t ion in a s p i r i t of good-
xvill and f r iendship , and dGfinos the r i g h t s and obliga-
t ions of the Government of India and of the Government 
of Pakistan concerning the use of water of the Indus 
r i v e r system. T i l l 1960/ i n the his'cory of India-
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , the Indus v/atars dispute was the 
only d ispute where both the Gove2mmenT:s had sho\/n a 
pos i t i ve s p i r i t of cooperat ion. 
The Chinese border invasion on several places 
of India abrupty canpl ica ted no-c only India-China re la -
t ionsh ip but India-Pakis tan re la t ions l i ip a l so . In chis 
conc l ic t / India suffered much m i l i t a r i l y and uhis 
brought a profound consequences for both Indian foreign 
policy and nat ional s ecu r i ty pol icy . India which was 
e a r l i e r be l ieving and follo\7ing only non-aligned policy, 
suddenly gave up her much vaunted non-aligned policy 
and dramat ical ly expanded defence budget in order to 
s t rengthen defence system. This Indian procramme of 
s t rengthening defence system agains t Gliina \:as taken by 
Pakis-can as her nat ional t h r e a t . So, Pakicoan came in 
c lose contac t of China and a sec re t mi l i ta i r - pact bet-
ween Pakistan and China was signed. Many economic aid 
V7as also provided by Cliina "co Palcistan, Thus, India 
r e a l i s e d the great need of m i l i t a r y capab i l i ty in order 
to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously. 
Chapter I I I deals with a long l i s t of factors 
t h a t had affected the s i t u a t i o n s i n ^he region in 
d i f f e ren t ways and f i n a l l y India and Pa'rcist:an met with 
a war. This war of 1965 sho\;ed t h a t Pakistan attacked 
on India by tv/o reasons b a s i c a l l y . One i s t h a t Pakistan 
thought t h a t India had become veir/ weak because of 19 62 
v;ar x.dth China and India i s not in a pos i t ion to v;in the 
war. Secondly, Pakistan bel ieved t h a t i f she did not 
a t tack in a decis ive manner, the Sta te of Kashmir -./ould 
be in tegra ted i n t o India and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t for 
Pakis tan ' s concerns v;ould dv/indle. 
Whatever the impression, Pakistan was having 
about India before oc curing the war proved com pie re ly 
wrong because both the countr ies suffered i n t h i s war 
and Pakistan also r e a l i s e d t h a t Indian armed forces 
could not be e a s i l y routed and Indian forces had come 
a long vzay from the Chinese debacle of 1962, On the 
Indian s ide , the v/ar provided a degree of comfort: to 
the mi l i t a ry v/hose p re s t ige and morale had sunk to an 
a l l - t ime low in the aftermath of 1962 c o n f l i c t . 
A new hope of mu-cual cooperation bet-.^een the 
two countr ies was seen when Tashkent Declaration was 
signed through the mediation of Soviet Union. But as 
for as permanent se t t lement of India-Pakis tan problems 
are concerned, i t did nothing new a t e l l . I t brought a 
temporary r e s p i t e to India-Pakis tan h o s t i l i t i e s . India 
and Palcistan remained suspicious and unyielding towards 
ea th o ther . 
In Chapter IV the s igni f icance of ideological 
differences betaveen the t\ro wings of -he United Pakistan 
has been explained. In the beginning before the out-
break of the war, the ideologica l differences creared 
the i n t e rna l c r i s i s i n Fa'cistan, and the East Pakistani 
peoples refused to accep-c a sujoservient ro le in Pakistan 
and demanded maximum autonomy. The au-conomist demands 
v/ere met with harsh measures by Pakistan. With t h i s , 
the refugees s t a r t ed to proceed tov/ards India . So, India 
thought t h a t ' i t was cheaper to go to ^•ar than to absorb 
the refugees i n t o i t s already bloated populaiiion. Final-
l y , these fac tors propelled India and Pakistan to war 
and subsequent c rea t ion of Bangladesh. 
Ind ia , in t h i s war of 1971, badly defeated 
Pakistan and unquestionably es tabl iched her m l i t a x y 
supe r io r i t y not only over Pakistan buz even in South 
Asia region as a whole. With t h i s supe r io r i t y of India 
and the defeat of Pakistan, bvo new things emerged. 
One i s t h a t Pakistan, a f t e r recognising her i n f e r i o r i t y 
i n conventional war, f e l t the t h r e a t for her secur i ty 
i n the sub-cont inent . So, i t made a sense for Pal:isuan 
to develop some nuclear c a p a b i l i t y i n order to meet 
with India in future . Second, Pak i s t an ' s claim on Kashmir 
a f t e r the separat ion of Bangladesh, a l so eroded in a 
major v/ay. The i n a b i l i - y of the West Pakistan to convince 
t h e i r b r e t h e m in the 3ast -co remain i n the same pol i ty , 
made i t exceedingly difficul-c for the Pakiscani leader-
ship to l ay a claim on Kashmir on the bas i s of i-cs 
r e l i g ious composition. ITacurally, India took advantage 
of the discrepancy be"c;/3en "cheory and p r a c t i c e . 
This chapter also discusses the importance of 
the Simla Agreement of 197 2 i n normalising Indo-Pakiscan 
r e l a t i o n s . The Simla Agreement, played a ver-y imporranr 
ro le in the establishmen-c of durable peace in the sub-
continent and for the se^stlemenr. of problems ar i s ing 
out of Bangladesh war. The g r e a t e s t mer i t of the Simla 
Pact i s t h a t the t\70 count r ies decided to renounce the 
use or t h r e a t of use of force aga ins t each other, to put 
an end t o the era of conf l i c t and confronta-cion; and 
commit -chemselves to standing coopera-cion and peaceful 
coexis tence . 
Part I I covering chapters V - VII, deals \;ith 
the period from 1977-19S7 ;/hich had been prescribed ior 
my doctoral work, but I have covered the even-cs up to 
1992. 
In Chapter V the main emphasis i s given on ^he 
coming of Janata Govemman!:: i n Power and on -che r e -
o r i en t a t ion of Indian foreign pol icy . The Janata 
Government follov/ed a foreign policy \7h4.ch ;/as a fresh 
t h r u s t to -che promotion of "che cause of peace and d i s -
armament, -co streng-chen s t a b i l i t y and cooperative spirit:, 
t o foruify independence and freedom from e:cploitacion. 
With the formation of Janata Govemmen-c in India , a ne\7 
chapter i n India-Pakis tan re lac ions v/as smarted. The 
Janata Government repeacedly emphasis3d "beneficial 
b i l a t e ra l i sm" and "good neighbour l iness" . The main aim 
of Janata foreign policy was -co promote and enrich 
Ind i a ' s rela-cions wirh the neighbours in general and 
wi-ch Pakistan in p a r t i c u l a r as a means no"c only co 
solve inhe r i t ed problems but also t o c rea te a climate 
of confidence and mutual good-all so t h o t more harmoni-
ous and benef ic ia l r e l a t i o n s in economic, pol ic ica l and 
cu l tu ra l f ie lds might be promoted in the t rue s p i r i t of 
peacef\il coexis tence. The leaders of India and Pakiscan 
during Janata Regime, exchanged a l o t of v i s i t s from 
each other country. Through t h i s e:ccnange of v i s i t s , 
the leaders of both the countr ies got success in d i s -
pe l l ing the apprehensions of fundamentalism of some of 
the Muslim and Hindu organir;ations from the minds of 
the people of both coun t r i e s , With t h i s , many ouc-
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standing disputes between India and Pakistan were 
resolved and the areas of rnu-cual coopera-cion i n various 
f i e l d s v/ere expanded. 
The above hopes and s p i r i t of cooperation 
received a j o l t vxhen Jana ta Government f e l l and mainly 
v;hen the Soviet Union occupied Afghanis-can, The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan producod a c r i s i s not simply 
for Afghan people but for -che South Asian region as a 
whole. I t mainly confronted the main regional ac tors -
India and Pakistan with a nev; p o l i t i c a l and s t r a r e c i c 
s i t u a t i o n to which they raacted in distinc-cive v;ays. 
India and Pakistan both -cook the consequences of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan noc on the bas i s of "che nacds 
and aspi ra t ions of the Afghan people bu-c chey rook inco 
account t h e i r ovm i n t e r e s t s . Their responses differed 
from each o ther . Pakistan pursue ac-cive opposix:ion co 
•che Soviet invasion and India made no public condemna-
t ion because of her c lose t i e s \ ; i th Soviet Union. The 
massive arms and economic help "co Palcistan by U.S. ',;as 
vehementally c r i t i c i s e d by India because India fel-c a 
t h r e a t for secur i ty in "che region due ro t h i s supply of 
arms. Thus, the Soviet invasion brought -che cold ;;ar 
to the region and esca la ted the differences betv^een 
India and Pakistan. 
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Chapter VI deals --d-di the impediments in the 
way of Indo-Pak coopera-cion. There i s no doubt -chai; 
some of the b i l a t e r a l i s sue s have been the major i r r i -
t a n t s betv/een the two count r ies bu-c in addi-cion to 
these , external involvem.en-c has exacerbated the s i tua -
t i o n and i n t e n s i f i e d i n t r a - r e g i o n a l r i v a l r i e s . 
Pak is tan ' s purchase of arras from the U.S., 
China and other countr ies has always oaen direcced 
agaxns-c India . Pakis-ian has cr ied to axploit; every 
situatiion which occurred i n Souuh Asia or ouuside 'co 
the detriment of Ind ia . When the Sovzar. Union invaded 
Afghani.stan in December 1979/ ix: was Zia-ul Haq who 
made Pakistan very imporiiant co "che Uniued Sca-ues ovar-
night and Pakistan became a "front l ine s t a t e " in U.S. 
perception. Through t h i s t a c c i c s , Palcistan received 
a Ice of arms and economic aid from Unired Szaces and 
o"cher countr ies and buili:: up her defence system more 
s t rong. The aim of Pakistan for improving re l a t ions 
with China and a lso "Co bring ClxLna's ro le as a councer_ 
va i l ing power in South Asia especia l ly againsr India. 
With th i s massive supply of arms and economic aid, India 
f e l t a great danger to her secur i ty in che region. Thus, 
India \7as compelled to jo in some one for res:uscing chis 
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danger. In t h i s v/ay, India opposed more to the sur.ply 
of ams to Pakistan from United S ta tes and Cliina than 
t h a t of Soviet invasion. India v/ith an a l l i a n c e of 
Soviet Urdon had t o faca Falcis-can + U.S. and China in 
t h i s region. But fron the -..dthdrawl of Soviet forces 
from Afghanistan and f i n a l l y ;; i th the d i s i n t eg ra t i on of 
Soviet Union, the cold war in South Asia ended. Thus, 
Palcisnan's usefulness to U,S, policy ca l cu l a t i ons was 
changed, U.S. , which v;as be l ieving b l i nd ly i n Pakistan's 
nuclear programme during Afghan c r i s i s , quickly changed 
her policy and suspended her militaari^ and economic 
ass i s tance to Pakistan under the P ra s s t e r Amendment. 
United S ta tes not only suspended her economic and mi l i t c ry 
a id to Pakistan but a l so shif ted her p r i o r i t i e s towards 
Ind ia , Thus whatever the burden India \7B.S facing during 
Afghan c r i s i s from the side of Pakistan helped by United 
S t a t e s was reduced and t h i s burden was shif ted to Pakistar. 
upto some ex ten t . In t h i s condi t ion, Pakistan, in order 
to bring the balance of powors in her ov/n favour, t r i e d 
to improve her contact more and more with CMna, France 
and some other coun t r i es , here one thing i s to be noted 
t h a t both India and Pakistan are suspecting about each 
other and both are t ry ing to receive arms and other kind 
of help from external powers. Both the countr ies had 
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never stopped themselves from taking such help hnx. 
according to t h e i r i n t e r e s t they have changed uheir 
t r ade of receiving the ou ts ide help from time to t i n e . 
Purcher, the Kashmir, Punjab and Siachin 
g l a c i e r i s sues have been the major i r r i t a n t s betjeen 
India and Paidstan r e l a t i o n s , Kashmir has been the 
problem since parti-cion. Before 1971, Pakistan t r i e d to 
take KashTiiir through m i l i t a r y e f for t s but a f t e r rhe 
defeat i n Bangladesh war of 1971, r e a l i s e d -cha-c no 
m i l i t a r y acrion could separa te Kashmir from India or 
could make Kashmir an independent S ta re , Thus, Pakis'can 
changed her strategy;- to one of c rea t ing a climcce of 
unla^vful ac-civi t ies , i n su r r ec t i on by giving support ::.o 
extremists and m i l i t a n t s of Kashmir as well of Punjab. 
This auri tude of Pakistan has created tension betw-oen 
the tv70 coun t r i e s . 
Chapter VII has analysed the frame\/ork of 
Indo-Pakistcn Jo in t Comnission and i t s cons t i t uen t 
sub-commissions, and appreciated i t s po ten t ia l rolo 
i n promo-cing -cheir b i l a t e r a l cooperation be-c\7een India 
and Pakistan. The Jo inr Commission was es tabl i shed 
between the b.;o countr ies for mutual benef i t i n Gcono.Ta.c, 
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t r ade , i n d u s t r i a l / educat ional , c u l t u r a l , consular , 
tourism, t r a v e l , information, s c i e n t i f i c and techno-
log ica l f i e l d s . The Comiscion a lso succested for 
the exchange of academicianc from each o ther coun-cri/. 
Another important point i s -che d iv is ion of comiiYLs i^cn 
i n to four sub-commissions e^ch dealing -rich specif ied 
f i e l d s , v/hich have provided opi-orTiunicies -co borih 
Indian and Pakistani l eaders T:O have a r.aeuing for 
discussing Come p a r t i c u l a r ma-cuers en-crusted -co a 
pa rc icu la r sub-commiscicn. The neicl"il:ourl7 relp-cion 
and promoting cooperation i n che agr3J^mGnt were main-
ta ined x-7ith the exception of p o l i t i c a l and military-
ques t ions . In t h i s agreement, 'je have seen one uhing 
t h a t the normal function of the agreemen-c was disturoed 
whenever India and Pakistan adopted r i c i d a t t i t u d e 
against each other and whenever they gave more xieicht-
age to the rrade with some orher coun t r i e s . 
In addi t ion to avenues of b i l a t e r a l intorac-cion 
there are also regional and in-carnational forums ' hich 
provide an opportunity ro both India and Pakistan x.o 
develop t h e i r p o l i t i c a l as well econoniic r e l a t i o n s . In 
t h i s way, the formation of Sounh Asien Association for 
Regional Cooperation iSAARC) of which India and 
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Pakistan are the t;7o major par-cnerc, end t:he regional 
and i n t e rna t i ona l organisa-cionc held ouu scne hope of 
not only m u l t i l a t e r a l coopera"cion but a l so b i l a t e r a l 
improvement betv/een India and Pakis tan. India and 
Pakistan along with other nerabers of -che various 
organisat ion got opportunity to discuss and suppress 
ter ror ism in the region and to h igh l igh t the imporcance 
of human r i g h t s . 
The f inal p a r t of "che study offers suggestions 
t o avoid the hurdles which are coming in the way of 
mutual cooperation bet-.reen India and Pakistan. At 
present both the counrries are having nuclear capabi l i -
t y and both are facing nuclear t h r o a t from each 0"cher. 
In bringing consensus be~..-een India and Pakistan, there 
i s need for some reorienuauion of po l i c i e s -co "cake inro 
account in the changed circumstances in Southern Asia. 
At present , i t i s difficul"c to v i s u a l i s e any meaningful 
process which could lead -co a reversal and denucleari-
sa t ion . So, ear ly consul mictions to wori: for suratagic 
s t a b i l i t y in the post nuc le r i ca t ion s^age are necessary. 
Both India and Pakistan shoi.ild move to\;ards the s t a b i l i -
sa t ion of the s i t ua t i on tliau loxvers the ^dangers of use 
of nuclear weapons aga ins t each other becauce the 
existence or possession of nuclear weapons are not 
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dangerous but the most dangerous th ing i s - h e i r use 
against each o the r . 
As far as Kashmir problem i s concerned, both 
India and Pakistan shoiild not do any -cl-dng through 
force or sentimental aiiti-cudes but -chrcugh mxiltidirec-
t iona l approach such as p o l i t i c a l , econoric, psycholo-
g ica l and diplomatic , Bo"ch che counurias should ope 
the tough measures agains t the t e r r o r i s e s and raili-ants 
and should control them, Palvic-an should no"c op-c 
s'uicidal pa-ch about Kashjrdr again and again, Jaram.u and 
Kashmir can not be allowed to d r i f t avay from India 
because the separat ion of Kashrdr from Indda v/ill fur-
the r esca la te the tension betx/een India and Fakisi:an. 
In the economic and t rade f i e ld , both the 
co\xntries should give p r i o r i t i e s t o the items of each 
other r a the r than other countr ies and bouh should do 
ma:d.mum import and export betvreen ther .selves . The 
economic expansion or t rade r e l a t i on beta/een the t-./o 
countr ies received a j o l t whenever the b i l a t e r a l d i s -
putes took place or whenever tiie external involver.^enr 
was m.ore in the region. Tiius, India and Pakistan 
3houI.d normalise t h e i r ro l ic icrJ . relcrcionc, and should 
avoid the external involvement: in the region. 
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Fina l ly Chapter IX suns up the main findings 
of the study. Our analysis leads t o a somewhat pessi-
mis t ic assessment of c o n f l i c t r e so lu t ion between India 
and Pakis tan. Since Parti-cion both India and Pakistan 
are t r y ing to brov/beat each other i n each and every 
f i e ld p a r t i c u l a r l y in improving t h e i r m i l i t a r y strength 
and the nuclear capsbil i -ciec. 3oth are s t ruggling to 
strengtl:ien themselves in uheir own v/ay and bo"ch are 
having l a rge forces and more sophistica-ced v/eapons t:han 
i n the p a s t . So i f v/ar does take place between the t'do 
countries^ i t s cos t wi l l be s u b s t a n t i a l l y g rea te r than 
the three previous wars. 
Another point i s t h a t i n s r i t o of b i l a t e r a l 
bickerings regional and intema-uional orgapJ.sations 
have se t the s tage for normalisat ion and im.provement 
of Indo-Fak coopera-cion. The opportur_ities available 
cannot be grasped because of the lack of a consensus 
on jX)l i t ico~stra tegic i s sues and lack of moral courage 
to resolve the outsranciing d i spu te s . 
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P R E F A C E 
This d i s s e r t a t i o n on "India-Pakistan Relat ions, 
1977-1987" aims a t an ana lys i s of the outstanding problems 
in Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s during the period 1977-199 2 
v/ith a viev; to comprehending the condit ions of durable 
peace and normal cooperat ion in the subcontinent . The 
period se lec ted for study i s s icmificant for many reasons. 
F i r s t l y , during t h i s period no hot war V7as fought between 
the tv/o countr ies occasional border ski r rushes nota/ith-
s-candinc. Secondly, the period v.-itnessed the genesis 
and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of insurgencies in Punjab, JarjTui and 
Kashmir and the eruption of the dispute over Siacban 
g l ac i e r and the Indian campaign against the Pakistani 
nuclear rrccramme. Thirdly/ the Soviet occuj^-caion of 
AfghanistcJi in December 1979 Isd to the g igan t ic 
American aid-package for Pakis-can being a bul\7ark against 
Soviet expansion. Fourthly , the period i s marked by the 
formation of Janata Party government in Ilew Delhi vrhich 
reversed the ers twhi le high-handed approach to^^^ards the 
neighbourinc coun t r i e s . F i f t h l y , a major breakthrough 
was achieved by the s igning of an agreem.ent in 1983 for 
establishment of a J o i n t Commission between India and 
Pakistan to boost b i l a t e r a l cooperation i n economic and 
cu l tu ra l f i e l d s . Thus the period under study presents a 
vivid picrura of cooperation and conf l i c t in the sub-
( i i ) 
con t inen t . No orher period in the h i s t o r y of Indo-Fak 
r e l a t i o n s has such magnitude or i n t e n s i t y of diplomatic 
a c t i v i t y . 
In the past much -.-lO^'^ i n both countr ies has 
been done on Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s but none discusses 
the s igni f icance of Indo-Fskis-cani arms-race in the 
l a t e r period and zhe impact of the regional cold war 
on the .prospects of t h e i r normal cooperat ion. This 
study pays special a t t en t ion to t h i s sicrnificant aspect 
of Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s . 
Scope^ sources and Method 
The work concentrates on p o l i t i c a l , diplomatic, 
s t r a t e c i c and economic r e l a t i ons of India and Pakistan 
agains t the backdrop of the process of normalization 
s e t i n motion by the Simla Accord of 197 2. In th-is 
study I have used the h i s t o r i c a l de sc r ip t i ve method. 
I have a lso given facts and figures vmerever I deemed 
necessary. 
The work i s based on both primary and secondare' 
sources such as Lok Sabha Rebates/ Rajya Sabha Debates/ 
Pakistani National Assembly Debates^ Annual Reports of 
the Indian Minis-cr\- of External Af fa i r s , Annual Rerorts 
(iii) 
of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Trade/ the I.M.F. 
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook/ the white 
papers of Indian and Pakistani goverrxients on the 
Kashmir issue and on India-Pakistan trade relations 
and numerous other books/•periodicals/ and press 
material. 
In this study I have- tried to find out the 
v-.^ i^ Jitions responsible for the deterioration of Indo-
Fak relations. The continuing divergence of political 
and scra-cecic perspectives and progressive escalation 
of tensions over the Kashjnir problem v/ere mainly res-
ponsible for the lack of further progress in the 
normalization of bilateral relations since 197 2. The 
study then proceeds to explore the possibilities and 
prospects of peace and neighbourly cooperation in the 
s ubconti nent. 
The Significance of the Study 
The work is organized under three parts. While 
Fart I mainly sets the h-is-corical background of Indo-
Fak relations. Farts II and III constitute the subs-
tantial parts of this dissertation. 
(iv) 
Part I deeds v/ith Indo-Pakistani relations in 
an h i s to r ica l perspective and i t i s not claimed to be 
very or ig ina l . I t merely sets the stage to bring into 
focus the period tinder study, namely, 1977-1992. 
The analysis of diverse data collected 
buttresses the main thesis of th i s work; tha t future 
progress in normalization of relat ions and peaceful 
cooperation depends on a prior resolu-cion of out-
standing b i l a t e ra l disputes and attainment of a 
pol i t ica l and s t ra tegic consensus. 
Analytical Framev;ork 
Part I consists of four chapters. 
Chapter I begins v/ith the events surrounding 
par t i t i ton of British India into India and Pakistan and 
the host of problems created in i t s wake such as the 
problems of refugees, minorit ies, currency and finance, 
division of assets , the Princely States and boundary'-
disputes. 
Chapter I I deals v;ith Pakistan's aim of improv-
ing contacts with the Islamic and VJestam countries and 
how these al l iances of Pakistan affected India-Pakistan 
t i e s . Pakistan raised the Kashmir i rsue in the United 
(V) 
Nations again and again because of the massive support 
given by the major powers in the U.K. I have also made 
an explanation why India was compelled to tilt towards 
the U.S.S.R. In the later part of this chapter, I have 
explained how the 1962 conflict of India and China 
brought a qualitative change in foreign policies of 
India and Pakistan, and hov/ India realized the need to 
strengthen her defence system. 
Chapter III deals with a long list of factors 
that affected the situation in the region in different 
ways and finally led India and Pakistan to the war of 
1965. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and its achieve-
ments in normalising subcontinental relations has been 
explored. 
Chapter IV deals v/ith the events surrounding 
the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and the creation of 
Bangladesh and ends with the signing of the Simla 
Agreement in 1972. 
Part II (Chapters V-VII) deals v/ith the period 
prescribed for this study. In Chapter V, the new 
orientations of the Janata Party Government towards the 
neighbouring countries, particularly its approach to-
wards Pakistan have been examined. 
(vi) 
In Chapter VI^ I have explored major impediments 
in the way of Indo-Fak cooperation. In the next chapter, 
the establishment of an India-Pakistan Joint Commission 
and i t s constituent sub-commissions i s taken into account 
and i t s potential role in promoting b i l a te ra l cooperation 
has been appreciated. 
Part I I I (covering Chapters VIII - IX) dwells on 
the present si tuation in the sxibcontinent. In" Chapter 
VIII/ I have suggested that both India and Pakistan 
should adopt such measures as may help in conflict-
avoidance, resolution of the outstanding disputes and 
advancing mutually beneficial cooperation. 
Finally* the main findings of the study have 
been summed up in the concluding chapter. In the rapid-
ly changing international s i tua t ion , both India and 
Pakistan are struggling for national survival and well-
being individually and with other countries. I t i s 
but natural and normal tha t the two "distant" neighbours 
join together for developmental and wel l far is t objectives. 
However, mutual d is t rus t and suspicion continue to 
pe rs i s t . Whenever b i l a t e ra l cooperation gained momentum 
(vii) 
it was soon enveloped by thick 'clouds of mistrust. 
These clouds of suspicion and mistrust cannot be 
removed until the two countries arrive at a basic 
understanding on their political and strategic 
objectives and regain mutual confidence. 
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PART I 
HISTORICAL SETTING 
C H A P T E R I 
INDO-FAKISTAM RELATIONS; THE INITIAL PHASE, 19 47-54 
The s t o r y of I n d i a - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s has been a 
l o n g s e r i e s of d i s c o r d and c o n f l i c t . Both t h e c o u n t r i e s 
a r e t h e most d i f f i c u l t and most i m p o r t a n t ne ighbour fo r 
each o t h e r . Dia logue i s t h e most v i t a l t h i n g between 
t h e two co ion t r i e s . T h e i r d r i f t tov^Aards war beg ins when 
t hey cease t o t a l k . The i r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a mix ture of 
n a t i o n a l p re jud ice^ i n f l a t e d psyche , i n j u r e d ego and 
p l a i n r i v a l r y . Th is was r o o t e d i n t h e h i s t o r y of p a r t i -
t i o n and t h e manner i n which t h e sxibcont inent was d i v i d -
ed i n t o two s e p a r a t e cox in t r i e s , i n which major r o l e s 
were played by t h e i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i c y of d i v i d e and roLe. 
t h e c o n f l i c t betv/een t h e Ind ian N a t i o n a l Congress and 
t h e A l l - I n d i a Muslim League, and t h e t w o - n a t i o n theo ry 
propounded by Mohammad Al i J i n n a h , t h e growing awakening 
of t h e Muslim middle c l a s s and t h e f e a r of Muslim land::: 
l o r d s of Hindu dominance, and t h e r i s e of Hindu chauvin-
ism as symbolized by t h e Hindu Maha Sabha and Rash t r i ya 
Suwayam Sevak Sangh ( R , S , S , ) , 
The I n d i a n sxibcontinent had evolved i n t o one 
s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic \ i n i t du r ing 200 yea r s of 
B r i t i s h r u l e . The d i v i s i o n of t h i s s i n g l e vmit i n t o 
India and Pakistan and the conflict and controversies 
between the tv/o major parties (Indian National Congress 
and Muslim League) over partition^ and the past 
experiences left a deep impact on the leaders of the 
two countries. These impacts iatftji^ counted a lot in 
the formxilation of the foreign policies of the two 
coiontries and coloured their v/orld view. India and 
Pakistan have been caught up in one or the other problems, 
The problems faced by the two countries are discussed 
below. 
1, Dispute over Boundaries 
The disagreement betv/een India and Pakistan over 
the demarcation line of the partition had been one of 
the biggest problems. These border disputes emanated 
from the Boxindary Commission which were set up for both 
Punjab and Bengal under the Chairmanship of Sir Cyril 
1 
Radcliffe. The Radcliffe Award was self-countradictory 
Concious of the defects Sir Cyril Radcliffe suggested 
that the final solutions was possible only in political 
arrangements. To remove the bottlenecks, a machinery 
for the settlement of disputes and for the prevention 
of untoward incidents was evolved through the Inter-
1 S.P. Shukla, India and Pakistan; The Orioins of 
Armed Conflict, (New Delhii Deep.gind.Deep Publica-
rions^; 1984), p. 6o 
2 
Dominion Agreement of May 19 48. In December, 1948 a 
joint review of the working of May 19 48 Agreement was 
made with justice A, Eagge (Sweden) as Chairman of new 
tribunal. Discussions were held from time to time at 
Inter-Governmental Conferences, In Septanber 1953, an 
Eastern Zone Conference of Officials met to discuss the 
Bagge Award of February 1950. Among other "things :it 
discussed the question of exchange of some enclaves in 
Cooch Bihar and East Pakistan as also the demarcation 
3 
of the Eastern Boundary between India and Pakistan. 
Maps were signed and exchanged in January 1954, In 1955, 
part of Eastern border (in Patharia Plills) was demarcated 
in accordance v;ith the Bagge A\;ard. The Joint Steering 
set up in July 1953, discussed the problems of demarcat-
ing the western border in March 1955. In May 1955, the 
Home Minister of India and Pakistan agreed to give high 
priority to the -work of demarcation and hoped to complete 
the work within three months. No doubt, Pakistan later 
on proposed for some amendment in the Agreement but by 
and large the border disputes between the two countries 
was solved. 
2 S,L, Poplai, ed,. Select Doctiments on Asian Affairs; 
India 19 47-50 (London, 1959), Vol. II, pp, 200-204. 
3 Shukla, ojD,cit,, p, 6. 
2. The Refugees and Evacuee Properties 
The rehabilitation of refugees and the settle-
ment of their properties was the difficult problems 
before India and Pakistan in 19 47 when the refugees 
crossed the new international border in search of a 
new home land. They left all their urban and agri-
cultural properties and carried only such movable 
belongings which the circvimstances had permitted. 
-Relating to the problems of immovable property, 
the negotiations, on August 29, 1947 started at a 
meeting of the Joint Defence Coxincils of India and 
Pakistan. As the stalemate continued, India decided 
to utilise the available evacuee property in India for 
the benefit of displaced persons. On October 9, 1954, 
The Displaced Persons (compensation and Rehabilitation) 
4 
Bill was passed by the Parliament. Earlier, India and 
Pakistan had made streneous efforts through Inter-
Daninion Conference to come to a settlement but the issue 
was practically closed when Pakistan in February 1955, 
issued an ordinance to allot evacuee property to 
5 
compensate the refugees. 
4 J.E. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations 19 47--1955 
(Amsterdam; Djambatan, 1958), p. 204. 
5 M.A. Chaudhri, "Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan" 
Pakistan Harizan, Vol, 10 (June 1957),p. 108. 
The movable was not the mat ter of g r ea t problems 
because agreements r e l a t e d to the deposi ts i n post 
o f f i ces , safe depos i t s i n Banks^ pensions and provident 
funds, the b i l l s of con t rac to r s were reached a t the f i r s t 
Inter-DomirJ.on Conference (held from December 18 to 20, 
1947), Many conferences and t a l k s were ca l l ed between 
the two coxintries for solving the problems of movable 
p r o p e r t i e s . In June 1950, Indo-Pakistan Movable Property 
6 
Agreement v/as signed on the ba s i s of Karachi Agreement. 
With t h i s agreement, sane problems were solved with a 
measure of success , 
3^ The Problem of Minor i t i es 
The t reatment of mino r i t i e s i n both the countr ies 
particxiLarly in Pakistan c rea ted ser ious problems between 
India and Pakis tan, The en-moss migration from both the 
count r ies to each o ther in 19 47 resxilted i n an ascending 
curve of communalism which worsened the already charged 
atmosphere. For the t reatment of minor i t i e s i n both the 
7 
count r ies Nehru-Liaqat Pact was signed on April 8, 1950. 
6 Shukla, o p . c i t . , p . 227, 
7 The Indian Commission of Jurists, "Recurrent Exodus 
of Minorities from East Pakistan and Disturbances in 
India". A ReTX)rt, (New Delhi 1965), Appendix 7-nA, 
pp. 321-324. 
Both the governments tried to protect the minorities but 
they were not always able to control the aroused feelings 
of majority towards minoirities in the initial stages of 
the partition. The first war was also occured between 
the two countries after partition due to savage communal 
violence and the fighting in Kashmir. Each government 
accused the other of failing to protect the minorities 
and of instigating commxmal animosities, though they also 
issued joint appeals for peace and joint declarations 
designed to calm and protect the minorities. As the time 
passed, the people of both the countries forgot the very 
communal scene of partition and the feelings of sympathetic 
attitudes in the minds of the majority of both the cotmtries 
towards minorities were developed. Minorities were given 
facilities and protection in both the countries in spite 
of some canmtinal feelings propagated by some fundamental-
ist parties and organizations. Minorities in India enjoy 
safeguards under the Indian Constitution. The Muslim in 
India are moving towards the national mainstream and in 
Pakistan the Hindu minority is free to exercise the right 
granted to it through the Constitution, The minorities 
in Pakistan received a set back when Islamic provisions of 
8 
the f i r s t Cons t i tuent Assembly dissolved i n October 1954, 
8 The Report, 1956 Ministry of External Affa i r s , 
Government of India , p. 16, 
4. Currency and Trade Relations 
Another c r i s i s arose betv/een India and Pakistan 
when B r i t i s h Government in l a t e 19 49 devalued the potmd 
9 
by 30.5 percent . Most of the count r ies whose currencies 
were l inked t o pound s t e r l i n g followed the s u i t . India 
a lso followed i n devalueing her currency but Pakistan 
decided not to follow. This stand of Pakistan had d i rec t 
repercussions on Ind ia . India refused t o t r ade v/ith 
Pakistan a t the o f f i c i a l exchange r a t e . The wheat and 
cot ton of West Pakis tan, the raw j u t e of East Pakistan 
and the manufactured goods of India no longer moved in 
t r a d e . Business between the two coxintries stopped and 
they s t a r t e d searching for nev/ markets for t h e i r raw 
m a t e r i a l s . This t r ade war between Islamabad and New Delhi 
spoiled t h e i r chances of comming close t o each other . 
5 . Financial I ssues 
The controversy over the f inanc ia l i s s u e s , which 
dragged on for years , a lso served t o widen the gulf 
between India and Pakis tan. The problems came p a r t i -
cxilarly over the d iv i s ion of cash balance of undivided 
9 W.J. Barnds"" India , Pakistan and the Great Powers 
(New York: f»raeger Publ ishers , 1972), p.' 56. 
8 
Ind ia . The cash balance of undivided India before 
p a r t i t i o n was 4,000 mi l l ion rupees , Pakistan demanded 
1,000 mi l l ion rupees, but Ind ia did not agree. The 
mat te r , t he re fo re , was refered t o the Arb i t ra t ion Tribunal, 
which had been se t up to decide such cases of di f ferences . 
In December 1947, however, t h e tn-ro governments arr ived a t 
a f inancia l agreement under which Pak i s t an ' s share v;as 
fixed a t 750 mi l l ion rupees. E a r l i e r as an in ter im 
measure 200 mi l l ion rupees- had been av/arded to Pakistan. 
But a t a subsequent s tage , t he payment of cash balance 
t o Pakistan got l inked with the Kashmir i s s u e , which led 
t o a fur ther de t e r i o r a t i on i n r e l a t i o n s . Final ly a t 
Gandhi j i ' s i n t e rven t ion , the d i spu te was s e t t l e d and India 
agree to pay Pakistan her cash balance a f t e r deducting 50 
mi l l i on rupees as advance adjustment of c e r t a in claims 
11 
aga ins t Pakis tan. 
6, Mi l i t a ry Stores 
During the p a r t i t i o n , t h e r e was a b i t t e r controversy 
between India and Pakistan regarding the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
m i l i t a r y s to r e s and egtu-pments of the B r i t i s h India . To 
10 G.W. Choudhury, Pak i s tan ' s Relat ions with India 19 47-
66 (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1977), p . 26. 
11 I b i d . , p , 28. 
resolve th i s dispute a jo in t defence council under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Moxontbatten was set up to supervise 
the division of armed forces and mil i tary stores and 
equipnents. Military stores were divided 3:2 with India 
12 
gaining Rs, 5 crores in l i eu of the ordinance factories. 
No doubt, this division of mil i tary storps did not 
sa t i s fy both the countries fully but had got much success 
in normalizing the relat ions between them. Today, there 
i s no such dispute. Both have the i r own autonomous 
in s t i t u t ions to build up the i r array and bureaucracy. If 
there could be sound xmderstanding beto/een them regarding 
the i r security, they coxold l imi t the unnecessary mili tary 
budget and usefully employ i t in some other constructive 
ac t iv i ty . Both the coxintries should i n i t i a t e a jo in t 
administrative ins t i tu t ions to have a sound understanding 
of the similar problems, 
7, Princely States 
OSie princely states arose as a hurdle between India 
and Paid.Stan. They created the problems between the two 
countries in different ways at different times, Indian 
leaders thought that the existence of the princely s ta tes 
12 Shukla, g p . c i t , , p, 3, 
10 
would be dangerous for Indian un i ty , d i s rup t ive of the 
economy and an e f f o r t s t o a l l n a t i o n a l i s t s . So, they 
thought not to recognize those pr incely s t a t e s as an 
independent s t a t e . On the o ther hand, Jinnah was aware 
t h a t he could not hope to en t i ce the Hindu Princes to 
j o in Pakistan, but i f they choose independence i t would 
13 
weaken India and i n d i r e c t l y s t rengthen Pakis tan . 
India and Pakistan were able to i n t e g r a t e most 
of the pr incely s t a t e s with a minimxjm of d i s rup t ion buf 
problems occured i n only three of the pr ince ly s t a t e s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y and they prove as a bane for India-Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n ? . 
(a) Junagarh; The f i r s t and l e a s t important problem of 
the three d isputes concerned Junagarh which was having 
l i nk with Pakistan by sea . This pr ince ly s t a t e was 
having 80 percent Hindu popxilation a t the time of p a r t i -
t i on but i t s r u l e r was a Muslim who on September 15,1947 
signed an instrtoment of accession t o Pakis tan. Resistance 
to the local government developed quickly and a r iva l 
government was s e t up. Early i n November 19 47, Indian 
t roops marched in", taking the s t a t e over i n the name of 
13 Bamds, o p . c i t . , p . 36. 
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the people . Pakistan took the i s sue t o the United Nations 
but received no s a t i s f a c t i o n . Ind ia held a p l e b i s c i t e in 
February 1948 and the people voted i n favour of accession 
14 
to India , For a l l p r ac t i c a l purpose t h a t ended the i ssue 
but c rea ted a r i f t between India and Pakis tan. 
» (b) Hyderabad; This was the second l a r g e s t pr incely 
s t a t e . After the Br i t i sh departure'/ tens ions and canmunal 
violence were continue t i l l e a r l y 1948, India asked Nizam 
of Hyderabad to curb violence and l i b e r a l i s e h i s government 
but Nizam i n f u r i a t e d India by lending money to Pakistan 
r a the r than curbing the v io lence . India invaded and 
quickly won cont ro l over the p r ince ly s t a t e and Nizam was 
made as ncxninal r u l e r xinder a new government responsive to 
New Delhi . This ac t of India was c r i t i c i s e d by western 
count r ies and Pakistan, Pakistan enjoyed seeing the India 's 
embarrassment before the world, 
(c) Jammu & Kashmir; Despite long and p ro t rac ted verbal 
a t t acks between India and Pakis tan, Junagarh and Hyderabad 
disputes were resolved. But the Kashmir d ispute has been 
the focus of the t h r e a t for both the count r ies and due to 
t h i s Kashmir d i spu te , many time border Skirmishes and xin-
declared war had taken p lace . The Kashmir i s sue i s s t i l l 
14 Ibid. ' , p . 37. 
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a problem between India and Pakistan s ince p a r t i t i o n . 
The Jammu and Kashmir was dominated by Muslim 
majori ty but i t was ru led by a Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh 
After the depar ture of the B r i t i s h , Maharaja had the 
r i g h t to decide whether h i s s t a t e should be acceded to 
India or Pakis tan . 
Pakistan put up pressures on Kashmiri by in te r rup t -
ing the flow of e s s e p t i a l commodities t o Kashmir, The 
Kashmir government p ro tes ted on several occasions but to 
no a v a i l . The economic blockage, however, f a i l ed to 
ensure Kashmir* s accession to Pakis tan, Against t h i s 
backdrop on October 22, 1947, several hundred f ron t i e r 
tribesmen a t tacked the western borders of Kashmir and 
proceeded along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar 
( the cap i t a l of Kashmir), . Maharaja f led t o Jammu and 
c a l l e d for m i l i t a r y help from India but Indian Government 
sa id t h a t forces would be sent only i f Maharaja acceded 
t o India , Left v/ith no choice', he did so on October 27, 
15 
1947. India immediately sent troops which landed a t the 
a i r p o r t i n Sr inagar to prevent the tribesmen from taking 
the c i t y . Gradually, the Indian troops pushed the t r i b e s -
men out of the v a l l e y and began advancing on o ther areas . 
15 V,P, Menon, The Story of the In teg ra t ion of the 
Ifadian S ta t e s (Madras: Orient Longmans, 1961).p. 383, 
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This was the s tage for the f i r s t war between India and 
Pakis tan . 
The Maharaja's accession to India was c r i t i c i s e d 
by Pakistani l e a d e r s , Jinnah sa id t h a t the accession of 
Maharaja through the suggessions of Moxontbatten and the 
subsequent d ispatch of Indian t roops to Kashmir v/as as a 
16 
p a r t of well-planned conspiracy, Liaquat Ali a l so 
emphatically s t a t e d t h a t the Maharaja 's accession to 
Ind ia was a f radulent i n as much as i t was achieved by 
d e l i b e r a t e l y c rea t ing ce r t a in cond i t ions , with the object 
of finding an excuse to stage the accession, 
Pakistan fur ther pointed out t h a t Maharaja had no 
au thor i ty l e f t to execute the instrument of accession 
because h i s subjects had overthrown h i s government bv a 
17 
successful r e v o l t and forced him to f lee from the cap i ta l . 
India u l t ima te ly on 1st January 1948 decided t o 
r e f e r the mat ter to the United Nations and f i l e d a formal 
complaint aga ins t Pakistan i n the Secur i ty Council. The 
Secur i ty Council asked both India and Pakistan not t o 
16 Bamds, Op.c i t .^ p , 41, 
17 S,li,Burke, Pak i s t an ' s Foreign Pol icy: An His tor ical 
Analysis (London: Oxford Univers i ty Press , 197 3), 
P. 27. 
14 
a g g r a v a t e the s i t u a t i o n b u t t o do e v e r y t h i n g i n t h e i r 
power t o improve i t , and e s t a b l i s h e d a med ia to ry commission 
18 
known as United Nat ions Commission on I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , 
On September 29> I9 48v Sheikh Abdullah was r e l e a s e d 
and l a t e r on i n s t a l l e d as t h e Prime M i n i s t e r of Jammu and 
Kashmir. But P a k i s t a n were a g a i n s t Sheikh A b d u l l a h ' s 
i n s t a l a t i o n and J i n n a h demanded an i m p a r t i a l a d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n i n t h e V a l l e y . N e h r u ' s r e p l y was t h a t S h e i k h ' s 
19 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was pure and i m p a r t i a l « 
In 1952, an agreement was concluded between the 
I n d i a n government and Sheikh Abdxillah a t New D e l h i , r e g a r d -
i n g c e n t r e - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s and Abdullah fxiLly a s su red t h e 
I n d i a n Government r e g a r d i n g Kashmir ' s a c c e s s i o n t o the 
I n d i a n Union, But g r a d u a l l y a s h i f t appeared i n h i s 
p o l i c y and i n h i s s e v e r a l s t a t e m e n t s , he l i m i t e d t h a t 
Kashmir might y e t remain s e p a r a t e from bo th I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n , The c u l m i n a t i o n of t h i s p o l i c y was t h a t i n h i s 
own p a r t y , t he Na t iona l Confeirence, deep t e n s i o n a r i s e d 
and h i s c a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e s , G i r d h a r i l a l Dogra, Bakshi 
20 
Gxilara Mohammad and Shamlal Sa ra f were a g a i n s t h i s l e a d e r s h i p . 
18 Ibid., p. 29. 
19 Ibid., p. 30.' 
20 Government of Pakistan^Ministry of Foreign Affairs^ 
White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir, 1977 (Islamabad: 
Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1977), p. 1. 
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Later on. Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and Bakshi Gulam 
Mohainmad was installed as the Prime Minister of Jammu and 
Kashmir on August 9, 1953. Finally Kashmir was regarded 
as an integral part of India. All these things were 
criticised by Pakistani. In the introduction of the White 
Paper published by the Government of Pakistan in January 
1977, it was mentioned that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir 
is the outstanding international dispu-ce in South Asia, As 
long as it is not justly settled; instability and discard 
will haunt the region. The two state Pakistan and India 
w'ill be iinabla to establish their mutual relations as good 
neighbours. 
Prom the above discussion", it becames clear that 
the first Kashmir v/ar was fought not for mere possession 
of territory not for strategic value alone. There was a 
strong idealogical component to the motives of the two 
states. For Pakistans the possession of Kashmir was crucial 
to her ideology, namely that religious ideology could serve 
as the cornerstone of a state. To India, Kashmir, quite 
apart from its strategic significance, represented two 
fundamentally important issues. ELrst its integration 
with India shov^ red that even a Muslim majority province 
could thrive within a predominantly Hindu state, thus 
16 
validating the concept of the secxolar, democratic s ta te . 
Additionally i t s integration had always considerable 
psychological import for key members of Indian e l i t e , 
many of whom feared set t ing a precedent t ha t might lead 
to the eventual "Ballcanization" of India. 
The origin of the Kashmir war can be traced to 
four major sources: 
i ) the existence of two competing ideological forces 
on the sub-continent, 
i i ) irredentism on the part of the Pakistani leader-
ship, 
i i i ) the s trategic location of Kashmir and finally, 
iv) the lack of sufficient ins t i tu t iona l arrange-
ments by the Bri t ish to ensure an orderly 
transfer of power. 
8, Indus Waters Dispute 
I t was another source of frict ion between India 
and Pakistan. The origins of the dispute goes as far 
back as the par t i t ion . The differences arose in respect 
of the use of water. India and Pakistan recognised two 
things? 
i ) F i rs t , the need for an agreement to regtilate the 
supply of water and. 
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i i ) Secondly, the absence of an ex i s t ing lega l r igh t 
e n t i t l i n g Pakistan t o any supply without an 
agreement. 
On December 18, 19 47, Stand S t i l l Agreement was 
signed. But l a t e r on supply of waters was d i s -
continued by India when Stand S t i l l Agreement was 
terminated. On April 24, 19 48, the Prime Minis ter of 
Pakistan proposed an Inter^Dominion Conference for the 
set t lement of the problem. Thereafter , the water 
supply was resumed. Regarding water d i spu te , a se r i e s 
of meetings were held between the twp c o u n t r i e s . But no 
permanent so lu t ion came out . In December 1950, Pakistan 
terminated the Agreement u n i l a t e r a l l y but India refused 
t o accept the no t i ce of terminat ion, and informed the 
U.N, S e c r e t a r i a t of the same. Pakistan a l so threatened 
21 
to take the water dispjute t o the Securi ty Council . These 
i r r i t a n t views, showed by both the countr ies agains t 
each other , fu r the r brought the r e l a t i ons a t s t a n d s t i l l . 
The V/orld Bank President , Black, was asked to 
offer the mediation for solving the d i spu te . A se r i e s 
of jConferences took place betv/een the two count r i es xander 
21 K.F. Kurunakaran, India i n World Affai rs 1950-1953 
(London, 1958), P. 185. 
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the supervision of World Bank headed by Black. Some 
proposals v/ere acceptable t o one coxintry sometime and 
someone to another sometime. Later i n Jxine 1955, an 
22 
agreement was signed which provided for adhoc t r a n s i -
t i ona l arrangements. The Agreement affirmed the des i re 
of both India and Pakistan t o cont inue negot ia t ions i n 
an atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill . This agree-
ment created the soxind s p i r i t and peaceful solut ion to 
both the coun t r i e s , 
9 , Ideological Differences 
Apart from the problems r e s u l t i n g d i r e c t l y from 
p a r t i t i o n , t he re were problems r e l a t i n g to idea log ies , 
pov/er games and na t iona l i n t e r e s t . The problem of 
idealogy can be t raced back to the p re -pa r i t i on days. 
The problem between the two coxintrles arose on tr.-ro counts 
namely Islam and Secularism, J i n n a h ' s Pres ident ia l 
address a t the Lohore Session of All India Muslim League 
of March 19 40 c rea ted a r i f t i n the minds of a l l the 
secu la r person. In t h a t address', J innah said t ha t the 
Piindxiism and Islam are not r e l i g i o n i n the s t r i c t sense 
of the word, but', are i n fac t d i f f e r e n t and d i s t i n c t 
orders and i t i s a dream t h a t the Hindus and the Muslim 
22 Shukla, O p . c i t . , p . 6. 
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can ever evolve a common nationality. The people of 
India and Pakistan witness the same type of feelings 
even after partition. Some chauvinistic parties and 
people of India also created the same feelings in the 
minds of Pakistani. Liaquat Ali Khan declared in the 
Constituent Assembly that "Pakistan was founded be-
cause the Muslim of this sub-continent wanted to build-
up their lives in accordance with the teaching and 
traditions of Islam, as they wanted to demonstrate 
to the v/orld that Islam- provides a panacea for the many 
24 
deseases v/hich have crept into the life of humanity. 
No doubt the above statements created a gap in 
bringing the two countries. But xirhat the influences 
of these statements were in the minds of the people in 
the beginning after the partition they are not of the 
same spirit. As the time passes the influences of the 
statements were also cooled down, and many meetings 
were called between the two countries for normalization. 
In many fields, both the countries have also got much 
success. 
23 K. Sarivrar Hasan, and Zubeida Hasan^eds., The 
Transfer of Power; Documents on the Foreign 
Relations of Pakistan (Karachi: The Pakistan 
Institute of International Affairs, 1966),pp. 19-20. 
24 Shukla, Op.cit., p. 10, 
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Conclusion 
In the beginning both India and Pakistan phased 
the problems of boiondaries disputes, the problems of 
rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their 
properties, the treatment of minorities in both the 
countries, currency problems, the distribution of 
military stores and equipments of British India, and 
problems of Indus water disputes etc. But these proHems 
wers for time being. Later on, by and large, these 
problems wera solved through talks, meetings and agree-
ments by both the ^countries. 
But the princely states Hyderabad and Kashmir 
created a big problem- betaveen the two coxintries. Both 
the states posed serious problems for the question of 
accession. The two states Hyderabad and Kashmir amount-
ed to polar opposites of each other. Hyderabad had a 
Muslim ruler but a predominantly Hindu population. The 
conditions were reversed in Kashmir. The rulers were 
from minorities in both the states and both rulers 
hoped to become independent states after the departure 
of the British, These two factors led to difficulties 
in In do-Pakistani relations because each side had a 
commitment to the states involved in the two states. 
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Pakistan, because of i t s Is lamic charac te r , f e l t 
compelled to shovr i t s s o l i d a r i t y with both the Nizam 
and the Muslims of Kashmir. S imi la r ly India f e l t 
equal ly moved to iden t i fy v/ith the Hindu of Hyderabad 
and the Maharaja of Kashmir. I t f e l t t o d i s c r e d i t the 
Nizam's claims to independence, because i f h i s claims 
were given any credence, i t could lead to the d i s i n t e -
g ra t ion of the Indian Union, as the monarchs of the 
var ious pr ince ly s t a t e s could a l l s t a r t a s se r t ing t h e i r 
demands for autonomy or independence. By tha same 
token, Pakis tani f e l t const ra ined to d i s c r e d i t Hari 
Singh 's claims to independence for fear of appearing 
t o foresake t h e i r Muslims i n a t e r r i t o r y for xvhich they 
f e l t respons ib le . 
From the geographical and Muslim dominated point 
of view, Pakistan wanted t h a t Kashmir should . -, accede 
to Pakistan but t h i s eUft^  not happen^-', because India sent 
he r troops to Kashmir on the i n v i t a t i o n of Maharaja and 
Kashmir .i^s^ acceded to India , This s tep of India was 
vehementally c r i t i c i s e d by Pakis tan , On the other hand 
the Pak i s tan ' s claim over Kashmir was c r i t i c i s e d by 
India . 
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Furthermore the carnage that accompanied 
Partition embittered the protagonists on both sides 
to such a high degree that the possibilities of mis-
understanding increased dramatically. Each side 
had reason to mistrust the other and any generosity 
of spirit perished amidst the chaos and violence of 
Partition. 
C H A P T E R I I 
INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 1954-64 
During t h i s period^ I n d i a - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s 
were d i s r u p t e d by t h e e x t e r n a l povrers i n one o r the 
o t h e r way. P a r t i c x j l a r l y the P a k i s t a n ' s a l l i a n c e with 
U.S.A. and w i t h some r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , and t h e 
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s w i th Communists coxint r ies l a i d the 
seeds of b i t t e r n e s s beti/een t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
1 . P a k i s t a n ' s Defence Agreement w i t h t h e U.S.A. 
P a k i s t a n was and^is s t i l l i n f e r i o r t o I n d i a i n 
each and every f i e l d s . So i n o r d e r t o come on equal 
l e v e l , P a k i s t a n began t o seek s u p p o r t from Western 
1 
c o u n t r i e s . P a k i s t a n , from t h e v e r y beg inn ing , v/antad 
t o come i n c o n t a c t of I s l amic c o u n t r i e s and Western 
c o u n t r i e s fo r eve ry kind of h e l p . In t h e e a r l y f i f t i e s ^ 
P a k i s t a n coxild on ly look t o t h e Uni ted S t a t e s fo r t h i s 
k ind of h e l p . U.S .A. , i n t u m ^ w a s seek ing a l l i e s i n 
As ia t o c o u n t e r t h e growing i n f l u e n c e of Ccxamunist 
c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y of China and R u s s i a . The i d e a 
of a U.S. - P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p f i r s t came 
under s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n Washington i n 1951. In 
1 Stephen P. Cohen, The P a k i s t a n Army (New Delh i : 
Himalayan Books, 1984), P . 137. 
24 
the end of the year 1951, a limited arms assistance to 
Pakistan was approved by United States and agreement 
in principle was apparently reached by mid - 1952, 
Pakistan initially desired to secure military 
assistance from Washington and thought to consider an 
2 
exchange of air bases for military equipment. This 
military programme was vehementally criticised by 
Indians, Soviets, and Chinese, Nehru warned that U.S. 
Pakistani alliance would bring the cold war to India's 
borders, v;ith far-reaching consequences in South Asia. 
Determined to protect his domestic position^ Nehru 
directed the Indian Congress Party to moxint public 
protest against the programme, India also warned 
Pakistan that this arms aid might cause India to move 
closer to U.S.S.R, 
In sp i t e of the p r o t e s t and demonstrations U,s,A, 
went ahead with i t s plan t o a id Pakistan and f i n a l l y an 
3 
arms agreement was approved on February 8, 1954 by 
America for Pakis tan, This plan of United S t a t e s t o aid 
Pakistan defen i t ly created a gap between India and 
Pakistan on the one hand, and between U,S. and India on 
2 William J^  Bamds, India , Pakistan and the Great 
Powers (New York: Praeger Publ ishers , 1972)^p.95. 
3 I b i d . , p . 96, 
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the o the r hand. President Eisenhower gave an assurance 
t o Nehru t h a t the nxilitary for Pakistan was not d i r ec t -
ed agains t India and said t h a t U.S. woxild come to India^i 
a id i f Pakistan were ever t o use t h e arms for aggression 
aga ins t India^ and offering t o give sympathetic considera-
t i o n t o any Indian request for arms. Nehru regarded such 
assurances as meaningless and s a id t h a t I n d i a ' s opposi-
t i o n to m i l i t a r y aid was based on calcxilation ra ther than 
4 
on p r i n c i p l e . 
The acceptance of m i l i t a r y a id of U.S. by 
Pakistan c rea ted two problems e s p e c i a l l y . One was thac 
Pakistan became the stooge i n the hand of America and 
moved according to d i rec t ion of U.S. Pakistan had no her 
own po l i c i e s bu t was cont ro l led by the o ther powers. 
Secondly, Pak i s t an ' s a l l i ance with west de te r io ra ted the 
r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakis tan , and India was 
compelled to have some a l l i ance with some one for her 
defence p ro t ec t ion . 
2, Pakistan ' s Membersliip of SSATO and Baghdad Pact 
For fu r the r help in m i l i t a r y and economic f i e lds , 
Pakistan joined South East Asian Treaty Organization 
4 Ib id . t p.' 97 . 
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5 6 
(SEATO) in September 1954 and Baghdad Pact ( l a t e r 
named CENTO) i n September 1955. Pakistan jo ined SSATO 
with the two aims. One i s t h a t Pakistan thought t h a t 
i f she did anything aga ins t the urging of America then 
her claim on -U.S. m i l i t a r y and economic ass i s t ance 
v/oiiLd be vreakened. Second i s t h a t Pakistan got chance 
t o r a i s e her b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s p a r t i c u l a r l y Kashmir 
i s sue i n the above Organizat ion. 
Pakistan ra i sed Kashmir i s sue i n var ious meetings 
of SEATO and Baghdad Pact . In the t h i r d meeting of 
S2AT0 t h a t v/as held i n March 1956 a t Karachi, Pakistan 
highl ighted the grov/ing d i s a t i s f a c t i o n i n Kashmir. I t 
was s t a t ed t h a t the condi t ion of law and order was 
worsening in Kashmir. In add i t ion , the Government of 
Pakistan published exaggerated repor t s of the v io l a t i ons 
7 
of borders by the Indian army personnel. In a l l th-is, 
Pak i s t an ' s main object ive was to put Kashmir on the 
agenda of impending SEATO Conference. 
5 Sat ish Kumar, ed. , Yearbook on I n d i a ' s Foreign 
Policy 1987/1988 (New Delhi : Sage Publ ica t ions , 
1988), F. 84„ 
6 Ib id . 
7 S«P. Shukla, India and Pakis tan; The Origins of 
Armed Confl ict (New Delhi ; Deep & Deep Publ ica t ions , 
1984) p . 26. 
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For Pakistan's point of view the meeting of 
SEATO was an occasion of jubilation because Pakistani 
got chances to internationalise the Kashmir issue. In 
the Pakistan National Assembly, the Foreign Minister 
Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhary said in March 1956, that 
Kashmiris should be given the right to decide their 
future has been accepted by the Member v/ho formed the 
Council, He also added that the aggression against 
any member v/ill be considered the aggression against 
all and all the member will come to rescue for the 
8 
suffering member. 
The SEATO pronouncement over Kashmir v/as 
vehementally protested by Indian Government, Nehru 
said that the reference to Kashmir issue in the SEATO 
communique "Confirmed our v/orst apprehensions about 
the organisations which it represents" and added that 
"this could only mean that a militar%'- alliance is 
backing one country namely, Pakistan in its dispute 
9 
with India,' 
8 Debates (National Assembly of Pakistan) March 26, 
1956, Vol. 1, pp. 65-83. 
9 Debates (Lok Sabha, India), March 20, 1956, Vol, 
III, Col, 3042, 
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Like SEATO Conference, Baghdad Pact Council a t 
Tehran i n April 1956 a lso mentioned Kashmir as a 
d i spu te , in p a r t i c u l a r the Baghdad Pact Council 
emphasized the need for an e a r l y set t lement of the 
10 
Pa les t ine and Kashmir d i s p u t e s , on the one hand, 
Pakistan t r i e d to br ing the Kashmir i s sue in Baghdad 
Pact J o i n t Communique, and on the other hand, t h i s 
commtinique was severely a t tacked i n India , In June 
1956, the Al l - Ind ia Congress Committee resolved t h a t 
"The Committee regre t s the reference to Kashmir in the 
recent meetings in Karachi and Tehran of the SEATO and 
11 
Baghdad Pact Organisat ion. 
India t r i e d to solve the Kashmir i s sue 
b i l a t e r a l l y and put up t h i s proposal before Pakistan, 
but Pakistan did not agree . Due to t h i s , I n d i a ' s 
a t t i t u d e had undergone a g r e a t change since 1955. 
India was no more apologet ic as i n the pa s t . There 
was a nev; s t r e s s i n India on a c l e a r recogni t ion of 
her ov/n nat ional i n t e r e s t s . The endeavours of India 
for d i r e c t negot ia t ions wi th Pakistan over Kashmir 
10 The Dawn, April 21, 1956. 
11 The Congress Bxilletin Nos. 5-G June, 1956, All 
India Congress Committee, p . 184, 
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proved completely f u t i l e , So, India made her a l l iance 
with Soviet Union, Prime Min is te r Khurushchev of Soviet 
12 
Union paid a v i s i t to India i n December 1955, and said 
t h a t "the question of Kashmir as one of the s t a t e s of 
the Republic of India, has a l ready been decided by the 
people of Kashmir While i n the l?epublic 
of India/ we find an a l l y i n the s t rugg le for peace 
and peaceful solut ion of the unse t t l ed problems, un-
for tuna te ly we c a n ' t say the same about Pakistan. This 
statement of Sovie-c leader c rea ted a ,gap betv/een the 
India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s . 
Fur ther the B i l a t e r a l Executive Agreement in 
1959 between U.S. and Pakistan Os^npliCai^^ the problems 
beti\reen India and Pakistan because t h i s agreement v;as 
Jl&heJl 
a fiiBir^"military a l l i ance with United S t a t e s , Under 
t h i s agreement, U.S. committed i t s e l f to the preserva-
t ion of independence and i n t e g r i t y of Pakistan and 
agreed to take "appropriate ac t ion inc luding the US^ 
of armed forces , i n support of t h a t goa l . 
12 S i s i r Gupta, Kashmir; A Study i n India-Pakistan 
Relat ions (New Delhi; Asia Publishing House, 1966) 
Po 300. 
13 Sa t i sh Kumar, Op .c i t . , p . 86, 
30 
Prom the above d iscuss ion i t becomes c l e a r t h a t 
P a k i s t a n ' s primary i n t e r e s t of joining Baghdad Pact and 
SEATO was not because i t perceived any major Communist 
t h r e a t but because i t wanted t o generate American support 
for i t s claims agains t Ind ia . This s t r a t egy i s evident 
from the prominent member of the Pakistan Foreign Policy 
es tabl ishment . As S.M, Burke has sa id , "the arms aid 
given t o Pakistan by America reduced the ex i s t i ng grea t 
d i s p a r i t y i n the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s of India and 
Pakistan, and enabled Pakis tan to breathe ea s i e r than 
they ever had done before . 
To Pakistan the m i l i t a r y aid from America was an 
instrument t o achieve the follovang ends. 
a) To l e s sen the pov/er inecjuali ty between her and India. 
b) To reduce the burden of heavy defence expenditure 
necess i t a t ed by a s t rong and h o s t i l e India , 
c) To receive diplomatic support i n the so lu t ion of 
her d ispute with India , and 
d) To ge t increased quaiitfties of economic aid for 
development purposes. 
14 S.M, Burke, Mainsprings of Indiatiand Pakistani' 
Foreign Pol ic ies (Minneapolis: Universit:y of 
Minneasota Press , 1974), p . 143, 
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Pakis tan ' s en t ry i n t o the above pacts d e f i n i t e l y 
affected the p o l i c i e s of the sxib-continent. F i r s t i t 
introduced the cold war i n t o the region as Pakistani 
a l l i e d i t s e l f t o the U.S. i n an attempt t o lind.t 
expansion of commiinism. S ign i f i can t ly , Ind ia , desired 
to come i n t o contac t of Sovie t Union. 
Second impact of Pakistan-U.S. l i n k was tha t i t 
provided Pakistan with an important source of both 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y leverage aga ins t Ind ia . Nehru's 
concern was c l e a r l y r e f l ec ted in a number of statements 
t h a t he made sooTi a f t e r the formation of the tv/o pacts . 
In a speech before Lok Sabha in 1956, Nehru s t a t ed that 
"the Pakis tani newspaper and the statement of responsi-
b le people i n Pakistan make i t pe r fec t ly c l e a r tha t thev 
have joined the pact e s s e n t i a l l y because of India . 
3 The United Nations and the Kashmir Dispute 
India and Pakistan could not reach TO any solution 
for Kashmir i s s u e . In the period 1953-19 56/ many 
proposals were discussed d i r e c t l y between the tv/o 
coxantries- but every d i r e c t negot ia t ions proved f ru i t l e s s . 
15 J . Nehru, I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy (New Delhi; publica-
t ion Division^Govt, of India , 1961), P. 94. 
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Thus, the Kashmir issue went back to the Security 
Council again. At this juncture Pakistan took much 
interest to solve the Kashmir issue through U.K. 
because most of the permanent members of Security 
Council were in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan was 
gaining support from West on Suez Canal issue be-
cause Pakistan v/as totally in favour of West "^ this 
issue while India's main emphasis WQS on the sovereign 
rights of Egypt. In January 1957, the Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan, Feroz Khan Noon thought that 
it was an opportunate moment to approach the Security 
Council to meet and take early action to implement 
the U.N. resolutions for holding a plebiscite in 
Kashmir. Feroz Khan Noon put up the following 
proposals before the U.N. 
a) India should be persuaded not to accept the 
accession of Kashmir state, 
b) The Security Council ought to direct India to 
accept all the terms and obligations of the 
international agreement for a plebiscite as 
embodied in the U.N, resolutions. 
c) The U.N. force should immediately be stationed 
in Kashmir for pro'tection and internal Security 
16 
of the state. 
16 Gupta, op.cit., p. 313. 
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Noon sa id t h a t these proposals coiild solve the 
problems between the two countr ies and could bring 
peace i n sxib-continent. But these proposals were 
vehementally c r i t i c i s e d i n India and were r e j ec ted . 
On January 23, 1957, the Indian r ep resen ta t ive V.K, 
Krishna Menon, with f u l l of quotat ions from docxaments 
and press r e p o r t s , j u s t i f i e d Kashmir's accession to 
17 
India as pe r fec t ly l e g a l and v a l i d . F ina l ly Menon 
accused Noon of d i s t o r t i n g fac ts and completed h i s 
marathon speech by asking the Securi tv Council to 
d e s i s t from unse t l ing the s e t t l e d condi t ions in 
Kashmir and hoped t h a t the peace in the region would 
not be dis turbed under the v/eight of some of the super 
pov/arc of the world, A s ign i f i c an t point to note here 
18 
i s t ha t for the f i r s t time India accused the Security 
Council of v i o l a t i n g the very f i r s t a r t i c l e of the U,N, 
cha r t e r and for the deadlock on Kashmir i s s u e a t the 
provocation of Anglo-U.S, a l l i a n c e . The Five-Pov;er 
resolu t ion was moved even before the Indian statement 
was completed. This was completely re jec ted by India . 
Menon challenged the l e g a l i t y of the r e so lu t ion and 
17 Ibid , 
18 The Times of India, January 26, 1957. 
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charged t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n sowed t h e seeds of d i s c a r d 
once more, 
I n d i a was ga in ing some p o p u l a r i t y and suppor t 
from s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . S o v i e t Union used he r v e t o 
power s ay ing t h a t the r e s u l t i n g p roposa l woiold n o t 
19 
c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e s e t t l e m e n t of p rob lems . The Chinese 
r e a c t i o n a l s o appeared f avou rab l e t o I n d i a . The Prime 
M i n i s t e r of China ChotL Bn Lai adv i sed both Ind ia and 
P a k i s t a n t o s e t t l e t he d i s p u t e th rough d i r e c t n e g o t i a -
20 
t i o n s . L a t e r on many r e s o l u t i o n s were passed by U.N. 
b u t no one can so lve t h e Kashmir d i s p u t e . The J a r r i n g 
Report of 1957 and t h e Graham Report of 1958 r ega rd ing 
Kashmir d i s p u t e a l s o piodiM^^no r e s u l t . As t h e border 
c o n f l i c t between Ind ia and China widened, China came 
o u t w i t h f u l l t h r o a t e d s u p p o r t t o P a k i s t a n on Kashmir. 
On t h e o t h e r hand U.S.A. came c l o s e I n d i a as China 
v a c a t e d h e r s e a t . Nehru p r o f u s e l y l auded t h e Eisenhc^er 
21 y 
v i s i t of I n d i a . ^ow, U.S.A. s t a t e d t o suppor t I nd i a 
and China t o / P a k i s t a n i n each and ever^' f i e l d . In 1960# 
China r e fused t o d i s cus s t h e boundary v/ast of Karakoram 
Pass between ChlV'^^^ S ink iang and Kasl^mir, I t was on ly 
19 Gupta, O p . c i t . , p . 3 20. 
20 Shukla , O p . c i t , , p . 58 . 
21 J . L , Neliru, I n d i a ' s Fore ign P o l i c y (Nex/ Delhi 
P u b l i c a t i o n Div i s ion , Government of I n d i a , 1961), 
p . 6 0 1 . 
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after t h i s , India real ised that China had "declined to 
recognise the accession of Kashmir to India." 
Ihe U.N, efforts as well as super-pov/ers' effort 
regarding Kashmir dispute ended with no resuilt. All the 
efforts that U.N. had succeeded in doing about Kashmir 
was to keep the ball rol l ing vdthout any clear end in 
view. This fa i lure revealed that there v/as fundamental 
weakness of the existing international order. The 
super-pov;ers exploited India and Pakistan as tools to 
ser\''e the i r global i n t e r e s t s . They maintained relation-
ship of understanding friendship to advance the i r 
legitimate and i l leg i t imate i n t e r e s t s . The time honoured 
standards of jus t ice and righteousness of cause v/ere 
tagged v;ith the super-powers• naked se l f - in te res t which 
they persued. In th i s background, the Kashmir dispute 
had the dubious dis t inct ion of being a point of conflict 
between the t'.-jo super-powars in the sense that they 
supported one or the other party in the dispute. In 
consequence, a workable solution could not be sought. 
I t further risked procrastination to create conditions 
of permanent c r i s i s on Kashmir. 
In retrospect i t wil l be pert inent to argue that 
both India and Pakistan regarded Kaslimir as indispens-
able to them. The pol i t ica l s t ra tegic and idealogical 
c o n t r o v e r s i e s were advanced t o s e c u r e b e t t e r apprec ia -
t i o n of t h e i r s t and p o i n t s . In t h e i r a t t emp t t o r e -
o r i e n t t h e t h i n k i n g and a t t i t u d e s of t h e people i n 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s , l e a d e r s of bo th t h e c o u n t r i e s 
i s s u e d a g g r e s s i v e s t a t emen t s v/hich were , many a t i n e , 
d ivorced from t h e r e a l i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . 
4 , The Farakka Barrage I s s u e 
The c l a s h of i n t e r e s t s bet^^reen t h e two count:r ies 
a ro se when I n d i a plaped t o c o n s t r u c t a dam ac ros s the 
r i v e r Ganges a t Farakka a fev; m i l i e s ups t ream from Sas t 
P a k i s t a n (now, Bangaladesh) because due t o construc-cion 
of t h i s dam, I n d i a wanted t o d i v e r t t h e w a t e r of Ganges 
through a f e e d e r cana l i n t o t h e B h a g i r a t h t o f lu sh the 
22 
Hoogly. I n d i a a l s o c la imed t h a t due t o t h i s p l an , t h e 
p o r t of C a l c u t t a can be saved from b e i n g s i l t e d up. As 
soon as I n d i a s t a r t e d t a k i n g keen i n t e r e s t i n t h e p lan 
and began t h e v/ork t o c o n s t r u c t t h e b a r r a g e , Pakis tan 
p r o t e s t e d and asked Ind ia t o c o n s u l t h e r be fo re going 
ahead v/ i th t h e p r o j e c t . In 1957, P a k i s t a n sugges ted 
t h a t t h e s e r v i c e s of U.N. should be u t i l i s e d t o r e so lve 
23 
t h e d i f f e r e n c e s . Pak i s t an had complained t h a t the 
22 Shukla , O p . c i t . , p . 242. 
23 The Repor t 1957, (Min i s t ry of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , 
Government- of I n d i a ) , p p . 15 -16 . 
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24 
Barrage wovild reduce t h e supply of wa t e r s t o P a k i s t a n . 
P a k i s t a n con t inued t o c a u s e w o r r i e s t o t h e Government 
of I n d i a . However, I n d i a was n o t keen t o a s s o c i a t e 
P a k i s t a n v/ith t h e P r o j e c t i n any way. As a r e s u l t t h e 
m a t t e r v/as dropped f o r t h e t ime b e i n g . In Ju ly 1960. 
t h e s u b j e c t was reopened and t a l k s were h e l d beta^reen 
25 
t h e eng inee r ing e x p e r t s of I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . In 
October 1960, t he two c o u n t r i e s again d i s c u s s e d t h e 
problems. Some of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s were i r o n e d out bu t 
m a t t e r v;as s t i l l a stxjmbling block JY\ the mutual 
c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
The c o u n t r i e s t o t a l l y shov/ed d i f f e r e n t aims f o r 
p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r own i n t e r e s t and t r i e d t o f ind ou t as 
t o what was most advantageous t o t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s . 
The h i g g l e - h a g g l i n g was b a s i c , a lmost r i t u a l i s t i c forms 
of n e g o t i a t i o n between t h e tv/o c o u n t r i e s OF' a l l k i n d s . 
Both t h e c o u n t r i e s adopted t h e method t o bend each 
o t h e r . But i n s p i t e of t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s , t he meetings 
between t h e two c o u n t r i e s g o t success i n i r o n i n g ou t 
some of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s . 
24 Debates (Rajya Sabha, I n d i a ) , v o l . XXII, Cols 4268. 
25 The Hindu J u l y 1, i 9 6 0 . 
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5. The Indus Waters Treaty 
The river waters dispute had been one of the 
biocking factors between the two countries. Almost 
all the water disputes originated from the partition, 
Indus water dispute is also one of them. A series of 
conferences and meetings were organized betx/een the 
two countries. Lastly, World Bank was asked to direct 
its efforts for finding a sulution which could ensure 
the independence of the two countries in the matter of 
the operation of supplies of v;ater falling to the 
share of each. In February 1954, the Bank had made the 
following proposals: 
a) The water of eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej 
should be used for India; 
b) The water of western rivers Indus, Jhelum and 
Chenab should be for the use of Pakistan; 
c) There should be a transition period during which 
Pakistan would construct a system of link canals 
to transfer water from the western rivers to re-
place the irrigation uses in Pakistan hitherto 
met from eastern rivers, and 
d) India should pay the cost of constructing these 
replacement link canals to the extent of the 
39 
26 
b e n e f i t d e r i v e d by h e r t he re f rom. 
The good o f f i c e s of t h e World Bank, however, 
s u r v i v e d t h e s t r a i n s and s t r e s s e s of Indo-Pak i s t an 
r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g the decade of compl ica ted n e g o t i a -
t i o n s ove r t h e wa te r d i s p u t e . By May 19 54, t h e main 
i s s u e s s t a n d i n g i n the way of a s e t t l e m e n t 
c r y s t a l i z e d , a l though niomerous c o n t r o v e r s i e s over 
t h e f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s had t o overcome. 
F i n a l l y , a f t e r t h e con t inuous e i g h t yea r s 
d i s c u s s i o n and n e g o t i a t i o n beti-zeen t h e two c o u n t r i e s , 
w i th t h e med ia t i on of World Bank^ on September 19, 
I960, t h e Indus-Water T r e a t y was concluded a t Karachi 
by F i e l d Marshal Ayub Khan and P a n d i t Nehru. 
The t r e a t y r ecogn izes t h e need f o r f i x i n g the 
d i l i m i t a t i o n i n a s p i r i t of goodv/ill and f r i e n d s h i p , 
and d e f i n e s t h e r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the Govern-
ment of I n d i a and Government of P a k i s t a n concerning 
t h e use of xi^ater of t h e Indus r i v e r sys tem. The t r e a t y 
s e t s up a Permanent Indus Commission composed of two 
p e r s o n s , one appointed by 2ach Government, The Commiss-
i o n w i l l have genera l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r implementing 
26 G,W. Choudhury, P a k i s t a n ' s R e l a t i o n s wi th Ind ia , 
1947-1966 (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1971), 
p , 125. 
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t h e p r o v i s i o n s and w i l l s e e k t o r e c o n c i l e any p o i n t s 
27 
of d i sagreement t h a t may a r i s e . In t h e t r e a t y both 
t h e Governments r e c o g n i s e d t h e i r common i n t e r e s t i n 
t h e optimum development of t h e r i v e r s and d e c l a r e 
t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o c o o p e r a t e by mutual agreement t o 
t h e f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e e x t e n t . 
In t h e h i s t o r y of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s t h e 
Indus-Water d i s p u t e i s t h e only d i s p u t e where both th 
Governments have shovm a p o s i t i v e s p i r i t of coopera-
t i o n . I f i n f u t u r e , t h e y fol low the same s p i r i t of 
c o o p e r a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , d e f i n i t e l y they could 
s e t t l e a l l t h e i r o u t s t a n d i n g d i s p u t e s . 
6 . The S ino - Ind i an C o n f l i c t and I t s Impact on Indo-
Pak R e l a t i o n s 
The Chinese b o r d e r i n v a s i o n of Oc tober 20, 
28 
1962, a t s e v e r a l p o i n t s i n bo th Ladakh and NEFA 
(Nor theas t F r o n t i e r Agency) a b r u p t l y compl i ca t ed not 
on ly Ind ia -China r e l a t i o n s h i p bu t I n d i a - P a k i s t a n 
r e l a t i o n s h i p a l s o . In t h e c o n f l i c t , I n d i a su f f e r ed 
a b i g l o s s because Ind i an f o r c e s were g r o s s l y 
tiTiprepared t o face t h e Chinese o n s l a u g h t . 
27 I b i d , pp .128-129. 
28 Barnds , op-«ci t . , p . 175 . 
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The Chinese c o n f l i c t b rought a profound 
consequences f o r both Ind i an f o r e i g n p o l i c y and n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . I t c l e a r l y compeled I n d i a t o g ive up 
t h e much vaun t ed non -a l i gned p o l i c y . Nehru v/ho on a 
m a t t e r of p r i n c i p l e had f o r u h r i g h t l y r e j e c t e d P re s iden t 
E isenhower ' s o f f e r t o p rov ide arms i f t h e need ever 
a r o s e , now found h imsel f t u r n i n g t o t h e United S t a t e s 
for arms a s s i s t a n c e . Nehru p e r m i t t e d a d ramat ic 
expansion of t h e Ind ian defence budget from 2,1 per c e n t 
of t h e GNF i n 1961-62 t o 3,0 p e r c e n t i n 1962-63 and 
29 
4,5 pe r c e n t i n 1964-65. 
This arms r a c e and defence budge t expansion of 
I n d i a hau i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
wi th P a k i s t a n p a r t i c u l a r l y . P a k i s t a n i l e a d e r s became 
f e a r f u l t h a t t h e i n f u s i o n of arms i n t o I n d i a from 
United S t a t e s and t h e United Kingdcsn would g ive Ind ia 
a d i s t i n c t q u a l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e edge over 
P a k i s t a n . A d d i t i o n a l l y , as I n d i a p a i d more a t t e n t i o n 
t o Cliina and abandoned i t s commitment t o nonalignment, 
t h e P a k i s t a n i l e a d e r s h i p exper ienced a n o t h e r f e a r s . G. 
Ahmad a former member of the C i v i l S e r v i c e of Pakis tan 
29 Raju G»C. Thomas, The Defence of I n d i a (Delhi : 
Macmillan, 1978), pp , 147-48, 
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s a d d t h a t " P a k i s t a n ' s f r i e n d s , U . S . and U . K . , h a v e 
d e c i d e d t o b i i i l d up I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l w i t h o u t 
f i r s t i n s i s t i n g and a s s u r i n g t h a t I n d i a s o l v e i t s 
30 
g r a v e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h P a k i s t a n . " 
T h u s , I n d i a ' s prograirane o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g i t s 
d e f e n c e s y s t e m a g a i n s t C h i n a and m o d e r n i z i n g i t s own 
mi l i t a ry ' - s y s t e m was t a k e n by P a k i s t a n a s a n a t i o n a l 
t h r e a t i - -This arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n of I n d i a had c o m p e l l e d 
P a k i s t a n t o c'ome i n c l o s e n e s s o f Ch ina and an i m p o r t a n t 
31 
b o r d e r a g r e e m e n t w i t h Ch ina was s i g n e d on March 2, 1963 
i n v/hich P a k i s t a n g a v e some of h e r t e r r i t o r y t o C h i n a , 
Ch ina and P a k i s t a n a l s o shov/ed some o f t h e I n d i a n 
t e r r i t o r y b e t w e e n P a k i s t a n i c o n t r o l l e d K a s h m i r and t h e 
C h i n e s e p r o v i n c e of S i n k i a n g . These moves i n f u r i a t e d 
I n d i a b e c a u s e I n d i a was c l a i m i n g t h a t a l l of Kashmir 
was l e g a l l y I n d i a n and P a k i s t a n h a d no t e r r i t o r i a l 
b o u n d a r y w i t h C h i n a . New D e l h i a l s o c h a r g e d t h a t 
P a k i s t a n had s u r r e n d e r e d some 2500 s q u a r e m i l e s of 
K a s h m i r i t e r r i t o r y t o C h i n a . I n t h e r e p l y , P a k i s t a n 
s a i d t h a t s h e had s u r r e n d e r e d no t e r r i t o r y t o Ch ina , 
and t h e a g r e e m e n t was p r o v i s i o n a l u n t i l t h e r e was a 
f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e Kashmi r d i s p u t e . 
30 Da\^m, A p r i l 9 , 1 9 6 3 . 
31 BaxTids, O p . c i t . , p . 1 8 9 . 
43 
During t h e n e x t two y e a r s , t h e r e was a p r o l i -
f e r a t i o n of S i n o - P a k i s t a n i c o n t a c t s and a c t i v i t i e s , 
32 
I n 1964, China extended a ^ 60 m i l l i o n c r e d i t t o 
P a k i s t a n fo r t h e purchase of Chinese goods . There 
were many c u l t u r a l and a i r agreements beta-^een China 
and Pak i s t an a l s o , b u t I n d i a ' s r e a l apprehension,hov/-
eve r , was not c u l t u r a l m i s s i o n s o r a i r agreements . 
New DelhJ. f ea red t h a t China and P a k i s t a n had formed a 
s e c r e t m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . This f e e l i n g v/as e s p e c i a l l y 
c u l t i v a t e d by Z.A. Bhu t to , f o r h i s domest ic p o l i t i c s 
a s we l l as t o i n c r e a s e I n d i a ' s apprehens ion , when he 
s a i d on J u l y 17, 1963 t h a t "Any a t t a c k by Ind i a on 
P a k i s t a n ;;ould no l o n g e r con f ine the s t a k e s t c the 
independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of P a k i s t a n , 
Any a t t a c k by I n d i a on P a k i s t a n wotild a l s o i nvo lve 
t h e s e c u r i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e a r i t y of t he l a r c e s t 
33 
s t a t e i n A s i a " , 
Thus, i t seems t h a t t h e Indo-Chinese c o n f l i c t 
of 1962 had no t d e t e r i o r a t e d t h e r e l a t i o n s of Ind ia 
and China bu t i t had a l s o a b r u p t l y compl ica ted t h e 
I n d o - F a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s h i p . With t h i s war , I n d i a 
3 2 I b i d . , p . 19 0. 
33 S .P . Se th , "China as a F a c t o r i n I n d o - F a k i s t a n 
P o l i t i c s " , The World Today, v o l , 25, No. 1 
(Januairy 1969), P, 4 3 , 
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also r ea l i z ed the g rea t need of mili tari ' - c apab i l i t y in 
order to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously. 
Conclusion 
From t h e forgoing discussion, i t becomes c lea r 
t h a t India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s were d i s rupted not only 
by t h e i r b i l a t e r a l i s sues but the ex te rna l powers in 
one or the o the r way had affected t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . In 
the beginning of t h i s period (19 56-G4), Pakistan 
matured her contac t with Western and Is lamic countr ies 
and received a l o t of arms and economic a id especia l ly 
fran America, America also took the i n t e r e s t i n 
supporting Pakistan for f ight ing with communism in 
South Asia reg ion . Thus, t h i s Pakistan-U.S. r e l a t ions 
disrupted not only India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s but also 
brought cold war i n the region. The arms aid to 
Pakistan from U.S. and Pakis tan ' s j o in ing the Baghdad 
Pact and SEATO t h a t had provided a sense of secur i ty 
to Pakistan, compeled India to come i n c loseness of 
U.S.S.R. for maintaining balance of pov;er i n the region. 
Pakis tan ' s primary i n t e r e s t of jo in ing Baghdad Pact and 
SEATO was not because i t perceived any major Communist 
t h r e a t but because i t wanted to generate American 
support for i t s claims against Ind ia . Pakistan also 
took much i n t e r e s t to solve the Kashmir i s s u e through 
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U.N, because most of the permanent members of Security 
Council a t t h a t time were i n favour of Pakis tan. But 
the U.N, e f f o r t s and Super Powers' e f f o r t s regarding 
Kashmir i s s u e ended with no r e s u l t , Super-pov/ers 
explo i ted India and Pakistan as a tool to serve t h e i r 
global i n t e r e s t s . 
With the conf l i c t of 1962 with China, India 
suffered much m i l i t a r i l y and t h i s brought a profound 
consequences t o both Indian foreign pol icy and national 
s ecu r i t y po l i cy . From t h i s defeat , India rea l ized to 
s t rengthen her defence system. India whtwv/as only 
be l iev ing and follov/ing non-aligned po l icy , suddenly 
gave up her much vaunted non-aligned po l icy , and dramat-
i c a l l y expanded/defence budget. With the formation of 
sec re t m i l i t a r y pact between Pakistan and China, India 
r ea l i zed the g rea t need of m i l i t a r y capab i l i t y in order 
to hold off China and Pakistan simxoltaneously. 
C H A P T E R I I I 
THE IITOO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965 AND TASHEC2.NT DECLARATION 
y. Before occur ingl the actual v/ar between India and 
Pakistan, a long l i s t of the fac tors had affected the 
s i t u a t i o n s in the region i n d i f f e r en t ways. These factors 
compelled both the count r ies to opt d i f f e r e n t forms of 
foreign pol icy . Western arms aid and Indian defense 
bui ld up following the Sino-Indian war foreshadowed for 
Pakistan a ser ious ly adverse sh i f t i n the balance of 
pxDwer. Seeking v/ays to o f f s e t India ' s grov/ing s t rength, 
Ayub and h i s col leagues gradual ly changed the or ien ta t ion 
of t h e i r foreign pol icy . Pakistan, a f t e r the 1962 
con f l i c t of India-China, opted n&.-i foreign pol icy. In 
order to take help from China, Pakistan l imi t ed her 
r e l a t i o n s with U.S.A. and had only formal r e l a t i o n s . On 
the o ther hand, India s t a r t e d to move away from the 
p r inc ip les of non-aligned movement. Pak i s t an ' s react ion 
t o I n d i a ' s defeat by China was a complex mixture of 
p leasure , fear and f r u s t r a t i o n . The f i r s t reac t ions to 
India reverses i n Pakistan were both sv/eet and sour. The 
sweet pa r t v;as the enjoyment one ge ts from seeing a 
neighbourhood bul ly meeting a bigger b u l l y . The sour pa r t 




1. Domestic Situation in India 
As regional tensions expanded In the wake of the 
Chinese invasion of 1962, certain domestic changes in 
India and Pakistan also contributed tov;ards the proclivi-
ty to resort to war. In November 1963, the Indian Home 
Minister Gulzarilal Nanda stated in the National Legisla-
2 
ture that Kashmir had been fvilly integrated into India, 
This aroused a waVe of protests in Pakistan, but the 
Indian Government did not seem to be unduly concerned 
about the Pakistan reaction, Pakistan brought its case 
against the Indian efforts to Integrate Kashmir before 
the Security Council, but the Indian delegate M.C. Chagla 
reminded the Council that Kaslimir had become an integral 
part of India. 
While Kashmir's i n t eg ra t i on i n t o t he Indian Union 
was proceeding apace. Sheikh Abdullah, the "Lion of 
Kashmir", i^as languishing i n Indian p r i s o n s . However,in 
April 1964, he was released pa r t l y because of the wide-
spread p o l i t i c a l ag i t a t ion i n Kashmir i n the wake of the 
1 ]mne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China 
(New York: Walker and Company, 1964), p . 75, 
2 Russel l / Br ines , The India-Pakis tan Conf l ic t (London: 
Pall Mall P ress , 1968), p . 236. 
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Hazratbal i nc iden t . After h i s r e l ease from prison, he 
went t o Pakistan where he questioned the i r revocable 
charac te r of the accession of Kashmir to India . He a lso 
contended, ho\irever, t h a t the Kashmir d ispute could be 
resolved only through amicable discussions between India 
and Pal-cistan, Despite Abdullah's remarks about Kashmir's 
accession. Prime Minister Nehru and Pres ident Ayub Khan 
agreed to meet i n June 1964 t o d iscuss the Kashmir 
problem and other outstanding b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . The meet-
ing however did not occure because Nehru died, and the 
hopes of an ear ly sumnit meeting between the t\/o heads 
of governments receded. Shor t ly t h e r e a f t e r i n June 1964, 
Shas t r i (Prime Minister of India) and Ayub Khan s t ressed 
3 
the urgent need for Indo-Pakistan understanding, but these 
sentiments were not r a p i d l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o policy and 
subsequent events on the sub-continent prodded the two 
nat ions tov7ards war. 
2. Domestic S i tua t ion i n Pakistan 
While President Ayub Khan professed friendship 
a f t e r Nehru's death, i t i s reasonable to assume t h a t he 
despaired of a negotiated se t t lement v/ith India . AdditionUy, 
3 Si s i r Gupta, Kaslimir: A Study in India-Pakis tan 
Relat ions (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), 
P. 361. 
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given I n d i a ' s recen t e f f o r t s to efface Kashmir's special 
s t a t u s , he probably a l so concluded t h a t e i t h e r the i ssue 
be resolved by force or be forever abandaned. At th is , 
c e r t a in domes-cic changes took place in Pakis tan which made 
condi t ions propi t ious for a bold i n i t i a t i v e . President 
Ayub Khan held the regime's f i r s t e l ec t ion and thereby 
t e s t ed h i s scheme of Basic Democracy. In t h i s e lec t ion , 
Ayub won a c l ea r mandate i n West Pakistan while Fatima 
Jinnah ( s i s t e r of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) came with majority. 
xn East Pakis tan . This weaked posi t ion i n East Pakistan 
became an opportunity for Z,A, Bhutto to have power and 
p r e s t i g e . So, Bhutto, i n the wake of the an t i - Ind ian 
hys te r i a generated by the Ha^ratbal i n c i d e n t , pushed the 
generals i n t o a successful v/ar \.dth India , Commenting on 
a 
the significance of the election Iwne WicdXpointed out 
that "weakened in the elections (in East Pakistan) and 
under pressure from Bhutto and the militants, Ayub Khan 
needed real success to restore the confidence of his 
government and of the attentive public. Since the base 
of the regime was in West Pakistan, that success had 
naturally to appeal to the values and goals of that region 
of the countr\^  where Kashmir and relations with India were 
the most powerful emotional issues. 
4 Siimit Ganguly, The Origins of War in Sourth Asia: 
Indo-Pakistani conflicts since 1947 (Lahore: Vanguard, 
1988), p, 81. 
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I t i s imxxjssible to say for sure j u s t hov/ much 
Bhutto pushed Ayub to go to v;ar to s a t i s f y h i s personal 
ambitions. Never theless , i t appears t h a t Bhutto did 
play a key r o l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y since he v/as instrumental 
i n expanding Pak i s t an ' s l i n k s v/ith China during t h i s 
e 
cruc ia l t ime. The importance of ChinBe connection, was 
underscored i n March 1965 v;hen President Ayub Khan paid 
an e icht day v i s i t to CMna and China gave assurances (jE-
5 
help m i l i t a r y support to Pakistan. 
This m i l i t a r y support to Pakistan by CMna 
cu l t i va t ed an atmosphere of nervousness i n India because 
Indian leaders and mi l i ta rv ' thought t h a t nov/ they have to 
fight/f.-jo front war (one i s v.'ith China and another i s 
v/ith Pakis tan) , While India was in no pos i t ion to f ight 
a two front war. 
3, The Rann of Kutch Incident; 
The tens ions i n t h i s area had a l so became a 
hurdle betai/een India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s . Though t h i s 
area was both s t r a t e g i c a l l y and economically use less but 
j i n g o i s t i c Indians have pe r iod ica l ly claimed t h a t o i l 
reserves e:dLst t h e r e . Skirmishes took place i n t h i s 
disputed area in January 19 65 and both the count r ies 
5 Brines, Op , c l t . , p . 252. 
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claimed the border p a t r o l l i n g agains t each o ther . By a l l 
accounts, the Pakis tani r e t a l i a t e d us ing regu la r t roops. 
The f igh t ing esca la ted quickly through the month of April 
1965, with the Pakis tanis t ry ing out t h e i r nev/ Patton 
6 
tanks , Kutch a f f a i r s was a proving ground for Pakistani 
men and m a t e r i a l . I t gave the Pakistani m i l i t a r y an 
opportunity to assess Indian s t rength and v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s . 
According to S i s i r Gupta, "Above a l l the a t tack on Kutch 
was a rehearsa l for the conquest on Kashmir, Before 
launching a f u l l - s c a l e a t tack the re , A^oib thought i t 
necessary to t r y h i s new American v^e^apons. 
The Indian defence s t ra tegy i n 1965 against 
Pakistan a lso proved t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to coordinate plans. 
This s t ra tegy was evident by Pakistan s ide p a r t i c u l a r l y 
a f t e r the Kutch episode. This supposi t ion a lso tends 
support to the t h e s i s t h a t the Kutch a f f a i r emboldened 
the Pakistani l eader sh ip and provided the necessary 
margin of confidence for an at tack on Kashmir. 
4 , The Outbreak of War 
Taking the advantage of Ind i a ' s assessed mi l i t a ry 
weakness due to 1962 c o n f l i c t of China-India and the 
6 Brines, O p . c i t . , p . 288. 
7 Ganguly, Op„ci t . , p . 84. 
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dangerously weak and f rus t ra ted pos i t i on of India in 
Rann of Kutch episode, the Ayxib Khan government of 
8 
Pakistan launched i t s "Op Gibra l t e r " 1965. Pakistan 
s t a r t e d t h i s operat ion with the hope t h a t Kashmiris 
v/ould r i s e i n r e v o l t and support the so -ca l l ed Muslim 
l i b e r a t o r s from Pakistan, but t h i s hope of Pakistan 
was sha t te red as the Kashmiris joined t h e i r hands with 
the Indian t roops i n defeating and rou t ing the Pakistani 
i n f i l l t r a t o r s . Some Kashmiris also gave slogans " We 
9 
wi l l he lp you capture Muzaffarabad i f you want u s . " 
Thisv atmosphere cu l t i va t ed a good Army-Civil r e l a t ion -
ship during tha^lt ' turbulent period i n the h i s t o r y of 
Kashmir. 
Pakistan at tacked v ' India i n 1965 b a s i c a l l y cue 
t o three wrong impressions about Ind ia . 
( i ) Pakistan gross ly overstimated the support of local 
populace, 
( i i ) Pakistan overstimated t h e i r attacJiment to notions 
of Islamic c o ^ r a t e m i t y , and 
8 Chandra B Khanduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem 
and an Approach t o Solution", S t r a t e g i c Analysis^Vol. 
XIII , No. 6 (September 1990), p . 622, 
9 I b i d . , pp. 622-23. 
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( i i i ) Pakistan under | t imated the language b a r r i e r be t -
v/een the major i ty of the i n f l i t r a t o r s and the 
Kashmiri populat ion. 
In t h i s second Kashmir war no doubt both the 
countr ies suffered from each o ther . Sometime India 
crossed the border l ine and sometime Pakis tan crossed 
borderl ine a t some p l aces . But one important thing i s 
t h a t the outbreak of war signaled an important fa i lu re 
of U.S, policy i n the sub-continent becaus'e a l l the 
economic and m i l i t a r y aid of U.S. v/ere suspended to 
both India and Pakis tan, Due to t h i s , U.S. was n o t ' 
having any inf luence on any country ( e i t h e r on India 
or Pakis tan) , 
In s p i t e of a l l these , U.S. , B r i t a i n and the 
Soviet Union a l l i n s i s t e d t h a t stoping the f ight ing 
betv/een India and Pakistan v/as the f i r s t order of 
business and cooperated i n working out an acceptable 
terms. By mid-September 19 65, the Secur i ty Coxincil 
passed a r e so lu t ion asking both p a r t i e s t o cease f i r e . 
The U,N. General Secretar\' ' U, Thant subsequently 
consulted with Pres ident Ayub Khan and Prime Minister 
S h a s t r i , India f i r s t l y accepted the cease f i r e on 
September 20^ , 1965 and two days l a t e r Pakis tan , The 
f ight ing was over, and the peace process began. 
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5. The Tashkent Agreement and I t s Achievements 
After the c e a s e - f i r e , no country was having the 
gurds to bring both the count r ies ( India and Pakistan) 
a t a nego t i a t ing t a b l e . China had already l o s t i t s 
image i n the region i n t he eyes of Indian and i n the 
World by supplying arms to Pakistan during the war. As 
far as super powers are concerned. United S ta tes was 
concerned with the Arab- I s rae l i problems. Further U.S. 
was beginning t o expand the war in Vietnam, drawing i t s 
a t t en t ion away from the South Asia region. The other 
power t h a t was able to mediate the dispute was United 
Kingdom but she did not de s i r e to take t h i s responsibi -
l i t y on her shoulder a lone. The Securi ty Council a lso 
shov/ed i t s f a i l u r e in reso lv ing the dif ferences between 
the two p a r t i e s . In these condi t ions , the chances of 
mediation was l e f t for Soviet Union. 
The two p a r t i e s f i n a l l y met i n Tashkent on January 
4, 1966, With considerably s k i l l and a mixture of per-
suasion and Cajolery, Prim.e Minister of Soviet Union 
Kosygin succeeded in hammering out an agreement between 
10 
India and Pakis tan. On January 10, 1966, the Agreement 
10 Denis Wright, India-Pakis tan Relations 1962-1969 
(New Delhi: S t e r l i ng Publishers Pr iva te Limited, 
1989), p . 75. 
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a t Tashkent was signed between India and Pakistan through 
the mediation of Soviet Union. The Agreement declared 
t h a t " a l l armed personnel of the tv/o count r ies shal l be 
withdrawn not l a t e r than February 26, 1966, t o pos i t ions 
they held p r io r to August 5/ 1965, and both s ides sha l l 
obseirve the cease - f i r e terms on the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e , l e s s 
important provisions d e a l t with exchanging pr i soners of 
war, r e s to r ing diplomatic r e l a t i o n s , and resimiing economic 
11 
l i n k s and communications". 
The importance of Tashkent. Declarat ion lay in t h a t 
i t represented important concession on both s i d e s . The 
Indians gave up s t r a t e g i c pos i t ions captured i n the Azad 
Kashmir region, and the Pakis tani agreed to withdrav; from 
t e r r i t o r y v/hat they had se ized in the c o n f l i c t . The Indians 
backwed down from t h e i r o r i g ina l pos i t ion t h a t Pakistan 
acknowledged i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for g u e r i l l a i n f i l t r a t i o n . 
Throughout the negot ia t ions whatever Kosygin played 
his ro le was ac3mired by many Indians and Pakis tani as well . 
Mr. Jha (an Indian delegat ion spokeman) described the ro le 
12 
of Kosygin as "very correct, cautious and constructive." 
11 Ib id . 
12 Keesinq's Contemporary'- Archives, 1965-66, p . 22188. 
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Pakistani v/ere also very happy with the new ro le of Soviet 
Union and v/ith t h e i r nev/ s t a tus i n Soviet eyes: 
"Kosygin played h i s pa r t not as r epresen ta t ive of 
the world revolut ionary movament bu t as a c l a s s i c a l peace-
13 
maker i n a c l a s s i c a l s i t u a t i o n of diplomatic mediation". 
Lai Bahadur S h a s t r i ' s death, a f t e r fev7 ours of 
signing the Tashkent Declarat ion, a l so shocked' the people 
of both c o u n t r i e s , because he" played very important role 
i n bringing closeness betv/een the tv/o coun t r i e s . But in 
sp i t e of a l l sympath-ies tov;ards Declarat ion, there were 
also c r i t i c i smSaga ins t i t i n both the coxintries. Opposi-
t ion p a r t i e s for t h e i r ovm p o l i t i c a l advantage,were ready 
uo attack ..' any point of government po l i cy . The r i gh t 
wing party i n India , the Jan Sangh, v/as highly c r i t i c a l of 
14 
the Declarat ion and the re v;as xaneasiness i n the more. 
l i b a r a l ranks of the opposi t ion. In Pakistan, the react ion 
was more v io l en t ; demonstrations occured i n Lahore,causing 
15 
the death of a t l e a s t two people. An opposi t ion leader 
in the National Assembly of Pakistan, Mukhlesuszaman Khan, 
13 Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 19,-No. 1 (1966), p . 5. 
14 B.L. Maheshi^arl, "Non-alignment". Economic and 
P o l i t i c a l Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 13 (March 1970),p. 1335. 
15 The Times (London) January 15, 1966. 
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at tacked Ayub for not consul t ing e i t h e r cabinet minis ters 
of the par ty about Tashkent, unl ike Mr. S h a s t r i , who had 
a mandate from h i s nat ion as well as -f/je pafZu, 
The fee l ing agains t Tashkent Declarat ion was 
s t ronger i n Pakistan than i t v/as i n Ind ia . Zulfiquar Ali 
Bhutto sa id t h a t "Tashkent Declarat ion contains no speci-
17 
f ie so lu t ions to our d i f f i c u l t i e s with India" , Many 
peoples were demanding the so lu t ion of Kashmir and were 
saying: 
"We had fought with our back not to leave Kashmiri 
i n l u rch . After a l l these s a c r i f i c e s , where do we stand? 
18 
The so lu t ion of Kashmir seemed to be as e lus ive as ever". 
Prom the above d iscuss ion , i t becomes c l ea r tha t 
Tashkent Declarat ion had achieved nothing new a t a l l in 
terms of permanent se t t lement of India-Pakis tan problems. 
I t brought a temporary r e s p i t e bet./een India and Pakistan 
T'As l lsclarat ion made no reference to the no war 
pact which India had des i red for many years while i t did 
reaffirm t h a t disputes should be s e t t l e d by peaceful means. 
16 National Assembly Debates (Palcistan) Vol.1 (Hos, l - l2) 
1966, p . 373. 
17 Ib id . 
18 Zaman Mukhtar, "Thoughts i n Indo-Pakistan Relations 
in the Tashkent Era," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 22, No.2 
(1969), p . 130. 
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The one i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t of D s c l a r a t i o n v/as t h e 
S o v i e t diplcanacy which g o t a chance t o promote h e r p o l i c y 
towards t h e sub -con t inen t* S o v i e t Union w i th t h i s 
d e c l a r a t i o n got success i n e r o d i n g wes te rn i n f l u e n c e from 
t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t and go t chance t o come i n c l o s e t o 
P a k i s t a n . 
The S o v i e t Union ' s ' aim t o a t t empt a ba lance of 
pov;er s t r u c t u r e on t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t came wi th i t s o f f e r 
t o supply Pak i s t an wi th arms and Ai r Marshal Nur Kharfsbf 
P a k i s t a n ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n about arms deal between Sovie-c 
Union and Pak i s t an c r e a t e d a confusion among Indians-
about P a k i s t a n . While Mrs I n d i r a Gandhi, a f t e r meet ing 
w i t h Kosygin on 16 J u l y 1966 i n Hoscovr, p u b l i c a l l y s ea t ed 
t h a t S o v i e t Union had n o t made any arms agreement w i th 
19 
P a k i s t a n . The rumours about t h e Sov i e t arms t o Palcistan 
i n 1966 gave Moscov/ t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t e s t the r e a c t i o n 
of Delhi t o such a p r o p o s a l . The S o v i e t l e a d e r s had a l s o 
no d e s i r e t o a l i e n a t e I n d i a t h a t i s why i n t h a t y e a r (1966),*tnea 
, 2 0 0 
i n c r e a s e d arms s a l e s t o I n d i a . 
19 K e e s i n q ' s Contemporary Arch ives , 1965-66, p . 21569o 
20 Ar thur S t e i n , " I n d i a and t h e U .S .S .R . : t he Pos t Nehru 
Pe r iod" , Asian Survey, Vol . 7 , No. 3 (March 1967), p . 
126. 
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A f t e r 1966, P a k i s t a n began t o i n d i c a t e t h a t 
P a k i s t a n was r eady t o modify t h e wes te rn commitment, 
2i 
This o f f i c i a l announcement was g iven by P a k i s t a n only 
f o r t a k i n g t h e S o v i e t s u p p o r t s , Ayub Khan on September 
25, 1967 a l s o p a i d a v i s i t t o Moscow wi th h i s fo re ign 
m i n i s t e r Mr, P i r s a d a i n t h i s connec t ion . Ayub thanked 
S o v i e t Union f o r i t s c o n t i n u i n g a s s i s t a n c e t o I n d i a and 
Pak i s t an a s f a r as e s t a b l i s h i n g good r e l a t i o n s were 
concerned, b u t remarked f u r t h e r t h a t Kashmir s tood i n 
t h e v;ay of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p . Ayub Khan i n t h i s v i s i t 
f e l t t h a t t h e S o v i e t - P a k i s t a n t i e s had been s t r eng thened , 
bu t h i s pr imary assessment of t h e t o u r v/as seen i n terms 
of I n d i a - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s , 
"The g r e a t e s t advantage of t h i s mee t ing v/as t h a t 
we ^verc a b l e t o a p p r i s e t h e Sov ie t l e a d e r s of deve lop-
ments subsequent t o t h e Kaslimir t a l k s and inform them 
t h a t , d e s p i t e a l l our e f f o r t s , I n d i a i s n o t ag reeab le t o 
22 
meaningful t a l k s on Jammu and Kashmir", 
The P a k i s t a n government regarded t h e f i r s t 
o f f i c i a l v i s i t of Kosygin (Sov ie t Prime M i n i s t e r ) of 
OS 
Apr i l 17, 1968jlvery i m p o r t a n t because i t was hoped t h a t 
21 K, Sarwar Hasan, "The Background of American Arms 
Aid t o P a k i s t a n " , P a k i s t a n Horizon, Vol , 20, No.3 
(March 1967) , p . 126. 
22 K e e s i n q ' s Con temporary'- ArcMves , 1967-68, p . 22345. 
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i t would r e s u l t i n l a rge economic b e n e f i t s for Pakistan, 
and perhaps the long awaited offer t o s e l l m i l i t a ry 
equipment to Pakis tan. So i n order t o shov/ an a l ienat ion 
from west, Pakistan authorised the c losure of American 
a i r base a t Pesli/ar on April 6, 1968 fev; days before 
Kosygin was due to a r r ive i n Rawalpindi, Foreign Minister 
of Pakistan Mr, Husain said "Pakistan had taken the step 
in keeping with our policy of developing b i l a t e r a l r e l a -
t ions of f r iendship and mutual understanding with a l l 
count r ies but i t s r ea l i n t e n t went well beyond tha t , 
While Kosygin described h i s concluding t ou r of Palcisian 
as "a dialogue between f r iends" and S o v i e t ' s ro le as 
neutral i n the a f f a i r s of the sub-cont inent . But in spi te 
of a l l these open d iscuss ions , the re were some secre t 
dealings between Soviet Union and Pakis tan , When Soviet 
Union, i n Ju ly 1968, confirmed t h a t she should go ahead 
with the arms sa le to Pakistan, Mrs, Ind i r a Gandhi 
expressed I n d i a ' s object ions through a l e t t e r to Kosygin 
and sa id , t h a t Pakistan had no reasonable j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for setBking to increase i t s armed s t r eng th , because of 
the la rge supplv of m i l i t a r y equirment given to Pakistan 
24 
between 1954 and 1965 throuqh i t s a l l i a n c e , China's 
23 N a t i o n a l Assembly D e b a t e s ( P a k i s t a n ) , v o l , 1 
(Nos , 1-15) 1968 , May 20 , 1968 , p p . 8 0 8 - 8 0 9 . 
24 Lok S a b h a D e b a t e s ( I n d i a ) , v o l , 1 8 ( N o s . 1 - 5 ) , 
1968 , Jxi ly 2 2 , 1 9 6 8 , C o l . 288 , 
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con t r ibu t ion t o arming Pakistan reduced the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the Soviet Union's supplying of arms to Pakistan. 
Soviet arms s a l s t o Pakistan were the stobject of a heated 
debate i n t he Lok Sabha a l s o . The opposi t ion in Indian 
Parliament got a good opportunity t o a t t ack the government 
and to c r i t i c i s e i t s f a i l u r e of foreign pol icy but no one 
i n the Indian Parliament was knowing the quant i ty or the 
charac te r of the arms or the condit ion of t h e i r del ivery 
t o Pakistan*. Seeing the upror i n Indian Parliament over 
the arms s a l e , Ayxib Khan mentioned t h a t the equipment 
Pakistan would feceive from Soviet Union represented only 
25 
a very small port ion of the U.S. ^ 9 0 0 mi l l ion Soviet 
aid v/hich India received. All the Soviet aid/ said Ayub 
in Tehran on h i s way to London on Jxoly 21, 1968, woiild 
f i l l c e r t a i n small gaps in Pak i s t an ' s defences. This 
arms deal d is rupted not only Indo-Soviet r e l a t i ons but 
a lso Ind ia -Pakis tan , .Pakis tan happily accepted the 
Soviet he lp and used i t as a propaganda weapon against 
India . 
The o f f i c i a l s i n America were very caut ious about 
the Soviet -Pakis tan arms dea l . After the annoxoncement of 
Pakistan Soviet arms deal , U.S. sent a delegation to India 
25 Pakistan Times (Lahore) Ju ly 23, 1968. 
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which held discussions v/ith Indian min i s t e r s from 26-28 
July 1968. U.S. a lso annotinced t h a t t he r e was no change 
i n her pol icy concerning arms supply t o the subcontinent, 
and U.S. would maintain the " le tha l \7eap0ns" embargo on 
India and Pakistan, 
Here i t seems t h a t i n s p i t e of the b i l a t e r a l i s sues 
as a hurdle beti-zeen India and Pakistan r e l a t i ons^ the ro le 
of super-powers and g rea t pot/ers had bean more dangerous 
betv/een India and Pakis tan. Because the super-pov/ers 
only wanted t h e i r base, inf luence and t h e i r i n t e r e s t some-
times i n India and sometimes in Pakis tan. The Chinese 
continued m i l i t a r y supply t o Pakistan s ince 1965 war of 
India-Pakis tan and Pak i s t an ' s receiving China 's a i r c r a f t , 
tanks and foreign exchange t o buy arms had fur ther d i s -
rupted the India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s . 
In 1969, the new Republican Pres ident , Nixon did 
not make any prono\inced change i n U.S. pol icy towards 
the Indian sub-cont inent . Ni::con did not want to appear 
as the pa r t i san of e i t h e r country"-. He ^^?anted to leave 
an impression of evenhandedness towards both coun t r i e s . 
But l a t e r i n 1970, Nixon changed h i s a t t i t u d e towards 
Pakistan and personally decided to s e l l Pakistan t\^in-
j e t bombers, j e t f igh te r s and armored personnel c a r r i e r s 
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v/ith a reported value ranging from ^ 15 mi l l ion to ^ 40 
26' 
mi l l ion . For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, the U.S.-Pakistan 
a l l i ance ex i s t ed on paper only. Relat ions betv/een India 
and United S ta t e s became more d i s t a n t when U.S. agreed 
to s e l l arms t o Pakistan and when India ordered to c los-
ing of several U.S. c u l t u r a l centres in 1970 vath vague 
accusations t h a t they were engaged i n improper a c t i v i t i e s , 
Conclusion 
From the above account, the 1965 vrar demonstrated 
that Pakistan attacked on India by tvro reason basically. 
One is that Pakistan thought that India had become very 
'..-eak because of 1962 v/ar with CMna and India is not in 
a position to win the war. The second reason is that 
Pakistan believed that if it did not act in a decisive 
manner, the state of Kashmir would be integrated into 
India and international interest for Pakistan's concerns 
woxild dwindle. 
The second Kashmir v/ar of 1965 demonstrated the 
willingness of both sides to use substantial force to 
achieve particular ends. As a result, the Pakistani 
26 The New York Times, October 11, 1970, 
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leadership learned that the Indian armed forces coiald not 
be easily routed and had come a long way from the Chinese 
debacle of 1962, On the Indian side, the war provided a 
degree of comfort to the military whose prestige and morale 
had sunk to an all time lov; in the aftermath of 1962 
conflict. 
The biggest achievement be-a-zeen India and Pakistan 
was thaT: the Tashkent Agreement was signed betv/een the two 
countries through the mediation of Soviet Union, The 
importance of Tashkent Agreement lay that it represented 
important concessions on both sides. Both 'the coxintries 
agreed to withdraw from the terriror^ '- that they had seized 
in conflict. But in spite of all these acliievenient, 
Tashken-c Declaration had ach-ieved nothing new at all in 
terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems. 
It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostili-
ties, India and Pakistan remained suspicious and unyield-
ing towards each other, and the Kashmir dispute remained 
as unresolved as ever. 
C H A P T E R IV 
THE BANGLADESH CRISIS AI'JD THE SII-ILA AGRBSMEtJT 
The Bangladesh war i s ccMnmonly though t t o have 
1 
begun on December 3/ 1971 w i th a P a k i s t a n i a i r a t t a c k 
on a niimber of m i l i t a r y ba se s i n I n d i a ' s nor thwes te rn 
r e g i o n . D e s p i t e t h e s u r p r i s e n a t u r e of a t t a c k / i t d id 
l i t t l e damage, and t h e I n d i a n Ai r Force r e t a l i a t e d t h e 
nex t day/ h i t t i n g s e v e r a l P a k i s t a n a i r b a s e s . But b e -
fore o c c u r i n g t h e a c t u a l v;ar t h e r e were many f ac to r s 
which had c o n t r i b u t e d a l o t f o r b r i n g i n g a war l i k e 
s i t u a t i o n . T h i s c h a p t e r examines t h e v a r i o u s f a c t o r s 
t h a t how they had a f f e c t e d t h e domest ic and ex t e rna l 
p o l i c i e s and Fore ign r e l a t i o n ; and how they had made 
t h e s i t u a t i o n more worse and f i n a l l y havr t h e s e s i t u a -
t i o n s c r e a t e d a r i f t between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . 
1 . Economic D i s p a r i t i e s 
A f t e r t h e 1965 war , P a k i s t a n s u f f e r e d from 
economic c r i s i s . So, P a k i s t a n d id n o t c a r e fo r the main-
tenance of h e r e a s t e r n wing and t h e people of e a s t e r n wing 
of Pak i s t an were bad ly a f f e c t e d . The economic d i s p a r i t i e s 
between t h e two wings of P a k i s t a n had become so g r e a t and trie 
1 Rober t Jackson / South Asian C r i s i s (New York: Praeger , 
1975)/ p . 1 0 5 . 
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ideo log ica l bonds betv/een the tv/o v/ings were beginning to 
fray. Pollov/ing the 1965 war with India , another sources 
of resentment v/as the r e a l i z a t i o n among the East Pakis tani 
l eader s t h a t the Kashmir i s s u e was e s s e n t i a l l y a West 
Pakistani cause, for which East Pakistan was being made 
needless ly vulnerable . As these i s sue s began to divide 
the tv;o wings, the e therea l qua l i t y of the ideologica l 
bonds became increas ing ly apparent. 
2. Tashkent and Dismal Scene 
The Tashkent dec la ra t ion of 1966 t h a t sought t o 
bring about a l a s t i n g peace betv/een the t\7o countr ies 
( India and Pakistan) did not have the same s igni f icance 
for the t^ ,70 coun t r i e s . The agreement was c r i t i c i s e d i n 
India as well as in Pakistan by some group of people, but 
i n India majori ty of the people respected the agreement. 
Prime Minis ter Lai Bahadur Shas t r i made i t c l e a r t h a t 
agreement i s an acMevement because a f t e r a grea t deal of 
discussion the tv/o count r ies agreed not to use force againsi 
each o ther and have decided to s e t t l e the dispute amicably. 
On the o ther side i n Pakistan, the s tudent groups 
were ac t ive ly encouraged by two r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s Nizam-i-
Islam and the Council of Muslim League. The students 
r i o t ed i n a nianber of major c i t i e s i n Pakistan to express 
67 
2 
t h e i r disenchantment with the agreement, while ac tua l ly 
these studentS^encouraged by r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s v/ere against 
Ayxib's re turn i n pox'/er. In con t r a s t , t he Awami League 
l eader Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, v;hose base was almost solely 
in East Pakistan, and some other l eade r s re f ra ined from 
c r i t i c i z i n g the Agreement, Mujibur Rehman did not c r i t ic i se 
the agreement because he did not want to antagonize the 
Indian leadership aga ins t himself and v/anted to bring world 
a t t en t ion towards the d i s p a r i t i e s betx;een East and West. 
3 
Pakistan, Mujibur Rehman v.dth a small group also declined 
the i n v i t a t i o n ca l l ed by the Vfest Pakis tani p o l i t i c a l 
pa r t i e s for a National Conference to d iscuss the key issues 
confronting the country. The Conference was completely 
fa i lured because Mujibur Rehman leading h i s group demanded 
more autonomy to East Pakis tan, This demand culminated in 
the break-up of Pakis tan, 
3, The Language Problem 
In Bangladesh c r i s i s language had a l so played very 
crucia l r o l e . I t was a fundamental i n a b i l i t y of the West 
Pakistani p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r to accchtodate the hopes and 
2 Lawrence Zir ing, llie A n^ab Khan Era (Syracuse; Syracuse 
University Press , 1971), p , 74. 
3 I b i d . , po 79. 
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expecta t ions of the majority of the East Pakis tan is . 
Despite the ccxnmon bond of Islam, profound differences 
between East and West Pakistan e x i s t e d . The majority 
of West Pak is tan i s were e i t h e r l i k i n g Urdu or speaking 
Urdu and the East Pakis tan i , Bengali , In addition the 
West Pakis tan i regarded Bengali Islam as t a in t ed by 
4 
Hinduism and thus in need of p u r i f i c a t i o n . Now i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t the r e l a t ionsh ip betv/een East and West 
Palcistan v/as not only tenuous but a l so a asymnetric. The 
West Pakis tani leadership did not viev; t h e i r Eastern 
v/ing as equals and in f ac t dea l t with them p a t e m a l i s t i -
c a l l y a t be s t , and exp lo i t a t i ve ly a t wros t . This langu-
age and cu l t u r a l d iv is ion increased the tension between 
East and West Pakistan, which cxiLminated i n the 1971 war. 
4o Pakistaioi Domestic Po l i c i e s and Mujib' s Six Points 
The Pakis tani l eader s had played d i f fe ren t role in 
p o l i t i c a l f i e l d in order to show t h e i r personal image, 
importance and i n order t o e s t a b l i s h themselves and i n 
order to come i n povrer. Even most of the leaders had not 
cared about nat ional i n t e r e s t . These a c t i v i t i e s were 
seen in high s p i r i t par t icxi lar ly betv;een the 1966-1971 i n 
4 Marta R, Nicholas, and Pli i l ip Oldenburg, Bangladesh: 
The Bir th of a New Nation (Madras: M, Seshachalam and 
Co, 1972), p . 15. 
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Pakistan, This was the main reason of the dismemberment 
of Pakistan. 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in February 1966 at the All 
Pakistan National Conference at Lahore, almost immediately 
after the Tashkent Agreement betr.-^ een India and Pakistan, 
5 
gave his six point programme. Those were as follow: 
i) There shall be a federal government at the centre. 
Elections to the federal legislature and the 
legislatures of the federating units shall be 
direct, and on the basis of universal adult 
franchise, 
ii) Federal government shall be responsible for 
defence and foreign affairs only. All other 
functions ahall be taken care of by the federating 
imits themselves. 
iii) There shall be separate currencies, or single 
currency but completely controlled by the regional 
reserve banks, 
iv) Federating lonits shall provide money to the 
• federal government for its functioning on the 
basis of a predetermined procedure. • 
5 Jagdev Singh, Dismemberment of Pakistan: 1971 Indo~ 
Pak War (New Delhi: Lancer, 1988), pp, 41-42. 
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v) Federat ing un i t s shal l maintain t h e i r ov/n foreign 
exchange accounts, and made foreign exchange avail-
able to the federal government on the bas i s of a 
predetermined procedure. 
v i ) Federat ing u n i t s can r a i s e t h e i r ov/n m i l i t i a s and 
para m i l i t a r y forces as necessary-, for national 
s e c u r i t y . 
These poin ts v/ere ba s i ca l l y a demand of regional 
autonomy for East Pakis tan, These po in t s a lso dramatic-
a l l y l imi t ed the pox-;er of the cen t ra l government to the 
areas of defence and foreign a f f a i r s , A\'ub ou t r igh t ly 
re jec ted a l l these demands on the ground t h a t they 
smacked of secessionism, Mujibur Rehman i n April 1966 
was a r r e s t ed under the defence of Pafcistan ru les and the 
East Pakistan safe ty ordinance on a charge of sed i t ion . 
This marked the s t a r t of the tv;o-year j a i l term for 
Mujibur Rehman which culminated in the Agartala Conspiracy 
case of 1968, The al leged aim. of the conspiracy was t o 
capture a pa r t of East Bengal and s e t up an indet^ndent 
government. On January 1, 1968, Rehman along v;ith t h i r t y -
four others including some c i v i l and m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s 
were a r r e s t ed i n connection with the Aqartala Conspiracy 
6 
case and put on t r i a l on June 19, 1968, With t h i s a r r e s t 
6 Ib id , 
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of Mujibur Rehman, h i s popular i ty grew so much. Autono-
mist sentiment continued to swell i n East Pakistan 
despi te Rehman* s absence. Later on a t the time o£ 
Mujib's t r i a l , charges were dropped aga ins t him. These 
dropped charges against Mujib proved a f a i lu re to Ayxib' s 
regime which was a milestone on the path t o i t s ovm d i s -
i n t e g r a t i o n and t h a t of Pakis tan, The prominent h i s t o -
r ian of the Pakistani Army Fazal Muqeem Khan also sa id 
by c r i t i o i s i n g . the a t t i t u d e of Ayub Khan "The Agartala 
Conspiracy Tr ia l provoked adverse r eac t ions and whispers 
about trumped up charges received credence. The accused 
person began acquiring an image of heroes and f ich te rs 
7 
for East Pak i s t an ' s r i g h t s . 
However, the furore aga ins t the t r i a l of Mujibur 
Reliman and some other l eader s was so loud t h a t the 
p o l i t i c i a n s i n both the v;ings s t a r t e d to uni te among 
themselves, A democratic Action Committee linder the 
l eade r sh ip of Nasrullah Khan was organised v;hich cal led 
for the l i b e r a u l i z a t i o n of some of the harshes t aspects 
of the regime. Forced with t h i s barrage of opposition^ 
AvvLb began to c a p i t u l a t e , f i r s t by dropping the Agartala 
7 Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pak i s t an ' s C r i s i s i n Leadership 
(Islamabad: Muqueom National Book Foundation, 1973) 
p« 13,' 
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conspiracy case and re l eas ing Mujibiir Rehman then by-
ca l l i ng for a Conference in *ferch 1969- But the 
Conference of the p o l i t i c a l leaders was f a i l u r e because 
of regional fee l ings and violence erupted once again* On 
March 25, 1969, Ayub handed over power t o General Yahya 
Khan who reimposed t h e Martial Law* 
Faced with the continxiing demands of the various 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and MuJib's i n s i s t e n c e on the Six 
Point Progranune on November 28, 1969, Yahya promised to 
hold e lec t ions and a l so e^qsressed a d e s i r e to d i sso lve 
West Pakistan* Yahya proved t o be t r u e t o h i s word,and 
from January 1970 permitted f u l l p o l i t i c a l ac t iv i ty* 
Following extensive d iscuss ions with the various 
contes tan ts for Power, Yahya came out with lega l Frame-
8 
work Order on March 31, 1970* I t included f ive basic 
p r inc ip l e s designed t o guide and d i r e c t any p o l i t i c a l 
arrangonents but i t was a far cry from, the eijqsectations 
of Mujib's Six Point Programme and did not succeed in 
bringing the nat ional s p i r i t i n Awami League and in 
some other p o l i t i c a l leaders because the Order was 
having some d i c t a t o r i a l a t t i t udes* 
8 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan 
( Bloomington•* Indiana Universi ty Press , 1974),p*94• 
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The shortccxnings of the Legal Brame Work Order 
were not l o s t on J&ijib and the Awami League who cont i -
nued t o press for regional autonomy. The fundamental 
i n a b i l i t y and unwill ingness of Yahya's regime t o concede 
ce r ta in bas ic p o l i t i c a l denands and grievances fueled 
Mujib's compaign. In fac t , one can argue t h a t vhat was 
emerging wi thin PaMstan \ « r e two sepa ra t e nationalisms: 
a) The nat ional ism of West Palcistan was predicated on 
the predominance of the West over the East and, 
b) The nat ional ism of the East was based on r e l a t i o n -
ship of p a r i t y . 
No longer could the supposedly transcendent 
qua l i ty of any ideology or ru l e contain the opposing 
nat ional isms. The t ang ib le di f ferences had become too 
great to be ignored. 
9 
The two na tura l d i s a s t e r s of August and November 
1970 in East Pakistan fur ther gave a s e t back t o the 
Pakistan nat ional ism, because these desas t e r s were a 
havoc for the people and p rope r t i e s both, and vrfiatever 
the help was esqsected by the people of East wing of 
Pakistan was not come i n t o r e a l i t y . The Army vAiich was 
9 Brig Jagdev Singh, Op .c i t . . pp. 39-40. 
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ca l led for help did nothing except t o provide minor help 
and playing cards s i t t i n g in bar racks , organising cinena 
shows, and relaxing* 
In t h e na t ional e lec t ion of December 7, 1970, 
10 
Mujib's v i c to ry of 160 seats out of 162 i n East Pakistan 
and other p a r t i e s ' poor performance indica ted the po la r i -
za t ion of popular fee l ings between East and West Pakistan^ 
Faced with t h i s une3<pected outcome, the leaders of regime 
and Bhutto thought t h a t the primacy of t h e m i l i t a r y and 
the West were i n jeopardy with a Bengali majori ty in the 
National Assembly. Thus, Yahya ac t ing i n cohcert with 
Bhutto decided t o postpone the convening of the National 
Assembly inde f in i t e ly - When i n March 1971 Yahya announced 
a meeting of a l l major p a r t i e s i n Decca, Mujibxir Rehman 
e a r l i e r refused t o at tend but l a t e r responded under 
increas ing p ressure from the more r ad i ca l members of his 
own par ty and issued a new se t of demands^ 
a 
a) the withdraw! o£ Martial law, 
b) the transfer of power to elected representatives 
c) the return of troops to their barracks, and 
d) an inquiry into recent police firings* 
10 G.W. Choudhry, Op.cit., p« 127. 
11 Jagdev Singh, Oo.cit.,p. 48. 
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Simultaneously, Mijib ca l l ed for a s tate-wide 
non-cooperation movement which proved t o be a complete 
success. A l a s t effort a t negot ia t ions broke down over 
the i s sues of investments and foreign t r ade - Shortly, 
t he rea f t e r , Yahya denounced Mujiab's non-cooperation 
movement as an "act of t reason" . Ha j i b and some Awami 
League members were a r re s t ed and the West Pakistani 
leaders a l so refused t o hand over power t o the elected 
r ep resen ta t ive of East wing- Later on March 25, 1971 
the Pakis tani Armed forces cracked down i n Dacca. 
In f ac t , the Pakistani c r i s i s demonstrated tha t 
the cu l tu ra l t i e s , l i k e those of e t h n i c i t y and language 
had kept Miislim apa r t . The d i v i s i o n s a r i s ing out of 
these t i e s had, of course, been exacerbated by the economic 
grievances of the East against the West. In addit ion the 
poor represen ta t ion of Bengali in Armed forces and c iv i l 
se rv ices and t h e i r exclusion from the decis ion making 
c i r c l e s make the people of Eastern wing disenchanted. 
Thus under these circumstances,, i t became impossible to 
hold a nation toge the r . 
5. The BenoaJ-J- Secessionist Movement ajxl I n d i a ' s Role 
No doubt t he above fac tors were su f f i c i en t in and 
of themselves to bring about the break-up of Pakistan but 
Ind i a ' s r o l e i s a l so unforgetfeble t h a t she had played in 
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encouraging the secess ion i s t forces of Pakistan through 
economic support , moral support and giving t ra in ing to 
them- These a t t i t u d e s of India became a hurdle between 
the r e l a t i o n of Pakistan and Ind ia . 
The o f f i c i a l Indian reac t ion t o the crackdown 
in Dacca was taken by Pakistan as an in te r fe rence in t he 
i n t e r n a l matter of Pakistan because Mrs* Indira Gandhii 
on March 27, 1971 said in Lok Sabha. "The values for 
which the victorioxis Awami League stood were our values 
for which we have always s tood and for which we 
have always spoken"- She a l so sa id ' "we have always 
12 
ra i sed our voice for those who have suffered". From 
t h i s moment India shif ted her previous pol icy by provid-
ing support to a s eces s ion i s t movement i n Pakistan-
India s t a r t e d to t r a i n and arm Bangaldeshi forces i n -
s ide India and extended covert support t o the Bangladesh 
prov is iona l government to organize a gue r i l l a >©r in 
13 
East Pakis tan. Tte Bangladeshi r e s i s t a n c e movement 
known as the "l»fia3cti Bahini" (Liberat ion brigade) was 
placed under t h e command of a r e t i r e d East Pakistani 
colonel M.A»G» Osmani-
12 Ind i ra Gandhi, India and Bangladesh (New Delhi: 
o r i en t Longman, 197 2), pp. 9-10-
13 Jackson, p . 451-
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These t r a i n i n g s and support t o Bangladeshi guer i l l a 
by India fur ther d is rupted the r e l a t i o n between India and 
Pakis tan, because t h i s g u e r i l l a organiza t ion vdth the 
Indian support d i s rupted the l i n e of communication by-
blowing up br idges , power l i n e s , and t e l egraph ic equipment, 
by k i l l i n g co l labora tors and by harrying the West Pakistani 
a u t h o r i t i e s in genera l . 
As the c r i s i s i n Pakistan grew and sp i l l ed over 
i n t o India , the Indian leaders inched c lose r t o a po l icy 
of confrontation but before going i n to any confrontation 
India wanted to show the c r i s i s of East Pakistan t o the 
i n t e rna t i ona l community and l a t e r wanted t o rece ive world 
opinion in her ovm favour. In t h i s connection Mrs Gandhi 
sent Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on an i n t e rna t i ona l 
tour of many countries? Mrs Gandhi hersel f paid a v i s i t 
t o Western Capi ta ls i n October and Novenber 1971 and she 
met with p a r t i a l success in convincing the U.S. leadership 
t o cut off arms to Pakistan. However, evidence shows tha t 
t h i s cutoff was by no means comolete, and an specif ied 
14 
amount of American weapons did t r i c k l e i n t o Pakistan 
during the course of con f l i c t . 
14 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia; 
Indo-Pakistani Conf l ic ts s ince 1947 (Karachi : 
Vanguard, 1988), p. 127. 
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On the other hand, India got much success in 
focussing the problems of East Pakistan and refugees in 
the eye of Soviet Union. The Soviet President Podgorny 
on April 13, 1971 urged the Pakistani leadersh ip to end 
15 
the "bloodshed and repress ion" a n d ' t o a r r i v e at a 
p o l i t i c a l s e t t l s n e n t with A&ijibur Rehman and other 
p o l i t i c i a n s who have received such convincing support by 
the overwhelming major i ty of the people of East Pakistan 
a t the-recent general e l e c t i o n s . Later on a t r e a t y of 
peace, fr iendship and cooperation was signed between 
India and Soviet >Union on August 9, 1971 i n New Delhi. 
The t r e a t y , both in i t s substance and t iming, was having 
two important foreign po l i cy object ive -
a) For t h e Soviet Union, i t appeared t o l eg i t imise 
fur ther the Soviet s e c u r i t y r o l e in South Asia at 
low p o l i t i c a l cost and second, 
b) From the Indian s e c u r i t y pe r spec t ive , the t r e a t y 
provided a check on what was held to be the nascent 
p o l i t i c a l axLs betx>?een Washington, Pelcing and 
Islamabad, while preserving I n d i a ' s scope for 
Independent ac t ion . 
15 Timothy George, Secur i ty in Southern Asia 2: India 
and the Great Pbwers (Hampshire (England)? Gower 
Publishing Company, L td . , 1984), pp. 89-90. 
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The s igning of the t r e a t y between India and Soviet 
Union was taken by Pakistan in a ser ious way. Even many 
western observers escpressed concern t h a t India might seek 
•to take advantage of the assxirance given by the t r e a t y 
17 
in the c r i s i s of East Pakistan. Soviet Union herself 
accepted the statement of Mrs Gandhi t h a t India i s de te r -
mined t o take a l l necessary measvures t o s top the flow of 
refugees from East Pakistan to India and t o ensure tha t 
those refugees who a r e already in India t o r e tu rn to 
18 
t h e i r homeland without delay. After t he signing of t r e a t y 
the Soviet arms were a l so reported t o reach in India t h a t 
encouraged India to move towards confronta t ion with 
Pakistan without any hes i t a t i on . 
6. The Outbreak of H o s t i l i t i e s 
In l i g h t of the rap id ly d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t ua t i on i n 
East Bengal, t he New Delhi Government f e l t compelled to 
act m i l i t a r i l y on December 3, 1971. The s t r i k e came on 
when Pakistani provided the m i l i t a r y r a t i o n a l e for d i r ec t 
Indian in te rven t ion by at tacking severa l Indian Air Force 
bases i n North-western India. Mrs Gandhi who was in 
17 The Times. August 10, 1971. 
18 Keesinq*s«.1971. p . 24991. 
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Calcutta at the time, flew to New Delhi where she pro-
claimed a state of emergency and said that the country 
19 
was on a "war footing" and "the war in Bangladesh has 
become a war on India". 
India in ro taLia t ion a l so g ive a b e f i t t i n g reply 
and at tacked many important Pakis tan p l a c e s . The Indian 
Army supporting the Bangaldesh g u e r i l l a forces , was able 
quickly t o overrun the former East Pakis tan . In the west 
though the con f l i c t was more balanced, the Indians were 
able to capture some t e r r i t o r y i n Kashmir. Lastly 
Pakistan was defeated by India and Pakis tan surrendered 
herself before Indian Armed forces . Indians a l so got 
success i n t rapping 90,000 Pakis tani s o l d i e r s . East 
Pakistan was separated from Pakistan and became an 
independent s t a t e knwon as "Bangladesh". 
In t h i s war, no doubt, India had suffered 
economically as well as m i l i t a r i l l y but Pa3d.stan suffer-
ed a l o t and a lso l o s t her eas te rn wing. Prom t h i s var 
India showed her s u p e r i o r i t y in arms forces and e s t a b l i -
shed her permanent image i n the eyes of the world. Soviet 
Union was a l so benef i t ted with t h i s war because the 
successful use of Soviet arms by Indian forces , coupled 
19 Jagdev Singh,Opi Gitw, p . 180 
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with the perceived failxire of Chinese and American 
po l i c i e s , perniitted the Soviet Union to energe after the 
conflict vdth i t s prest ige as a r e l i ab l e , effective 
partner enhanced both in India and the broader South 
Asia region. , ' 
/ 
To grapple with the issues in India-Pakistan 
re la t ions during the war, i t i s necessary to understand 
the nature of Indian support in Bangladesh struggle for 
l ibera t ion ' In this connection i t - i s needed to ask 
three questions-
(a) Why did India choose to mi l i t a r i l y intervene? 
(b) What were the forces which supported or opposed 
India 's intervention and why, 
(c) What India wanted to gain? 
India 's in teres t in the Bangladesh war was primari-
ly po l i t i co-s t ra teg ic . India and Pakistan have been lock-
ed in a conflictual relat ionship ever since the pa r t i t ion 
of the sub-continent. The two wars that they have fought 
(1947 and 1965) changed neither the power balance nor the 
po l i t i ca l equation. Therefore, the po l i t i ca l turmoil in 
East Pakistan in 1970-71 which culminated in a c ivi l war 
was for India a golden opportunity to dismember i t s enemy, 
India ' s mili tary intervention on behalf of the Bangla-
deshi freedom fighters was indeed motivated by th is r e -
solve. The presence of 10 million odd East Pakistani 
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r e fugees on i t s s o i l and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an e x i l e 
government i n C a l c u t t a merely p rov ided t h e necessary-
j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r i t s a c t i o n - The a t r o c i t i e s done by 
t h e P a k i s t a n i government upon unarmed peop le of East 
Bengal was condonned by I n d i a n p a r l i a m e n t i n Warch 1971 
xinmistakebly and t h e p a r l i a m e n t a s s u r e d them t h a t t h e i r 
s t r u g g l e and s a c r i f i c e s w i l l r e c e i v e t h e v*iole h e a r t e d 
20 
sympathy and suppor t of t h e peop le of I n d i a . 
Regarding t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e r e was a mixed 
r e a c t i o n t o I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . The v a r i o u s 
heterogeneous fo rces - t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s and l i b e r a l s , 
t h e r a d i c a l s and r i g h t i s t s , t h e s e c u l a r i s t s and r e l i g i -
ous z e a l o t s , t h e c i v i l i a n s and m i l i t a r y , and so on had 
c losed t h e i r r anks on one p o i n t , i . e . overpowering the 
PaJcistani m i l i t a r y J u n t a and wining independence for 
Bangladesh. But over t h e q u e s t i o n of s t r a t e g y i n genera l , 
and I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y r o l e i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e were d i s -
agreements . By and l a r g e , t h e p r o t a g o n i s t s of conven-
t i o n a l war were i n favour of I n d i a ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n vdiile 
t h o s e vdio favoured a p e o p l e s war were no t - But i n t h e 
western wing of P a k i s t a n and some o t h e r Wjslim c o u n t r i e s 
t h e peop le were not i n favour of I n d i a ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 
Bangladesh on a lmost a l l p o i n t s . 
20 Par tha S*Ghosh, Coopera t ion and C o n f l i c t i n South 
Asia (New D e l h i : Manohar P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1989) ,p . 61-
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As far as India 's gain i s concerned, India had 
four principal objectives -
i ) To see that Pakistan lost i t s eastern province and 
its power was reduced, 
i i ) To see the refugees returning t o Bangladesh, 
i i i ) to see that the Coinm\inists, par t i cu la r ly pro-Chinese 
variety , did not gain in p o l i t i c a l strength through 
the l iberat ion movenent, and 
iv) to see that the new nation accept India 's pre-
eninence in the region as a fact of l ife* 
In sp i t e of the above points , India was benefitted 
on other issues- As Pakistan came apart , i t s claim on 
Kashmir also eroded in a major way. The inab i l i ty of 
the West Pakistanis to convince the i r brethren in the 
East to remain in the same pol i ty , made i t exceedingly 
d i f f icul t for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on 
Kashmir on the basis of i t s re l igious composition. 
Naturally, India took advantage of the discrepancy bet-
ween fact and theory. 
7. The Simla Agreement and the Peace Process 
/^ The turbulent period 1970-71 marked a turning 
point in international po l i t i c s in Soth Asia in general 
and India-Pakistan relat ions in pa r t i cu la r . The period 
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vdtnessed the genesis of an i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s 
within the United Pakistan, the s ece s s ion i s t raovement 
and the c iv i l war i n East Bengal, t h e Indian in terven-
t i o n and culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as 
a r e s u l t of the Indo-Pakis tani war of 1971. The Simla 
Agreement of 197 2 was a milestone because i t formed the 
legal bas i s for s e t t l i n g the problems a r i s i n g out of 
the Bangladesh war and for normalisat ion of India -
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s and establishment of durab le peace 
i n the sub-cont inent . 
The Simla Agreenent was signed on Ju ly 2, 197 2 
by Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and Pakistani 
President Mr. Z. A. Bhutto* The accord r e i t e r a t e d the 
d e s i r e of both t h e countr ies t o normalise t h e i r t rade , 
p o l i t i c a l and economic r e l a t i o n s e t c . In her Rajya 
Sabha speech on August 2, 1972 on the Simla Pact , Mrs. 
Indi ra Gandhi s t r e s s e d the need for peace in t he sub-
continent in these words: "I have always be l ieved , and 
I do bel ieve even today t h a t I n d i a ' s major enemy i s not 
Pakistan, i t i s not even big po^^ers, which are in t e res t ed 
in t h e i r sphere of inf luence . I n d i a ' s g r ea t e s t eneny i s 
the economic backwardness o£ the country. I t i s the 
poverty of the country. If we do not have t h a t handicap, 
we would have done many th ings in t he world. We can 
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overcome this handicap, if we have peace"* 
Mr* Bhutto too had shown positive response in 
this direction and said that "Pakistan wants peace with 
India, not because it is afraid but because peace is 
22 
necessary for the progress of nation". 
/ At Simla, India, even after wining the war, did 
not try to impose her views over' Pakistan but make 
Pakistan a partner in peace and peace based on equality 
was concluded. In order to initiate the process of the 
establishment of peace, India and Pakistan agreed that 
"their forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the 
international border. The withdrawl shall commence up-
on entry into force of this agreement and shall be 
completed within a period of thirty days of". 
Both countries implemented almost all the provi-
sions of the agreenent within a short duration of three 
years of the conclusion of the pact. In the past several 
agreements were signed between the two countries with the 
intention of resolving their disputes and establishing 
21 Rajya Sabha (India), Debates. August 2, 1972. 
22 G.S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender; The Simla 
Summit (New Delhi: Sterling, 197 2), p. 124. 
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peace between then as viell as in t he region, but none of 
them proved useful i n e s t ab l i sh ing cooperative understand-
ing and durable peace i n f u l l s p i r i t . Upto some extent , 
Indus Water Treaty of 1960 -was more helpful i n d i s so lv -
ing t h e cont rovers ia l problem of d iv i s ion of Indus Water 
between India and Pakistan and i t i s the only problen 
which had been s e t t l e d s ince 1947 between them, and t h e 
r e s t of the t r e a t i e s were of very short terro s igni f icance 
and a l l of them fa i l ed t o r e so lve actual t e n s i o n . ' Now 
the obvious question i s how far t h e Simla Agreement 
d i f f e r s from the r e s t of the agreements and t o what extent 
i t has succeeded i n e s t ab l i sh ing durable peace-
The s ignif icance of t h e Simla Agreement and i t s 
unique character were h ighl ighted in the statements of 
prominent p o l i t i c a l l eaders i n both t he countr ies-
Sardar Swaran Singh, e r s twhi l e External Affairs 
Minister of India , in his r epo r t t o Parliamentary Consul-
t a t i v e Committee at tached t o his minis t ry sa id , "The 
Simla Agreement was very much unl ike the other agreements 
between India and Pakistan and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Tashkent 
Declarat ion of 1966. According to him the re were follow-
ing dif ferences between the tvo^ 
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1. The Tashkent acco rd had been ach ieved th rough t h e 
good o f f i c e s of a t h i r d coun t ry namely t h e Sovie t 
Union, while t h e Simla Agreement was t h e r e s u l t of 
b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
2. I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , under Tashkent Agreement, agreed 
t o withdraw t h e i r forces t o t h e 1949 C e a s e - ^ i r e Line 
i n Jammu and Kashmir, whereas acco rd ing t o t h e Simla 
Agreement, t h e UN-Supervised c e a s e - f i r e l i n e was r e -
p l a c e d by a m u t u a l l y demarcated Line of t h e Actual 
Con t ro l • 
3 . Under t h e Tashkent D e c l a r a t i o n , I n d i a i n s i s t e d on 
t h e u s e of some of United Nations machinery for r e -
c o n c i l i a t i o n b u t t h e r e was no such p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e 
23 
Simla Agreement. 
S i m i l a r l y , Bip inpal Das, t h e t h e n I n d i a n Deputy 
Fore ign ^^Lnister of I n d i a , whi le d i s c u s s i n g t h e t e x t of 
Simla Agreement, c a l l e d i t , "a sound and e x c e l e n t beginn-
i n g , a r i g h t s t e p i n t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , a h e r a l d of new 
e r a , an e r a of p e a c e , p r o g r e s s and p r o s p e r i t y not only 
for Ind ia and PaJ t i s tan bu t f o r whole of Asia and perhaps 
a s h i n i n g l i g h t house i n t h e e n t i r e wor ld" . He fu r the r 
23 I b i d . , p . 6 6 . 
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s a i d t h a t fo r t h e f i r s t t ime bo th c o u n t r i e s had agreed 
24 
t o s e t t l e a l l d i s p u t e s th rough b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
Mrs Gandhi s a i d t h a t t h e Simla Agreement was i n 
pursuance of domes t ic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s fol low-
25 
ed by Ind ia i n t h r e e y e a r s . 
f^l^ . Bhutto Sa id , "Peace i n t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t was 
26 
not on ly In I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t bu t e q u a l l y In P^klstan's"-
I 
I t i s on ly t h e Simla Accord t h a t t augh t Mr. 
Bhutto about h i s own c o n d i t i o n a s wel l as of h i s own 
coun t ry . Bhutto r e a l ' i z e d t h a t i f he f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h 
f r i e n d l y and c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s wi th I n d i a , he w i l l l o s e 
c o n s i d e r a b l y h i s p r e s t i g e i n t h e eyes of Asian c o u n t r i e s 
e s well a s among h i s own p e o p l e , because Ind ia had noxnnal 
r e l a t i o n s with a l l he r ne ighbours . This caused g r e a t 
change i n h i s t h i n k i n g and t i l l y e s t e r d a y t h e s o - c a l l e d 
war l i k e Bhutto who was always t a l k i n g about \ « r s and 
d e s t r u c t i o n a t once r e a l i z e d t h e impor tance of du rab l e 
peace, and took necessary and concrete steps to gain 
durab le peace . 
24 I b i d . , pp. 69-70. 
25 I b i d . , p . 7 2. 
26 The P a k i s t a n Times. J u l y 3 , 1972. 
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In pu r suance of t h e Simla Agreement t h a t t r a d e 
and c o o p e r a t i o n i n economic and i n o t h e r f i e l d s w i l l be 
resumed.as f a r a s p o s s i b l e , t h e two c o u n t r i e s s igned a 
27 
Trade P r o t o c o l on November 30, 1974 a t Ra\ijaloindi 
p r o v i d i n g for resumpt ion of t r a d e from December 7, 1974. 
According t o t h e P r o t o c o l , t h e two c o u n t r i e s decided 
t h a t t h e t r a d e would be in c o n v e r t i b l e cu r rency and t o 
beg in w i th g e n e r a l l y on a government t o government b a s i s 
o r t h r o u g h government c o n t r o l l e d t r a d e c o r p o r a t i o n s - o f 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e ag reed . This would 
p r e v e n t s p e c u l a t i v e exchanges and i l l e g a l l eakages , and 
vrould h e l p i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t r a d e t h r o u g h mutua l ly bene-
28 
f i c i a l c h a n n e l s . 
Regarding t h e p r o v i s i o n of payments i n c o n v e r t i b l e 
cu r r ency , some problems a r o s e between t h e two coun t r i e s 
because i t was i n t h e i n t e r e s t of I n d i a t o have t r a d e i n 
r u p e e s . The problem was overcome when I n d i a gave conce-
s s i o n t o P a k i s t a n . The two c o u n t r i e s a l s o dec ided i n 
t h e P r o t o c o l t h a t t h e t r a d e would be on t h e b a s i s of t h e 
"most favoured n a t i o n " p r i n c i p l e i n accordance with t h e 
29 
p r o v i s i o n s of t h e GATT. 
27 Surendra Chopra, Post -Simla I n d o - P a k i s t a n Rela t ions 
(New D e l h i : Deep and Deep P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1988) ,p. 207. 
28 I b i d . , p . 208. 
29 The Hjndxistan Times, J a n u a r y 11 , 1986. 
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The P ro toco l noted immediate p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
commencdng t r a d e i n c o t t o n , e n g i n e e r i n g goods , j u t e 
manufac tu re r s , i r o n o r e , r a i l w a y equipment , r i c e and 
t e a . The l e a d e r of P a k i s t a n i d e l e g a t i o n , E i j az Ahmed 
Naik, C h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e Pro toco l as a major s t e p t o -
wards n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s i n t h e Ind ian sub-
30 
c o n t i n e n t i n acco rdance with t h e Simla Agreement. 
No doiabt, t h e s i g n i n g of t h e Simla Agreement l a i d 
t h e foundat ion of new c o n t a c t s and opened p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of meaningful t r a d e * But t h e a c t u a l t r a d e s t a r t e d only-
a f t e r t h e s i g n i n g of t h e Trade Agreement of J anua ry 23, 
1975. This agreement f i r s t l y was v a l i d for one year 
31 
and l a t e r i t was extended for a n o t h e r p e r i o d of two yea r . 
In t h i s agreement i t was made m.andatory t h a t bo th t h e 
c o u n t r i e s have t o t r e a t t h e t imes of impor t s and e:<port 
s t r i c t l y for home consumption- Both t h e c o u n t r i e s a l so 
dec ided t h a t such i t e n s under no c i r cums tances would be 
32 
r e - e x p o r t e d t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . 
In one of t h e most s p e c t a c u l a r developments s ince 
t h e Simla P a c t , I nd ia and P a k i s t a n agreed t o r e - e s t a b l i s h 
d i o l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s by exchanging ambassadors and decided 
30 Chopfa, p . 209. 
31 Kalim Bahadiir, " India and P a k i s t a n " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
S t u d i e s . Vol . 27 ( 3 - 4 ) . 
32 Chopra, p . 213. 
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to restore rail, road and air links after three days 
talks- in the middle of May 1976 at Islamabad. Mrs 
CSandhi expressed the hope that the Islamabad accord 
33 
would lead to a "proper climate of understanding" bet-
ween the tvio countries. On the other hand, Bhutto also 
assured Mrs. Gandhi that Pakistan wotild implanent the 
accord by the agreed date". 
In spite of the above talks, regarding different 
matters, many developmental cooperation were discussed 
between the two countries. It is only in the Simla 
Agreement both countries for the first time decided to 
solve the dispute on any issue bilaterallv. 
/Concl usaon 
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that 
the ideological crisis threatened the very existence of 
United Pakistan. It wes the ideological differences that 
created the internal crisis in Pakistan, and the East 
Pakistani peoples refused to accept a subservient role 
and desired for autonomy. This autonomist demands were 
met with harsh measures by Pakistan and India got an 
opportunity to support the autonomist movement- In India, 
the refugees were comming from Bangladesh. So India 
33 Chopra, p. 224. 
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thought that i t was cheaper to go to war than to absorb 
the refugees into i t s already bloated population. Finally 
these factors propelled India and Pakistan on a coll ision, 
and East Bengal was separated. 
In th is war of 1971, India unquestionably 
established her mil i tary superior i ty not only over 
Pakistan but even in South Asia region. With India's 
superiori ty in the region, i t made sense for PaJcistan to 
develop some, nuclear capabil i ty. Resentment against 
India for i t s part in 1971 war and the dismemberment of 
Pakistan reinforced long-held animosities and feelings 
of s t ra teg ic vulnerabil i ty, which fielded the desire 
for nuclear weapons. 
As Pakistan came apa r t , i t s .claim on Kashmir also 
eroded in a major way. The i n a b i l i t y of the West 
Pakistani to convince the i r brethren in the East to re-
main in the same pol i ty , made i t exceedingly di f f icul t 
for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir 
on the basis of i t s rel igious composition. Naturally 
India took advantage of the discrepancy bet\«en fact and 
theory. 
93 
For the establishment of durable peace i n the 
stib-continent and for the s t t lement of probl^ns a r i s ing 
out of Bangladesh war, Simlci Agreement played very-
important r o l e . The g rea t e s t meri t of t h e Simla Agree-
ment i s t h a t the t-wo countr ies decided t o renounce the 
use or t h r e a t of use of force against each other , t o 
put an end t o the era of con f l i c t and confrontat ion, 
and commit themselves t o standing cooperation and peace-
ful cpexistence. 
The Simla Agreement for both Indian and Pakistani 
leaders served as a guidepost towards peace-btLilding« I t 
helped t o give a sense of d i r ec t i on t o Pakis tan ' s search 
for nat ional i d e n t i t y and i t has given an opportunity t o 
India t o show i t s sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a power 
v^^ Lch seeks a durable peace system with i t s neighbours. 
The Simla Agreement not only reduced the development of 
nuclear and arms race in the region but i t had imporved 
the t rade and economic development a lso-
PART II 
POST-SIMLA DEVELOPMENTS 
C H A P T E R V 
INDO-P-AICISTAIT RELATIONS DURING THE JAIJATA RUL3, 1977-79 
Perhaps no s i n g l e y e a r s i n c e 1947 h a s been so 
momentous i n t h e p o l i t i c a l a n n a l s of I n d i a a s 1977. I t has 
been momentous f o r t h e unexpected b u t epoch-making po l i t i ca l 
change t h a t occured wi th t h e f a l l of Mrs , I n d i r a Gandhi ' s 
emergency regime through t h e b a l l o t box . I t has a l s o been 
mcanentous f o r promised q u a l i t a t i v e change i n the s t y l e of 
p o l i t i c s i n t h e country'- and t h e performance of t h e r u l i n g 
e l i t e . F ina l ly . , i t has been momentous f o r b r i n g i n g a 
d r a s t i c change i n t h e fo re ign p o l i c y of I n d i a and develop-
t ing r e l a t i o n s w i th t hose c o u n t r i e s from v/hich Congress o r 
I n d i r a regime v/as n o t having good r e l a t i o n s . But before 
going f u r t h e r , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o h i g l i l i g h t t he i n t e r n a l 
developments and c r i s i s of I n d i a j u s t b e f o r e 1977. 
1* I n t e r n a l Develorments i n I n d i a and Co l l apse of I n d i r a 
Regime 
In I n d i a betv/een 1974 and e a r l y 1976, an a p p a l l i n g 
s i t u a t i o n came t o p r e v a i l / a s i t u a t i o n of u t t e r l a x i t y , 
a larming f l a b b i n e s s , n e a r complete e ros ion , of t h e e thos 
of work and impermis s ib l e d i s r e g a r d of t h e f i n a n c i a l 
d i s c i p l i n e s n e c e s s a r y for a c o u n t r y l i k e I n d i a , The most 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e demands were put forv^ard and encouraged by 
many p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and g rou i^ - and t h e s l i g h t e s t 
r e s i s t a n c e l e d t o a g i t a t i o n s and d e m o n s t r a t i o n which 
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often ended in violence, jo ined in competit ive radical ism 
by var ious p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s as v;ell as rump groups, one 
s tep l ead ing to another, some of the opposition p a r t i e s 
decided t o abandon the path of democracy, refused to abide 
by the ru l e s of the democratic system and t r i e d t o f ind a 
shor t - cu t to pov/er not by v;inning e lec t ions but by cap tur -
1 
ing the s e a t of po\-/er through d i r e c t ac-cion. 
The f i r s t s tep i n t h i s s t r a t egy v/as seen in Gujarat 
in January 1974 v/hen a student" committee v;as' foxroed to 
lead the ag i t a t ion and t o demond the l e g i s l a t o r to res ign 
from the Assembly of Gujarat , The housed of l e g i s l a t o r s 
were ra ided and they v/ere threa tened v/ith d i re consequences 
i f they did not res ign . F ina l ly Morarji Desai l eader of 
Congress v/ent to hunger s tr i lce i n support of the demond 
Ad 
for d i s so lu t ion of the Gujarat Assembly. In order t o 
save Morarji Desai ' s l i f e , t he Assembly v7as dissolved. 
For the opposi t ion, t h i s opened the flood ga te s . A s imi l a r 
b a t t l e cry was taken up i n 3 iha r and other places of the 
country. 
The prophet of " l o s t causes" Shri Jaya Prakash 
Narayan jumped i n t o the fray a t t h i s stage and gave a c a l l 
for t o t a l revolut ion" . Open dec la ra t ions were made by him 
1 V,P. Dutt, "The Emergency i n Ind ia : 3ackgro\md and 
Rat ionale" , Asicin Survey, Vol, XVI, No. 12 (December 
1976) ', p . 1126. 
2 Ibid. 
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and many o ther oppDsition leaders t h a t the ag i ta t ion to 
paralyse l e g i s l a t u r e s and the governments v/oiild be spread 
to a l l the s t a t e s and the cent re as v /e l l . In a speech to 
September 9, 1974, while announcing the plans for the 
Bihar a g i t a t i o n , Jaya Prakash Narayan sa id : 
Prom t h i s date (October 3-5, 1974) the re v/ill be no 
t r a i n s running through Bihar, buses v/ould be off the road, 
work i n government of f ices including s e c r e t a r i a t v/ould be 
3 
paralysed and shops wi l l remain c losed . 
In the same speech, J . Narayan again said, " I t i s 
nov7 an open confrontat ion vjith the c e n t r e and not merely 
the Bihar Government, The S ta te Government has ne i ther 
s t a tus nor stamina". 
The movement for " to t a l revo lu t ion" was on and was 
given impetus by increas ing the s t r e n g t h of opposition, 
Jaya Prakash Narayan, himself, ou t l ined the follov/ing 
programme for h is movement; 
a) boycott of school and colleges and examinations for 
one year by the s tudents ; 
b) "gherao" of MLA to force them to r e s ign from 'member-
ship i n the Assembly; 
c) Social boycott of M.L.As,; 
d) formation of a p a r a l l e l Assembly; 
3 The Statesman (New Delhi) September 10', 1974, 
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e) paralysing work in govermnent offices, 
f) no tax compaign; 
g) boycott of courts; 
h) establishment of parallel government and parallel 
courts, 
i) appeal to armed forces, police, and government 
4 
servants for support of t'ne movement. 
Some of the o ther l eaders of opposi t ion p a r t i e s 
c r i t i c i s e d the Ind i ra Government and did t h e i r e f fo r t s to 
continue the ag i t a t ion aga ins t the government, George 
Femandes, one of the leaders of S o c i a l i s t Party and the 
Railwaymen's Union sa id in Madras on March 29, 1974: 
"Realise the s t rength which you posses . Seven days' 
s t r i k e of the Indian Railv/ays every thermal Suation in 
the country would c lose down. Ten days s t r i k e on the 
Indian Railways - every s t e e l mil l i n India v/ould close 
dov/n, and the indus t ry i n the country would come to a 
h a l t for the next 12 months. If once the s t ee l mill 
furnace i s switched off, i t takes nine months t o r e - f i r e , 
A 15 days s t r i ke in the Indian Railways — the country 
5 
wil l s t a rve" . 
4 Dutt, Op. c i t . , p . 1127. 
5 The Hindu (Madras) March 30/ 1974, 
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Likewise many other leaders also agitated tt^ 
general people and students by giving firy speeches 
against the government and about the high prices of the 
things. The R,S,S. and other poltical and pressure 
groups were also preaching hatred against lower castes 
and other communities. A veritable campaign of hatred 
and columny against individuals in the congress party 
and against the Prime Minister in particular was un-
leashed. The kind of scurrilous campaign that was carried 
on against Mrs. Indira Gandhi was unique in contemporary 
histor^ .^ The Jan Sangh and R.S.S, were the agencies used 
for spreading the most fantastic rumours. This climate 
6 
of violence and columny resulted in the assassination of 
the Railway Minister L,N, Misl^ ura, and an attempt on the 
life of the Chief Justice A,N. Roy, 
The role of a section of press in this x^ h^ola situa-
tion v/as most: unfortunate. Seme newspapers, including 
some big ones, contributed to the build up of an atmosphere 
of tension, agitation and anarchy. They had no comment to 
make when the opposition used blatantly undemocratic means, 
adopted tactics of gherao and intimidation, staged dliarnas 
in Parliament and State Assemblies, and used the most 
vituperative language in their political compaings. They 
6 Dutt, Op.cit., p, 1133. 
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adopted a see no e v i l , speak no e v i l , hear no e v i l " policy 
where the opposition was concerned, but they were ready to 
pounce upon the Congress Par ty and the Government for any 
major or minor, rea l o r fancied, l a p s e . They gave 
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y to rumours and .^ ome of them became openly 
p a r t i s a n . 
This was the background (Pf vmcartainty, chaos and 
lav/lassness that compled the government to take any d ra s t i c 
s tep in order to imply ru les ar^ d regxilat ions. The immediaue 
c r i s i s V7as resolved v;hen on JuriQ 25, 1975 the President on 
7 
the advice of Mrs, Ind i r a Gandl'-i declared a s t a t e of 
emergency. Mrs Gandhi's sayim^ was t h a t t he imposition 
of emergency -.ras the requi red riseds in order t o avert 
condi t ions of chaos and lav/les^ness, Mrs Gandhi and her 
supporters ' opinion was t h a t tlie emergency v/as declared 
according to -he provis ions of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . All the 
cons t i t u t i ona l procedures v/ere abided by a t the time of 
dec la ra t ion . Not a s ing le s t ep has been taken i n v io la -
t ion of the provisions of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . While the 
imposit ion of emergency v;as vehementally c r i t i c i s e d by 
7 David Tavlor, "India-The s t a r t of a new e ra" . Asian 
Affairs ,^Vol. XI, Par t I I I , October 1980, p . 247. 
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most of the opposi t ion l e a d e r s . I t v;as sa id tha t through 
emergency^ Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi v/anted t o remain i n power. 
In t h i s connection, many leaders of opposi t ion were also 
a r r e s t ed . 
During the emergency, Mrs. India Gandhi received 
much popula r i ty . Some people supported her and her pairty 
due to sympathetic a t t i t u d e tov/ards Congress, and some 
supported due to fear and some due t o t h e i r personal gain. 
But majority of people were agains t the very norms of 
emergency by h e a r t . Tliis coxild noc be unders"cood by Mrs. 
Indi ra Gandhi and her adv i se r s . All the repor t s tha t 
she received predicated a massive v i c to ry for her . Finally, 
she could never be l ieve t h a t the opposi t ion par-cies, in 
view of the shor t time a t uheir d i sposa l , v/ovild form a 
s ingle par ty , cooperate e f fec t ive ly , and evoke a mar tyr ' s 
response from the people. Having the v;rong impressions 
about her p a r t y ' s image in the eyes of the people, Indira 
GandhJ. suddenly announced t h a t e l ec t i on would be held in 
8 
March 1977. 
In the e lec t ion campaign, Mrs, Gandhi 's posi t ion 
was de t e r io ra t ed day by day and the image of opposition 
par ty "Janta Party" was improved. Many Congress leaders 
8 Iqbal Narain, "India 1977: Prom Promise to EcLs-
enchantment", Asian Survey, Vol, XVIII^ NQ. 2, 
February 1978, p. 106. 
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also l e f t Congress par ty and joined Jan ta Party. Majority 
of the people were i r r i t a t e d with the unwarranted a r r e s t s , 
f i r i n g s , ba rba r i c , inhuman, and unimaginative administra-
t ion of the family planning programme. At the time of 
e l ec t ion , masses r e a l i s e d what they were missing during 
emergency. The e l ec t ion striack the f ina l blov; to the 
dominant Congress system, which VJSLS a lready d i s in t eg ra t ing 
under the weight of i t s i n t e r n a l con t r ad i c t i ons . The three 
major bases of Congress 's support - the ru ra l e l ec to ra t e , 
the Muslims and the Harijans - had become a l ianated frcm 
i t i n good measure in the wake of emergency excesses i n 
genercil and the family planning programme i n particiiLar, 
Jagjiwan Ram' s e:d.t from the Congress had i t s ovm share i n 
s t r i k i n g a ser ious wedge in the Harijan support base of 
the organiza t ion . With t h i s , the Congress l o s t her image 
in the eyes of the people and Indi ra regime was colapsed. 
2. Coming to Pov/er of the Janata Party 
The majority of the people were i r r i t a t e d v/ith the 
emergency and c a s t ' ."• t h e i r vote i n favour of Janata Party 
in the general e l ec t ion of the Lok Sabha of March 1977. 
The e l ec t ion resu l t ed in the resounding defeat of Indira 
Gandhi's par ty Congress ( I ) . The Janata Pa^ty won a ' 
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9 
commanding 3 28 of the 542 parl iamentary sea ts and Janata 
Par ty came in pov/er. The Janata Government with Moraji 
Desai as Prime Minister was sworn i n on March 24, 1977. 
3» Reorientat ion of Indian Foreicm Policy 
P o l i t i c a l l y , the year 1977 i s somathing of a land-
mark in t h e h i s to ry of Independent India not only ffo^yn 'fne 
domestic poin-c of view i n India but a l so IfOlfh the external 
point of viev;. With the formation of the Janata Govern-
ment i n 1911, i t was expected t h a t a d r a s t i c change in 
I n d i a ' s foreign policy v/ould take p lace . I t was hoped 
t h a t there wotild be a c e r t a i n amoiont of cooling off of 
r e l a t i o n s with Soviet Union and more in t imate r e l a t i o n s 
v;ith U.S.A. but t h i s was not seen. The Janata Government 
t r i e d to develop very in t ima te r e l a t i o n s with both the 
super powers, and bring about g rea te r balance and sobr ie ty . 
Non-alignment i s the cornerstone of I nd i a ' s Foreign 
Policy and the policy has been i d e n t i f i e d as the policy of 
non-alignment. The Janata Government too adopted t h i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l policy but added the pre f ix of "genxrLne" or 
"proper" before non~alignment. I t s e l e c t i o n manifesto 
9 George Timothy, Securi ty i n Southern Asia 2t India 
and the Great Powers ( Englands Gower, 1984), p^lOO. 
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declared t h a t " i t i s coinr.utted to genvdne non-alignment 
free from attachment to any power b loc" . On March 24, 
1977, the day Morarji Desai v;as sworn in as Prime I'linister, 
he emphatically declared a t a press conference in Nev/ 
Delhi t h a t "The foreign policy of India w i l l be a 'proper ' 
non-alignment pol icy . I t w i l l be fxilly non-alirmed, no 
10 
suspicion of any alignment with any body. I n i t i c t a n g a 
debate i n the Lok Sabha on the demands for grants for the 
Ministry of Sxteimal Affai rs on June 2S/ 1977, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee presented a fu l l exposi t ion of the Janata Govern-
ment' s non-alignment pol icy and i t s viev; of "proper" or 
"genuine" non-alignment. He sa id , "Non-alignm.ent i s not 
the pol icy of an indiv idual or a pa r ty . This i s based on 
nat ional consensus. The pol icy of non-alignment i s in 
fact a log ica l and essent ia l extension of the national 
11 
independence in the f i e l d of i n t e rna t i ona l a f f a i r s . 
Like a l l other p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The Janata Party 
also made foreign pol icy pronouncement in i t s e lec t ion 
manifesto, v/hich shov;ed the broad framexrark of the p a r t y ' s 
foreign po l i cy . Speaking a t a seminar on cont inui ty and 
^^ Indian and Foreign Reviev;, -Vol. 14, No, 12, April 1, 
1977, p . 6. 
11 Lok Sabha Debates ( Ind i a ) , Vol. 3, No, 16, June 29, 
1977, Col. 193. 
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change i n I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy" a t Jav;aharlal Nehru 
Univers i ty , New Delhi, on May 12, 1978, Foreign l i i n i s t e r 
A.E. Vajpayee refer red to goals and objec t ives of the 
Janata Goverrjr.ent, 
"The el act ion manifesto of the Jcinata Party had 
defined the goals of i t s foreign pol icy c l e a r l y and 
p r ec i s e ly . Sven though, as you are wll av/are, the h i s t o r i c 
e l ec t ions of March 1977, were fought e n t i r e l y on domestic 
i s s u e s , the d i rec t ions given in the manifesto became my 
aovemment 's firm guide l i n e s i n the conduct of i t s 
12 
foreign pol icy" . 
The Janata P a r t y ' s e lec t ion manifesto and the 
various statoments and speeches of Janata leaders on 
d i f fe ren t occasions explained the main objectives and 
goals of the Janata Government. 
The Janata manifesto had made a special reference 
to the South Asia region, Vajpayee described h is South 
Asian pol icy as a policy of " turning some swords in to 
ploughshares" in his f i r s t foreign policy speech in the 
Lok Seibha on June 29, 1977: "We have recognised t h a t our 
12 Atal Behari Vajpayee " Ind i a ' s Foreicn Policy Today", 
i n Prasad, Bimal ( e d . ) . India ' s Foreign Policy 
{Ue\-r Delhi: Vikas Publ ica t ions , 1979)/ p. 379. 
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f i r s t p r i o r i t y must be t o promote a r e l a t i onsh ip of 
cooperation and t r u s t with our immediate neighbours. 
We sha l l be v i g i l a n t about our t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y 
but pose no t h r e a t to t h e i r na t ional p e r s o n a l i t i e s . We 
bel ieve i t i s i n our separa te and common i n t e r e s t to 
forge, on the bas is of geography, the sinev7s of economic 
cooperation i n the subcontinent . I f v;e succeed, we 
could ease the burdens for a l l our peoples so t h a t some 
of the swords can be turned i n t o ploughshares and the 
e n t i r e region can b e t t e r t ack le the common enemy of 
13 
poverty and inhe r i t ed degradat ion. 
The Janata Government t r i e d to improve r e l a t i o n s 
with China on the bas i s of Panchsheel. Mr Vajpayee 
said in Parliament, "Based on the old f ive p r inc ip les , 
we must have as our goal the forging of benef ic ia l 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s as i n appropriate between tv;o l a rge 
14 
Asian countr ies l i k e India and China. With t h i s proces 
tafo th ings v;as achieved. F i r s t , uneasy r e l a t i ons with 
China i n the past had d i s t o r t e d the p r i o r i t i e s of the 
coxintry by imposing a heavy defence burden. Secondly, 
13 Foraicm Affairs Record, June 1977, pp. 91-92, 
14 Husati Lai Behl and Dilbagh Singh, " Ind ia ' s Foreign 
Policy under Janata Rule" Social Sciences Research 
Journca, Vol. VI, No. 192 March-July 1981, p. 111. 
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i t was des i r ab l e to c u l t i v a t e f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s with 
China so t h a t Pakistan may not r e v e r t t o i t s old s tance . 
On the o the r hand China v/as a lso eager to improve r e l a -
t ions with India because, they were so much engrossed i n 
t h e i r domestic problems t h a t they wanted peace on borders 
with Ind ia , 
• Apart from giving " f i r s t p r i o r i t y " to b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s v/ith immediate neighbours^ the Janata Govern-
ment declared i t s in tens ion to pursue a polic\^ of c lose 
cooperation v/ith the develoioing count r ies of Asia, Africa 
15 
and Latin America, India a l so extended i t s support to 
the a n t i - r a c i a l po l ic ies and l i b e r a t i o n movements in 
Africa. 
Thus Janata Government emphasised "beneficial 
b i l a t e r a l i s m " as the operat ional guide l ine of Indian 
Foreign Policy, which means mutually benef ic ia l b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s with a l l count r ies for c lose cooperation in 
economic, technological and commercial f i e l d s . I t a lso 
declared in i t s manifesto t h a t i t w i l l oppose a l l forms 
of colonial ism and rac ia l i sm. Further the Janata Govern-
ment made a special reference to the move for the e s t ab l i -
shment of a new In te rna t iona l Economic Order, I t s e lec t ion 
15 Ib id , 
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manifesto l a i d dovm t h a t " i t w i n s t r i v e for the 
peacefxol setrlornent of a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l C±Lspates and 
v/ill -jork \ / i th o ther t h i r d v/orld na t ions to e s t ab l i sh a 
16 
new and j u s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l econonic order . 
Regarding Nuclear policy^ the Janata Party had 
no perspec t ive . Mr. Morarji Desai promised t h a t "if i t 
was not necessary to have nuclear explosions for peace-
17 
ful purpose, then i t should never be done. An addit ional 
feature of the Janata ' s Foreign Policy v/as uhat i t up-
held " l i b e r t y " and "Human Rights" and uas v/ i l l ing to 
denounce t h e i r violation uhenevet and wherever t h i s might 
18 
occur. 
In short:, Janata Party follov/ed a foreign policy 
which \-ias highly pragmatic and aim.ed at promotion of 
national interest. However, there v;as not much deviation 
from the basic principles on which the Indian foreign 
policy had been based so far. There was no much changes. 
The shifts in India's foreign policy during Janata rule 
were neither new nor great e::cept some minor changes. If 
there had been a change, it was a fresh thrust to the 
promotion of the cause of peace and disarmament, to 
16 Ib id , 
17 Husan Lai Behl and Dilbagh Singh, O p . c i t , , p . 112, 
18 Ib id . 
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s t reng th s t a b i l i t y and cooperat ive s p i r i t to fo r t i fv 
independence and freedom from e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
4, New Charter i n Indo-Pakistan Relat ions 
With the forrnation of the Janata Government i n 
India , a s ignif icanu s l i i f t i n I n d i a ' s foreign policy 
came i n scene ta^'/ards not only v;ith Palcistan but about 
other counties a l s o . But here I have to discuss 
I n d i a ' s and Pakis tan ' s at t i - tude towards each other dur-
ing Jana ta period p a r t i c u l a r l y . The Janata Government 
in India projected i t s pol icy -cov/ards I n d i a ' s immediate 
neighbours as a major show-piece of success in the 
realm of foreign pol icy. This poliqv V7as described as 
19 
"benef ic ia l b i l a t e r a l i s m , Tlie Janata Government 
repeatedly emphasised "benef ic ia l b i l a t e r a l i sm" as the 
opera t ional guidel ine of I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy v/hich 
ca l l ed for the development of mutual benef ic ia l b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s with a l l co\intries of the v/orld i n general and 
v/ith I n d i a ' s neighbouring countr ies i n p a r t i c u l a r on the 
basis of "equality, mutual respec t and appreciation of 
each o t h e r ' s s e n s i t i v i t i e s and a s p i r a t i o n s " . The main 
aim of t h i s "neitrhbourhood diplomacy" v:as to promote and 
19 S.D, Muni, "Indic^Beneficial B i la te ra l i sm in South 
Asia", India Quarterly, Volo XXXV, No. 4, October-
Dec emb eFT9797~Pr'^fr7r 
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enrich I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s v/ith the neighbours as a means 
not only t o solving i n h e r i t e d problems but also t o c rea t -
ing a c l imate of confidence and mutual goodwill i n the 
region so t h a t more harmonious and benef ic ia l r e l a t i o n s 
i n economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s might be 
promoted in the t rue s p i r i t of peacefxol coe:-dstence. 
The Janata Government, v/hile set-ting out t o 
define i t s policy towards Pakistan and i t s neighbours, 
f i r s t took a c r i t i c a l s c ru t iny of i t s predecessor ' s 
policy on the subjec t . In t h i s sc ru t iny , i t v/as found 
t h a t thcs previous government's (Mrs, Gandhi's Government) 
policy v/as c r i t i c i s e d by Jana ta Goveamment on the ground 
t h a t i t suffered from a dua l i t y of us ing "good neighbour-
l i n e s s " as a c l i che on the one hand and adorzation of a 
20 
"superior and imperious tone" on the o ther . There v;as 
a lso c e r t a i n lack of c r e d i b i l i t y on accoxint of the 
problem of dealing with nat ional ism and s e n s i t i v i t i e s 
21 
nearer home. The Janata Government declared t o end 
t h i s d u a l i t y and r e s t o r e c r e d i b i l i t y by bui ld ing ."bridges 
of t r u s t and cooperation -.;ith Pakistan and o-her neighbours 
20 A.B, Vajpayee, " I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy Today" 
In te rna t iona l S tudies , Vol, 17, Nos, 3-4, July-
December 1978, p . 381. 
21 A,3, Vajpayee, " I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy in a changing 
World", Indian & Foreign Review, Vol;' 15, No, 21, 
August 15, 1978, p,' 13,' 
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22 
v/ith d e l i g e n c e and t r u s t . 
The main goal of t h i s p o l i c y of J a n a t a Government 
'.ras t o s e r v e I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l as v/ell P a k i s t a n ' s i n t e r e s t 
and of o t h e r south Asian c o u n t r i e s , because the peace and 
s t a b i l i t y i n t h i s r eg ion i s mainly depend on ::he good and 
c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s of I n d i a and PaicLstan. 
The execution of t h e p o l i c y of " b e n e f i c i a l b i l a t e r -
a l i sm and good n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s " h a d . r e a l l y brought a nev/ 
c h a p t e r i n Ind ia -Pa lc i s t an r e l a t i o n s . Th is po l i cy had 
e s p e c i a l l y fou r fea 'cures : 
a) Persona l r a p p o r t , 
b) r e s o l v i n g l o n g s t a n d i n g b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s through 
mutual n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
c ) E:q5ansion of b i l a t e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n 
d) n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , 
a ) Pe r sona l Rapport; F i r s t of a l l , t h e J a n a t a Government 
l e a d e r s sought t o e s t a b l i s h p e r s o n a l r a p p o r t au the h igh -
e s t l e v e l w i th t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t i n each o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . 
This was done through t h e exchange of v i s i t s of each 
o t h e r coun-cry. An i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e of t h e s e exchange of 
22 A.B, Vajpayee, " I n d i a and t h e changing I n u a m a r i o n a l 
Order" , I nd i an and Foreign Review, Vol . 15, No, 9, 
February 15, 1978, p . 12, 
I l l 
v i s i t s was t h a t the Indian s ide adopted a s t y l e of 
presenta t ion t h a t was noticeajbly modest and amicable. 
This was par t icxi lar ly so i n case of Foreign r-liniser A.B. 
Vajpayee, During h i s v i s i t , he not only d i spe l l ed 
apprehensions i n the Pakis tani minds a r i s i n g out of h i s 
Jan Sangh/R.S.S.* background but a lso charmed h i s 
Pakis tani audience by love for , and command of Urdu 
23 
poetry. Mr. A.B, Vajpayee through h i s act ion and s ty l e 
won the confidence of the Pakistani people, 
b) Resolving Longstanding S i l a t e r a l I s sues ; The Janata 
Government r ea l i s ed from the very beginning t h a t complete 
normalisat ion of r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan v/as 
possible only i f a l l outstanding i s sues betv;een the ti70 
countr ies were resolved to the mutual s a t i s f a c t i o n by 
making concession to each o the r . Besides, I n d i a ' s serious 
border d isputes v;ith Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, the 
cons t ruc t ion and design of the Salal Hydro-electr ic 
Project over the Chenab in the upper reaches of Jammu 
and Kashmir v/as an important i s sue v/hich became nev; i r r i -
t a n t i n mutual relationslxLps of India and Palcistan. 
S ign i f i can t ly , the Janata Government was successful i n 
reaching an agreement with Pakistan amicably through 
b i l a t e r a l negot ia t ion on April 4, 1973, The Sala l Project 
i s the f i r s t major scheme which has come up on the western 
^^ Davm (Karachi)* February 10, 1970, 
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r i v e r s . S ince t h e s i g n i n g of t h e Indus Water Trea ty , 
i t i s an i m p o r t a n t agreement r e l a t i n g t o t h e use of 
common w a t e r s . P a k i s t a n ' s Foreign M i n i s t e r Agha Shahi 
s a i d t h a t t h i s agreement was a new s t e p tov/ards the 
road of I n d o - P a k i s t a n i f r i e n d s h i p and n o r m a l i s a t i o n of 
r e l a t i o n s . While s u p p o r t i n g t h e agreement , Ind ian 
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vajpayee s a i d i n t h e Lok Sabha: "The 
agreement once aga in demons t ra te s t h a t t h e J a n a t a 
Government r e s p e c t s i n h e r i t e d o b l i g a t i o n s and seeks t o 
b u i l d v/ith g r e a t e r v i g o u r c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s v;ith 
24 
our immediate n e i g h b o u r s " , Zia--ul-Hag a l s o c o n g r a t u l a -
t e d Vajpayee f o r t a l k s of t h e agreement and expressed 
t h e hope t h a t r e l a t i o n s bet\7een t h e tv;o coxin t r ies v/ould 
con t inue t o develop i n a s p i r i t of mutual accommodation 
25 
and t o t h e b e n e f i t of bo th t h e c o u n t r i e s . Thus, t h e 
agreement -./as g e n e r a l l y welcomed i n bo th I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n , because i t had b rought t o an end a p o t e n t i a l l y 
exp los ive d i s p u t e v/hich had dragged on f o r e i g h t yea r s 
and which could have e m b i t t e r e d r e l a t i o n s betv^een the 
tx^io c o u n t r i e s . 
24 Surendra Chopra, Post^Simla Indo-Pak Re l a t i ons , 
(New D e l h i : Deep & Deep, 1988), p . 228. 
25 The Tribune (Chandigarh) June 10, 1980. 
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c) Expansion of B i l a t e r a l Cooperat-Lon; Janata Govern-
ment was not only eager t o resolve a l l outstanding 
i s sue s with i t s neighbours b i l a t e r a l l y but also to 
expand the areas of mutual cooperation i n various 
f i e l d s i n the s p i r i t of economic accommodation on India's 
p a r t . This policy of c l o s e r i n t e r a c t i o n and cooperation 
with immediate neighbour v/as vigorously pursued from the 
very beginning of the Janata per iod . Vajpayee^ the 
Janata Foreign Minis ter , emphasised the "logic of economic 
cooperat ion i n a s p i r i t which i s of advantage to both 
c o u n t r i e s . Considering the atmosphere more congenial 
a f t e r the e x i t of Mrs Indra Gandhi, General Zia asked 
India t o have a more l i b e r a l posture and give Palcistan 
a more favourable balance of t r a d e . An important 
development which took place during the Janata regime 
was t h a t the t rade was resumed on government to govem-
26 
ment bas i s as envisaged by the 1974 pro tocol . I t 
r e s u l t e d in a slump i n I n d i a ' s exports and created an 
unfavourable balance. In s p i t e of unfavourable balance 
of t r a d e , the Indian Government was keen to continue 
v/ith much des i red c lose r l i nk with Pakis tan. 
A telecommunication Agreement was signed bettifeen 
India and Pakistan on October 1, 1977, a t Islamabad. The 
26 Chopra, Op .c i t . , p , 217. 
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agreement provided f o r the con t inuence of t h e e x i s t i n g 
te leconununicat ion s e r v i c e s p u t i n t o o p e r a t i o n under t h e 
I n d o - P a k i s t a n Telecommxinication Agreement of September, 
1974 and f o r t h e i r improvement by t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
27 
a d i r e c t s a t e l l i t e l i n k betv;een t h e tiAro c o u n t r i e s . 
During Mr, Va jpayee ' s goodr/zill v i s i t t o Palcistan 
i n I\2bruary 1978, bo th s i d e s h e l d d i s c u s s i o n s on f u r t h e r 
exchanges i n t h e a r e a s of a g r i c u l t u r e , c u l t u r e and spor t s . 
Being "b ig b r o t h e r " , I n d i a agreed t o exchange farm t ech -
nology, and o f f e r ed Ind i an a s s i s t a n c e t o Paicistan i n the 
28 
f i e l d of peacefu l n u c l e a r r e s e a r c h . Here t h e Indian 
Government under J a n a t a r u l e t r i e d t o b r i n g accommodating 
adjustx:ient a t a l l t h e meet ings of I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . 
Even Z ia -u l -Haq went t o t h e e^ctent of s ay ing t h a t " our 
r e l a t i o n s w i l l imporove as t h e y (accommodating a t t i t u d e s ) 
29 
should be betiveen two f r i e n d s " , 
d) N o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s : The J a n a t a 
Government a l s o fol lowed t h e p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y and 
n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of o t h e r coxontcL-
e s p a r t i c u l a r l y of ne ighbour ing c o u n t r i e s . The s p i r i t 
27 Foreign A f f a i r s Record, Vol . 23, No. 1 1 , 1977,p . 189. 
28 The Times of I n d i a (New Del l i i ) , August 15, 1977. 
29 The S ta tesman, February 7, 1978. 
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and en thus iasm of J a n a t a Government* s p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i -
t y and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e can be guessed from t h e viev/s of 
A,B, Vajpayee v/hen he p o i n t e d ou t i n h i s address a t a 
seminar i n Nev/ Delhi i n May 1977 and he s a i d : 
"The J a n a t a Government, from t h e f i r s t day of i t s 
e x i s t e n c e , s e t ou t d e l i b e r a t e l y t o c l e a r t h e Coba-;ebs of 
s u s p i c i o n , and ban i sh t h e f e a r of i n t e r f e r e n c e . We have 
no t on ly p ro f e s sed s t r i c t n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s of i t s ne ighbour s , b u t _also p r a c t i s e d i t , o f t en 
i n t h e face of g r e a t t e m p t a t i o n t o do t h e contrar^^. In 
seek ing c o o p e r a t i o n from and o f f e r i n g i t t o our ne igh-
bour s , X'/e have never imxxjsed o u r s e l v e s upon them. We 
have g e n e r a l l y t r i e d t o ercplain t o them t h e mu tua l i t y of 
advantage i n b i l a t e r a l i s m and allov/ed t h e i r r e s i s t i b l e 
l o g i c of geography t o a s s e r t i t s e l f , . , we have conducted 
and a r e conduc t ing an open p o l i c y of f r i e n d s h i p , mutua l ly 
advantageous c o o p e r a t i o n and equal and " b e n e f i c i a l 
30 
b i l a t e r a l i s m " v;ith our n e i g h b o u r s " . 
The J a n a t a Government fol lowed t h e p o l i c y of 
n e u t r a l i t y and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e n o t on ly v e r b a l l y bu t 
v a r i o u s l e a d e r s of J a n a t a Government had a l s o shox^n i t 
iO Vajpayee, " I n d i a ' s Fore ign P o l i c y Today" i n ^/Tn 
ff^ad ( ed , ), I n d i a ' s Fore ign P o l i c y (New Delhi : 
Vikas P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1979) , pp . 3 -4 . 
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p r a c t i c c J . l y a t many o c c a s i o n . The o c c a s i o n came on J u l y 
5 , 1977 u h e n Z.A, E h u t t o was d i s p l a c e d from o f f i c e i n a 
m i l i t a r y c o u p . The J a n a t a Government r e g a r d e d t h e o v e r -
31 
throv/ o f t h e B h u t t o o r e g i m e a s an " i n t e r n a l a f f a i r " o f 
t h a t c o u n t r y and d i d n o t p a s s any comraant, I n d i a ' s 
f o r e i g n t l i n i s t e r "^/ajpayee r e i t e r a t e d t h i s p o s i t i o n d u r i n g 
h i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t i n F e b r u a r y 1978 and s a i d t h a t I n d i a 
r e s p e c t e d t h e r i g h t o f e a c h c o u n t r y t o d e t e r m i n e i t s 
p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . When t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e v/as c o n f i r m e d 
on Z.A, E h u t t o and v/hen h e was h a n g e d i n March 1979, 
t h e r e v/as no c h a n g e i n I n d i a n Government* s p o s i t i o n . I n 
f a c t v;hen Pr ime M i n i s t e r M o r a r j i D e s a i vras a s k e d 
e s p e c i a l l y on t h i s i s s u e d u r i n a h i s B a n a l a d e s h v i s i t , he 
32 
r e f u s e d t o make any comment . Only P r e s i d e n t o f I n d i a , 
Mr, Reddv made a s t a t e m e n t t h a t on " h i j m a n i t a r i a n g r o u n d s " 
33 
P r e s i d e n t Z i a - u l - H a q s h o u l d s p a r e B h u t t o ' s l i f e . 
I n v i e w o f t h e s h a r p p o l i t i c a l c l e a v a g e s t h a t 
e x i s t e d w i t h i n P a k i s t a n , t h e p o s i t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y and 
n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e a s o b s e r v e d by I n d i a d u r i n g : t h e J a n a t a 
r e g i m e a p p e a r t o be f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e , P a k i s t a n was 
f a c i n g s e v e r e p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s i n t e r n a l l y and needed 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t and r e c o g n i t i o n i n h e r d r i v e s f o r 
3 2 B a n g l a d e s h Times ( D a c c a ) A p r i l 1 8 , 1 9 7 9 . 
33 The Times of I n d i a , F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 7 9 , 
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survival and systenance, Herev I n d i a ' s pos i t ion of 
n e u t r a l i t y and non- in ter ference meant t h a t India showed 
the ges ture of accommodation towards Pakistan, Thus , 
the t h r u s t of the Janata Goveimment' s pos i t ion in 
respec t of n e u t r a l i t y and non- in ter ference cons t i tu ted 
a s i g n i f i c a n t departure i n an idea log ica l sense and i n 
respec t of previous government of Ind ia , 
5, Evaluation of J a n a t a ' s Policy Towards Pakistan 
The J a n a t a ' s pol icy aimed a t serving concrete 
nat ional i n t e r e s t s and advance the process of coopera-
t ion not only beti-^een Pakistan and India but i n the s\ib-
cont inent as w e l l . The gains of the Jana ta policy was 
t h a t I n d i a ' s approach ( in Jana ta regime) invoked recipro-
c i t y i n some matters from i t s neighbours which helped a 
l o t i n br inging closeness i n following x^ays: 
( i ) Pakistan responded t o I n d i a ' s suggestions for open-
ing b i l a t e r a l l i n k s and channels for the flow of people, 
communication and information between the two count r ies . 
By the middle of 1979; on an average 9000 Pakistani and 
14,000 Indian v i s a s were being granted for v i s i t s be t -
ween the ti>ro coun t r i e s , 
( i i ) Owing to the Janata Government's new approach, the 
p o l i t i c a l atmosphere between India and Pakistan was alao 
re laxed . For example Mr. A.B.^ V&jpayee i n h i s v i s i t t o 
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Is lamabad of February 1978, h e l d t a l k s vrlth Z i a - u l Haq 
and Agha Shahi i n peacefxol a tmosphere , Vajpayee a l s o 
r e j e c t e d t h e n o t i o n of hegemony over t h e r e g i o n by any 
34 
one c o u n t r y . Whatever v a l u e one may a s s i g n t o t h i s 
s t a t e m e n t , i t he lped i n c r e a t i n g a f e e l i n g of t inder-
s t a n d i n g betai;een I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . 
( i i i ) The r h e t o r i c , of harmony and mutual conf idence 
by t h e t e a c h e r s of bo th I n d i a and P a k i s t a n c i iLt iva ted 
a p l e a s a n t atmosphere betr.-jeen I n d i a and P a k i s t a n a t -
l e a s t f o r t ime b e i n g . Soon a f t e r t a k i n g t h e oa th of 
o f f i c e on March 24, 1977, Prime M i n i s t e r Morar j i Desai 
s t a t e d i n a p r e s s confe rence t h a t I nd i a wanted f r i e n d - . 
l y r e l a t i o n s w i th a l l c o u n t r i e s . I f t h e t r e a t y of 
peace and f r i ends l i i p w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union stood i n 
t h e wav of f r i e n d s h i p w i th t h e o t h e r s , t h e n i t woxxld 
35 
have t o go . 
On t h e o t h e r occas ion when Agha Shahi v i s i - t ed 
I n d i a i n Apr i l 1978, Desai t o l d t h e P a k i s t a n i J o u r n a l -
i s t s t h a t he was p repa red t o s o l v e a l l problems wi th 
P a k i s t a n through n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h a t t h e r e was more 
unde r s t and ing beti-zeen P a k i s t a n and I n d i a today than in 
36 
t h e p a s t t h i r t y y e a r s , Z i a - u l Haq s a i d t h a t Desai was 
34 K e e s i n q ' s Contemporary Arch ives , June 9 , 1979, 
p . 29019, 
35 Peking Review, March 25 , 1978, 
36 I n d i a Today, (New Delhi ) , February 16-19 , 1980 ,p ,84 . 
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s ince r and en thus ias t i c tov/ards improvement of r e l a t i o n s 
v/ith Pakis tan. 
6, The Development of the Afghan C r i s i s 
and the Indian Approach 
Though war has not taken place betv/een India and 
Pakistan since 1971/ a number of events have taken place 
t h a t have affected the r e l a t i o n s of these taw'o coun t r i e s . 
One of the most im.portant events i s the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanis-
tan produced a c r i s i s not simply for the Afghan people 
but for the regions of South and South-West Asia as we l l . 
I t confronted the main regional ac tors - Pakistan, I ran 
and India with a new p o l i t i c a l - s t r a t e g i c s i tua t ion to 
which they reacted in d i s t i n c t i v e ways. However, Soviet 
invasion has affected the v/hole v/orld par t icxi lar ly the 
Afghanistan 's neighbours but here I have to study the 
e f fec ts of invasion in South Asia espec ia l ly on india-
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . For the count r ies of Pakistan and 
India , the Soviet invasion se r ious ly changed the regional 
balance of power, and put them almost overnight i n the un-
eviable pos i t ion of having t o respond to t h i s new develop-
ment and cope with i t s consequences i n t h e i r own p a r t i -
c u l a r ways. There responses', however, c ame to be formu-
l a t e d not so le ly on the ba s i s of the needs and asp i ra -
t ions of the Afghan people. Natura l ly , they also took 
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i n t o account t h e i r ov/n i n t e r e s t s . The responses t h a t 
they adopted e s s e n t i a l l y mirrored these p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t and s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f fe red from each o ther , 
Pakistan chose t o pursue ac t ive opposi t ion to the 
Soviet invasion', and India made no public condemnation 
of the invas ion . 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 
37 
1979/ occured during the f inal days of Charan Singh 's 
ca re taker Government, The Soviet t roops entered Afghan-
i s t a n , overthrew the government of Hafizullah Amin and-
i n s t a l l e d a nevr regime under the l eade r sh ip of Babrak 
Karmal, 
A niamber of fac tors a r i s e s from the Soviet inva-
sion v/hich shaped Pak is tan ' s response. This Pakis tan ' s 
response and the Soviet r e l a t i o n s with India shaped the 
Indian approach t o the Afghan c r i s i s , 
Pakistan showed a number of reasons to become 
very fearfxil of the impl ica t ions of the Soviet invasion 
for i t s na t ional i n t e g r i t y and secur i ty as well as 
regional i n t e r e s t . Pakis tan, the re fore , found herse l f 
37 George Timothy, ed. , Securi ty i n Southern Asia 2; 
India and the Great Powers (England: Gower Publish-
ing Company Ltd . , 1984), pp, 110-111. 
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with l i t t l e choice but t o adopt a stance of act ive oppo-
s i t i o n to the invasion by providing g r e a t e r l o g i s t i c 
support for the Mujahideen and ac t ing as the main conduit 
for supply t o them of outs ide arms v/hich l a rge ly became 
ava i lab le only \irhen the Soviet invasion generated i n t e i 
na t ional sympathy for MujaMdeen, 
The whole development of Afghan c r i s i s provided 
the i n t e rna t i ona l a s s i s t ance which began t o pour i n to 
Pakistan for the Afghan refugees and Mujahideen, t h i s 
type of ass i s tance helped Pakistan, and Zia achieved 
th ree important t h ings : 
a) l i r s t , he was able on the one hand t o strengthen and 
sus ta in h i s m i l i t a r y base of support , and on the 
o'cher hand t o generate an xmprecednted leve l of 
economic a c t i v i t y and grov/th i n support of grea ter 
domestic s t a b i l i t y , 
b) Second, he managed to assume a cen t r a l posi t ion in 
regional pov/er p o l i t i c s and to earn for h is regime 
a l a r g e r degree of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p e c t a b i l i t y 
than \/oxild normally be the case with a regim.e of 
t h a t type , 
c) l i n a l l y , he succeeded i n drax\?ihg on the f i r s t two 
to demoralise h i s domestic opponents and neu t ra l i se 
h i s external c r i t i c s . As a resxil t , Pakistan secured 
what one might c a l l c o n f l i c t based soc ia l and econo-
mic s t a b i l i t y . 
122 
This collid i n no v;ay please Ind ia , The reneual 
of U.S.-Pakistan t i e s and the grov/th of China-Pakistan 
friendsli ip was contrary to t he regional and global 
i n t e r e s t of India , 
I n d i a ' s response towards the invas ion of Afghan-
i s t a n by U,S,S,Pv, r e f l ec t ed her own na t iona l pecTJliari-
t i e s because India did not vrant to make. Soviet Union 
unhappy and wanted t o make the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 
1971, a l i ve t h a t i s why India covild not publ ica l ly 
condemn the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union, 
I n d i a ' s r ep resen ta t ive a t the U.N,, Brajesh Ilishra, 
j u s t i f i e d the Russain invas ion of Afghanistan refer ing 
to "-che attempts of the outs ide powers to i n t e r f e r e in 
the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Afghanistan by t r a in ing , arming 
33 
and encouraging subversive elements ," He fur ther a t 
the anergency session of U,2T, General Assembly i n a care-
fiiLly worded decl-aration, s t a t ed t h a t "the Soviet Govern-
ment has assured our Government that i t s toops v/ent to 
Afghanistan a t the request of the Afghan Govemmen-c, a 
request t h a t was f i r s t made by President Amin on 
December 26, 1979 and repeated by h i s successor on 
December 28, 1979, and we have been fu r the r assured t h a t 
38 New York Times (Weekly Review), January 13, 1980. 
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the Soviet t roops w i l l be V7ithdra\7n vrhen requested to do 
so by the Afghan Government. We have no reason to doxibt 
such assurances, p a r t i c u l a r l y from a f r iendly coxontry 
39 
l i k e the Soviet Union, La te r , Ind i ra Gandhi to ld a 
r epo r t e r t h a t she v/as indeed aga ins t the Soviet in terven-
t i o n i n Afghanistan but t h a t she regarded the U.S. as 
40 
respons ib le for destabl is l i ing t he region, India even 
c r i t i c i s e d the General Assembly's d iscuss ing the Soviet 
invasion and did not t a k e p a r t i n supporting the resolu-
t i o n aga ins t Soviet Union in which Assembly strongly 
deplored the Russian in t e rven t ion i n Afghanistan and ca l led 
for "the immediate, uncondit ional and t o t a l withdrawal of 
41 
foreign troops. 
The position which India adopted during the 
General Assembly Session provoked considerable amazement 
particularly to Pakistan and his allies. Subsequently 
Indian officials sought to doxmplay it and did not 
reiterate it publically in nearly as stark terms. For 
example, the Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao 
spealcing in Parliament on January 23, 1980 said that India 
39 UN General Assembly Si:cth Emergency Special Session, 
Provisional Verbatism Record of the Third Meeting, 
Document (A/SS-6/F.V. 3, General Assembly, U.N., 
January 11, 1980). 
40 Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan and World Society 
(Karachi; Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 117. 
41 Ibid. 
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hoped t h a t " , , , , t h e peop le of Afghanis tan v d l l be ab le 
t o r e s o l v e t h e i r i n t e r n a l problems v a t h o u t o u t s i d e i n t e r -
f e rence " We a r e a g a i n s t t h e p r e sence of fo re ign 
t r o o p s and b a s e s i n any c o u n t r y . We have expressed our 
hope t h a t t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s v / i l l withdrav; from Afghanis tan. 
He also exp re s sed deep concern about t h e i n d u c t i o n of arms 
i n t h e r e g i o n (a r e f e r e n c e t o t a l k a t t h e t ime of p o s s i b l e 
American m i l i t a r y a id t o P a k i s t a n ) and t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
Grea t po^/er c o n f r o n t a t i o n as a t h r e a t t o ' t h e loeace and 
42 
s t a b i l i t y of t h e r eg ion i n c l u d i n g t h e s e c u r i t y of I n d i a . 
The Ind ian r e a c t i o n t o t h e bloody coup of Apr i l 1973 i n 
v;hich \inder t h e aeg i s of pro-Mascoi-/ t h e P e o p l e ' s Democratic 
P a r t y of Afghanis tan (PDPA) t opp l ed t h e r e p u b l i c a n govern-
ment of Mohanunad Dchid, v/as a l s o q u i t e r e l a x e d . The 
p r e v a i l i n g b e l i e f i n I n d i a v;as t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union had 
43 
n o t i n i t i a t e d t h e Apr i l 1978 coup b u t r a t h e r had 
e x p l o i t e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s p r e s e n t e d by i t . 
From t h e above arguments of Ind i an o f f i c i a l s and 
l e a d e r s , i t becomes c l e a r t h a t I n d i a ' s approach t o Afghan 
c r i s i s i s depend on two p o i n t s . One i s on I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y 
i n t h e r e g i o n . In t h i s way, I n d i a opposed more t o the 
42 Foreign A f f a i r s Record, J anua ry 19S0, p . 19, 
43 Timothy, O p . c l t , , p . 1 1 1 . 
125 
supply of arms to the Pakis tan from other coxantries p a r t i -
cxilarly from U.S. and China than t h a t of the Soviet invas -
ion . Second, India remain v/anted to maintain her r e l a t ions 
v/ith Soviet Union because Soviet Union had come to I n d i a ' s 
rescue i n her c ruc ia l t ime. 
Conclusion 
The Janata Party folloi-zed a foreign policy ;/hich 
^^ ras highly pragmatic and aimed a t promotion of national 
i n u c r e s t s . However, the re \7QS not much deviat ion from the 
basic p r inc ip l e s on which the Indian foreign policy had 
been based so fa r . If the re had been any deviation then 
i t v/as a fresh t h r u s t t o s t rengthen peace, s t a b i l i t y and 
cooperat ive s p i r i t to f o r t i f y independence and freedom 
from exp lo i t a t i on . 
During the Janata period the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i ons 
weire improved with neighbours par t ic^I lar ly with Pakistan. 
The Janata pol icy created a cl imate of confidence and 
mutual goodi/ill between India and Pakis tan, Through the 
exchange of v i s i t s between India and Pakistcin, the 
leaders of both the count r ies d i spe l l ed the apprehensions 
of fundamentalism of some of the >luslim and Hindu 
organisa t ions from the mind of the people of both the 
coun t r i e s . With t h i s , many outstanding disputes between 
India and Pakiscan were resolved and the areas of mutual 
cooperation i n var ious f i e l d s were expanded. 
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Regarding the Afghan c r i s i s India followed tv-zo 
viev7s. F i r s t , she f e l t a' f ea r for her s ecu r i t y because 
of massive arms supply to Pakistan by U.S. and China. 
Secondly, India could not pub l ica l ly condemned the 
invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union because India 
v/anted to keep a l ive her r e l a t i o n s V7ith Soviet Union. 
C H A P T E R VI 
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN INDQ-PAKISTAI'J RELATIONS^ 1980-92 
I t i s w e l l kno\m f a c t t h a t I n d i a and Pak is tan 
s i n c e t h e i r ve ry i n c e p t i o n had c o n f l i c t u a l and c o n t r o -
v e r s i a l p o l i c i e s . Many b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s and some i n t e r -
na l f a c t o r s came as a h u r d l e between I n d i a and Pak i s t an , 
and t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s d e t e r i o r a t e d , 
P a k i s t a n had t h e b e l i e f ' t h a t i t was p o l i t i c a l l y and eco-
nomica l ly weaker than I n d i a , This i n h e r e n t weakness and 
l i m i t a t i o n of h e r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s I n d i a l ed h e r t o 
coxmter t h i s b i d by seek ing a " p a t r o n s " who wo\ald support 
h e r i n h e r d i p l o m a t i c d i s p u t e s wi th I n d i a and guaran tee 
h e r s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t any t h r e a t from t h e q u a r t e r . Pak i s t an 
i n t h i s sense was successfxil i n making f r i e n d s h i p t o those 
major powers who can come t o h e r r e s c u e i n he r c r u c i a l 
t i m e , P a k i s t a n , through t h e h e l p of wes t and sane Muslim 
c o u n t r i e s ' , develop>ed bo th h e r arms and n u c l e a r f i e l d , and 
h e r economic c o n d i t i o n a l s o , w h i c h b rough t a t h r e a t t o 
I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . 
1 . Indiaft o b j e c t i o n s t o P a k i s t a n ' s Arms Purchases 
P a k i s t a n had been t h e t r a d i t i o n a l arms purchase r 
from United S t a t e s s i n c e p a r t i t i o n , and most of t he arms 
i n P a k i s t a n a r e s u p p l i e d by U.S. In s p i t e of U,S. l i n k , 
P a k i s t a n had a l s o developed h e r r e l a t i o n s wi th China , 
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France and some other coTintries for economic and defence 
support from time to tirtie. 
(a) Pak i s t an ' s Purchase of Arms from the U.S. ; The United 
S t a t e s tended to neglect Pakistan a f t e r 1971 despi te 
General Yahya Khan's r o l e i n ge t t i ng the U.S.A. and China 
c lose to each o ther . Z.A. Bhutto was not wholly t r u s t e d 
by U.S. pol icy makers. However, Pak i s t an ' s new m i l i t a r y 
r u l e r General Zia-ul-Haq has proved to be an extremely 
shrewd r u l e r . I t was Zia-ul Haq who, due to invasion of 
Soviet t roops i n Afghanistan, made Pakistan very important 
t o the U.S. overnight , U.S. was also i n search of such 
a l l y as Pakistan was, Zia a s t u t e l y expected American 
over-act ion to the Soviet en t ry i n t o Afghanistan not only 
t o prop up h i s own regime bu t a l so to refurbish the 
Pakistan image. Pakistan became in U.S. perception " a 
f ront l i n e s t a t e " and assumed a s t r a t e g i c importance which 
trancended a l l o ther cons ide ra t ions . Zia-xil Haq, i n the 
bargain with U.S. , was able to prevai l upon on tha U.S. to 
provide massive economic and m i l i t a r y a id . Zia who had 
e a r l i e r re jec ted the U.S. a-id worth ^ 400 mi l l ion descr ib-
ing i t as "peanuts", e s t ab l i shed a new secur i ty r e l a t i o n -
1 
ship with U.S. by accepting ^ 3 , 2 b i l l i o n economic and 
1 Sat ish Ktmiar, ed . , Yearbook on India ' s Foreign Policy 
1987/88 (New Delhij Sage Publications ' , 1988), p . 86. 
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military aid package in 1981. The U.S. viewed its 
connections with Pakistan, its anti-Soviet "strategic 
consensus" plan and Pakistan needed U.S. support for 
its security in view of the changed geographical situa-
tion in the region, Pakistan required massive arms 
supply for promoting U.S. interests in the region and 
in this context managed arms for itself with some top 
and new weapons, Pakistan had nevertheless accepted 
the status of a "frontline state" and embarked upon an 
ambitions expansion and modernisation programme for its 
armed forces with the friendly countries. In June 1981, 
Reagan administration concluded a major agreement for the 
transfers of sophisticated American military equipment 
2 
and technology to Pakistan. 
Thus the U.S. arms aid to Pakistan in the wake 
of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan caused understand-
able adverse reaction to India. It not only hindered the 
India's improving relations with Pakistan but also 
increased Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union. 
These developments sparked off another bout of race for 
more and more arms in South Asia especially between India 
and Pakistan. With the Soviet intervention, the region 
of South Asia was directly involved by two super powers. 
2 New York Times, June 16, 1981. 
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The most serious impact was the emergence of "New Cold 
War" which had been brought to the region. The Indian 
experts thought that the arms and weapons supplied by 
U.S.A. to Pakistan would be of little use against Soviet 
Union, They were more likely to be used against India. 
This has been the Indian experience during 1965 and 1971 
war. This time United States has shown no desire to 
assure India that the weapons supplied by it to Pakistan 
would not be used against India, 
In this significant change in Asia, the new 
relationship between Pakistan and United States shows 
that Pakistan has come to occupy an important place in 
U.S. strategic plans in the region. With the establish^ 
ment of the U.S. Central Command in Diego Garcia in the 
Indian Ocean, the security relationship between U.S.A. 
3 
and Pakistan was currently at an all time high. It is 
presumed that"in the U.S. strategy, Pakistan had major 
even vital role to play in the region. This development 
of U,S, in Indian ocean impinges on India's security 
environment because in the event of conflict between 
India and Pakistan, the Central Command could be of great 
assistance to Pakistan, It was not difficult to understand 
3 V.D. Chopra, ed., Pakistan and Asian Peace (New Delhi: 
Patriot Publishers, 1985)', p. 117. 
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I n d i a ' s concern about these developments i n i t s neighbour-
hood. Since Pakistan was the centre of t h i s s t r a t e g i c 
network, India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s had been adversely 
affected. 
The Pakist-Sn* s acquir ing Airborne Warning and 
command System (AWACS) combined with most sophis t ica ted 
4 
F-16 with nuclear c a p a b i l i t y and Harpoon miss i l es from 
the United S ta tes fu r the r upset the m i l i t a r y balance i n 
the region. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the supply of t h i s 
sophis t i ca ted system to Pakistan was the a l leged frequent 
v io l a t i ons of t h a t coun t ry ' s border by Soviet and Afghan 
a i r c r a f t . While the r e a l i t y was t ha t the AWACS was i n -
effec-cive i n the mountainous t e r r a i n of Afghanistan. The 
experts opined t h a t AWACS would, on the o ther hand, be of 
tremendous value i n monitoring Indian a i r - space as well as 
a s ign i f i can t por t ion of the Soviet a i r space i n the 
Tashkent region. The Indian experts bel ieved t h a t the 
in t roduct ion of AWACS i n t o Pakistan woiold pose grea t 
challenges to I n d i a ' s a i r defence i n future and a t present 
a completely new paradigm of secur i ty concern to the 
defence p lanners . 
4 J.K. Baral , "Indo-Pak Diplomacy since 1981 j Motiva-
t i o n s , S t r a t eg i e s and Prosjjects", Foreign Affairs 
Reports, Vol. XXXV, Nos. 4 -5 , April-May 1986, p . 33. 
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When i n the beginning of 1987 United States 
Congress was going to d i scuss the second tranche of arms 
5 
suppl ies to Pakistan inc lud ing the AWACS, Pakistan wanted 
to give the U.S. Congressmen an impression of a beleagu-
ered nat ion facing both the Soviet t h r e a t , and the mass-
ive Indian armed forces . This would c e r t a i n l y f a c i l i t a -
ted the approval by the Congress of the United Sta tes a 
massive economic and arms a id amounting to 4,2 b i l l i o n 
d o l l a r s . India was keen to de -esca la te tension rapidly 
and to demonstrate the rou t ine na ture of the excercises 
6 
which had no h o s t i l e i n t e n t behind them. India also 
wanted to ensure t h a t the Members of Senate and House of 
Representative should not be misled by the Pakis tan 's 
f a l se propaganda, 
(b) China' s Arms Supply to Palcistan; Another dispute 
between India and Pakistan was the c lose l i nk tha t has 
been es tab l i shed between Pakistan and China i n the 
production of armaments. I t has changed from one of 
simple arras sa l e s to Pakistan a l b i e t under •* fr iendship 
r a t e s " to one of cooperation i n i t s production. The 
improving r e l a t i o n s of Pakistan and China were d i rec ted 
5 The Times of India, January 24, 1987. 
6 The Hindu, February 27, 1987, 
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agains t Ind ia , With the s a l e s of arms by China to 
Pakistan, Pakistan der ives ta^ro d i s t i n c t advantages. 
1. F i r s t , i t c rea ted the prospect of having to f igh t a 
b a t t l e on two fronts for India t h a t can present 
India with a formidable chal lenge. 
2, Second, Pakistan brought Chia ' s r o l e as counterva i l -
ing power i n South Asia e spec ia l ly aga ins t India . 
With the de te r io rac ing r e l a t i o n s between India 
and China clima^cLng i n 1962y Pakistan hoped to achieve 
i t s object ives t h a t was every kind of help from China 
aga ins t India , China on the other hand was wi l l ing to 
give a l l kinds of help to Pakis tan. In the Indo-Pak war 
of 1965, China n a t u r a l l y sided with Pakistan sec re te ly . 
In JtiLy 1966, the f i r s t m i l i t a r y agreement between China 
7 
and Pakistan valued a t $ 120 mi l l ion was signed, signall-
ing the commencement of a s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Between 1966 and 1980, arms t r ans fe r s from China to 
8 
Pakistan amounted to more than $ 630 m i l l i o n . These 
supply of arms to Pakistan not only strengthened Pakistan 
but i t c rea ted an i n s e c u r i t y for India as well as for 
South Asia region. For improving r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan, 
7 Alka Achar^a* "China's Arms Sale: The Fvilcrum of i t s 
South Asia Policy", S t r a t eg i c Analysis , Vol. XV No. 2, 
May 199 2, p . 157. 
8 Ib id . 
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China lent her aegis to the bilateral efforts betv/een 
India and Pakistan. Better relations of India and 
Pakistan were precluded to hostilities and the China's 
help gave Pakistan time to recover from the war. 
The 1974 peacefva nuclear explosion by India 
gave fresh impetus to China's efforts in South Asia and 
to Pakistan an opportunity to raise an anti-Indian pro-
paganda for her own security. On this issue, China 
assured Pakistan of full and resolute support in its just 
stmaggle in defence of its national independence and 
sovereignty against foreign agression and interference, 
including that against nuclear threat and nuclear black-
9 
mail. 
In the meanwhile the Soviet intervent ion, i n 
Afghanistan provided Pakistan an opportunity to build up 
her defence. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan upgrad--
ed Pak i s t an ' s value as a s t r a t e g i c f ron t l ine s t a t e and 
thereby received a subs t an t i a l quant i ty of sophis t ica ted 
weaponry from U.S. and China, Pakistan meanwhile proved 
an invaluable a l l y by playing the go-between in the Sino-
9 Yaacov I , Vertzberger, "China's Diplomacy and Strategy 
Towards South Asia: From benign Neglect to Prominence" 
S t r a t eg i c Digest, July 1987, p . 1304, 
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American rapprochenent, for which i t was dxily rewarded 
by both. At t h i s juncture India with an a l l i a n c e of 
U.S.S.R. had to face U.S. + China and Pakistan in t h i s 
region . 
In l a t e 1985, a Chinese warships f i r s t ever 
v i s i t to Pakistan and some o ther coxintry of the region 
caused some concern to Ind ia . Reportedly, Chinese 
planners were c lose ly v/atching the acce le ra t ing pace of 
I n d i a ' s naval expansion. The expedit ion apparently was 
intended as a demonstration of the fac t t h a t Beijing did 
not consider the Indian ocean as beloning to India be-
cause a s i g n i f i c a n t proport ion of China 's sea borne 
t rade flov;s through the Indian ocean. China's naval 
cooperation with Pakistan a lso seems to be on the r i s e . 
.Pakis tan had expressed an i n t e r e s t i n a Chinese Han 
Class nuclear a t tack submarine a f t e r India had leased 
the Soviet Char l ie c lass submarine i n 1989, China also 
10 
made funds for Pak is tan ' s naval modernisation programme. 
The sudden manufacture of a v a r i e t y of miss i les 
i n Pakistan has an obvious China connection, Pakistan 
acquired on l e a s e during 1989 of e igh t Garcia and Brook-
c la s s f r i g a t e s , along with MR-SM 1 a n t i - a i r c r a f t miss i l e s 
10 Alka Acharya, o p . c i t . , p . 160. 
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and Honeywell Mk 46 Mod 5 l i g h t weight anti-submarine 
torpedoes: a l l cos t ing a mere U.S. $ 68 mi l l ion from 
China, These were i n addi t ion to 10 secondhand f r iga tes 
11 
including two leander c l a s s from the U.K. These acquis i -
t i o n has v i r t u a l l y dovibled Pak i s t an ' s naval capab i l i ty 
i n a period of one year . Sumiiltaneously Pakistan es ta -
herse l f 
b l i shed /as an arms expor ter even though- i n a low tech-
nology spectrum. With support from China and to some 
extent from U.S.A. along with f inancia l help from other 
Arab covmtries, Pakistan can onerge as a major arms 
producer and can emerge as a power i n the region which 
may pose a danger to Ind ia . During the ear ly 199 0s the 
Pakistan Air Force* s aquir ing 7.2 ^-165 and nearly _15£ 
F-7 Ps (Chinese Mig 21) and updating tank force in to her 
army fur ther created a tens ion between India and Pakistan, 
The Pak is tan ' s purchasing of arms dangered peace and 
secur i ty i n South Asia e spec ia l ly for Ind ia . Due t o the 
danger of sedur i ty and i n t e g r i t y India a lso t r i e d to 
develop her arms f i e l d s . Thus, India and Pakistan both 
witnessed an alarming r i s e i n arms race and mi l i t a ry 
expenditure. On the o ther hand China continued to inhance 
i t s arms sa l e s to Pakis tan. I t i s evident i n the t ab le 
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China also categorically warned the west that she woxild 
continue to maximise prof i ts from arms sales as long as 
12 
other countries are doing t h i s business. The indiscr i -
minate sale of arms and missi les by China to Pakistan 
has not disrupted only India-Pakistan relat ions but has 
also made the si tuat ion much harder i n the region to 
a t ta in peace. 
(c) Indian Alarm at Pakistan's Nuclear Programme; 
Pakistan nuclear ambitions are a new source of conflict 
in India-Pakistan re la t ions , Pakistcin's nuclear plans 
flow from i t s desire to combat i t s weaker military 
forces would not look on Pakistan army as a mere walk-
over. The defeat and the surrender of the Pakistan army 
a t Dacca i n December 1971 goaded the Pakistani leadership 
to redouble the i r efforts on the nuclear weapons' t r a i l . 
Senior Pakistani mili tary leader believed that Pakistan 
can never afford to achieve par i ty or even near parity 
in conventional forces with India and hence, i t i s 
important for Pakistan to opt for a nuclear weapon s ta tus . 
Pakistan, in order to achieve th i s nuclear status, matured 
her contact with many western countries from time to time. 
Finally, Pakistan achieved a nuclear weapon status through 
12 The Times of -India', March 10, 1992, p. 7, 
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a dedicated c landes t ine programme. I t s nuclear policy has 
res ted on a " t r i ad of ambigtiity, de te r rence , and no xani-
l a t e r a l renxinciation of the nuclear op t ion , " 
The decis ion to rtianufacture nuclear weapons was 
taken i n 1972 by the Pakistan government xinder the l a t e 
Z,A, Bhutto. This was two years before I n d i a ' s nuclear 
explosion a t Pokhran of 1974, Long before these events, 
Bhutto had c l a r i f i e d the u l t imate objec t ive of Pakis tan ' s 
nuclear programme, Bhutto to ld i n an in terview tha t 
13 
Pakistan wotild even ea t grass but make a bomb. During 
h i s tenure as Prime Minis te r of Pakistan, Bhutto repeated 
h i s determination to make Pakistan a nuclear weapons 
power. For t h i s purpose the Kahuta Plant under the charge 
of Abdul Qadeer Khan was developed. In producing weapons 
grade Uranium, Pakistan took the help of Br i t a in , Switzer-
land, West Germany through c landes t ine and i l l e g a l means, 
and d i r e c t l y from France and China. Pak i s t an ' s nuclear 
programme was progressed with f\inds from o i l - r i c h Arab 
countr ies mainly. The events i n Afghanistan of 1979 
opened a new chapter i n Pakistan-U,S, r e l a t i o n s and 
provided an opportunity for Pakistan to help more and 
more from Muslim count r ies e spec ia l ly t h a t helped Pakistan 
13 Sat ish Kxjmar, O p . c i t . , p . 88. 
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with economic point of view. Pakistan developed her 
nuclear prograirme without facing f inancia l problems, 
Abdxol Qadeer Khan i n 1984 gave well px±>licised i n t e r -
views to inform the world of the progress being made 
i n h i s i n s t i t u t e and claimed t h a t "by God's grace, 
Pakistan i s among the few count r ies which have acquired 
14 
mastry over Uranium enrichment. The leading s c i e n t i s t 
of Pakistan also claim.ed t h a t Pakistan could achieve 
within two years what had taken some western countr ies 
15 
i n near ly 20 years and cos t them i 2 b i l l i o n . These 
developments created a suspicion about the secur i ty and 
i n t e g r i t y for India i n minds of the Ind ians . Pakis tan ' s 
d e l i b e r a t e l y overplaying her nuclear success to make 
India to bend i t s s t r a t e g y . Pakistan was thinking t h a t 
through Pak i s tan ' s propaganda towards nuclear threshold, 
India would be forced t o sign "No war Pact" and accepts 
i t s o ther proposal meant to "remove the nuclear danger 
from the subcontinent . The o ther reason of overplaying 
her nuclear success was to e s t a b l i s h Pak i s tan ' s superior-
i t y over India and a t l e a s t India shoxild not dare t o 
a t tack on Pakistan. 
14 Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), February 10, 1984. 
15 Ib id . 
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The year 1987 fur ther opened a hurdle between' 
India and Pakistan, when Abdxil Qadeer i n January 1987 
i n an in terv iew with J o u r n a l i s t Kuldeep Nayar opened 
t h a t Pakistan had already produced the nuclear bomb. 
AbdtiL Qadeer l a t e r r e t r a c t e d h i s s ta tement . The e n t i r e 
episode of the Kuldeep Nayar - Abdul Qadeer Khan i n t e r -
view l e f t the impression of Pak is tan ' s devious nuclear 
diplomacy. Further Zia-ul Haq sought to give an 
impression t h a t Pak is tan ' s programme v/as peaceful and 
he l e t Abdul Qadeer to give the impression tha t Pakistan 
16 
had been able to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Here , 
Pak i s t an ' s nuclear p o l i t i c s showed herse l f as a poker 
game, Nov/, the question a r i s e s why Pakistan had been 
playing a poker game i n nuclear po l i c i e s? Pakistan did 
t h i s thing because: 
i . One motivation was India f ac to r . Since i t was a 
widely held be l i e f i n Pakis tani c i r c l e s t h a t India 
acquired nuclear weapons a f t e r the 1974 Pokhran 
explosion. So, Pakistan thought t h a t a s t a t e of 
asymmetry between India and Pakistan should not be 
allowed to cont inue. 
16 Tribune, March 9"; 1987, 
14 2 
i i , P a k i s t a n was n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n making an e Jcp l i c i t 
d e c l a r a t i o n of i t s p o s s e s s i o n of a n t i c l ea r bomb 
through t e s t i n g a n u c l e a r weapon, because t h i s 
would g ive I n d i a t h e excuse t o resxMtie i t s own 
n u c l e a r weapons prograinme, 
i i i . P a k i s t a n was n o t s u r e about U.S. a t t i t u d e i n c a s e 
Pak i s t an t e s t s , a n u c l e a r d e v i c e , Pak i s t an i s f a r 
too dependent on U .S . n d l i t a r y and economic a i d 
and cannot a f fo rd t o be depr ived of i t . 
Thus, Pak i s t an s e c r e t e l y developed he r n u c l e a r 
programme t a k i n g c a r e about h e r f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y 
h e l p from o t h e r coxin t r ies e s p e c i a l l y from U.S.A. 
P a k i s t a n ' s Army Chief Genera l Aslain Beg acknowledging i n 
1989 t h a t h i s c o t m t r y ' s n u c l e a r programme was des igned t o 
17 
p rov ide a "meaningful d e t e r r e n t " , t o I n d i a f u r t h e r 
c r e a t e d a t e n s i o n between I n d i a and Pak i s t an r e l a t i o n s , 
(d) U.S. S h i f t i n g P r i o r i t i e s towards I n d i a : Pak i s t an , i n -
f a c t , was o c c a s i o n a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e Uni ted S t a t e s as 
a s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n t h e c o n t e x t of Amer ica ' s co ld war 
a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union, P a k i s t a n d u t i f u l l y toed t h e 
17 J a s j i t Singh, "Nuclear Weapon P r o l i f e r a t i o n i n Asia", 
S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s , Vol . 14, No. 12, March 1992, 
p . 1350. 
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U.S. l ine f i r s t by enrolling i t s e l f as member of U.3.-
sponsored regional security al l iance structures and 
l a t e r by accepting the role of a "frontline s ta te" and 
as conduit during the Afghanistan confl ic t . While the 
U.S. alv/ays considered Pakistan as an a l ly in the cold 
war/ the l a t t e r sought close all iance v/ith the former to 
strengthen i t s e l f via-a-vis India. Pakistan, due to 
this close t i e s with U.S. got considerable mili tary and 
economic help from Washington, especially since the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
However, the Afghan confl ict took a different 
turn with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
and l a t e r with the vanishing of Soviet Union from the 
earth as one sovereign nation, Pakistan's usefulness to 
U.S. policy calculations was bound to change. Even the 
U.S. administration, which had turned a blind eye to 
Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons programme during 
the Afghan c r i s i s , quickly changed i t s policy and suspend-
ed i t s mil i tary and economic assistance to Pakistan under 
the Pressler Amendment. The Pressler Amendment made i t 
c lear that no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan 
and no mil i tary equipment or technology shall be sold or 
transfered to Pakistan, unless the U.S. President shall 
have cer t i f ied in writing to the Speaker of the House of 
144 
Representat ives and the Chairman of the Conunittee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate t h a t Pakistan 
18 
does not possess a nuclear explosive device. 
The downturn i n U.S. - Pakistan r e l a t ions came 
due to increas ing Indo-U.S. defence cooperation, since 
then the Pakistani Policy-makers had begun to perceive 
American pol icy tov/ards India through the prism of the 
zero-sum-game. Already f r u s t r a t e d over the U.S. aid 
cu t and disappointed ove r r i s i ng Indo-American coopera-
t i o n , the Pakistani ru l ing e l i t e s became more suspicious 
about the new U.S. "designs" i n South Asia . The former 
Chief of Staff of Pakistani Array General Aslam Beg said 
i n a seminar t h a t the "most important development affect-
ing Pakis tan ' s s ecu r i ty i s the new s t r a t e g i c alignment 
19 
between the U.S. and Ind ia . The India-U.S. naval 
exerc ises i n the Indian Ocean i s one of the watermarks 
i n Indo-U.S. defence cooperat ion. Pakistan x:ook these 
exercises as a t h r e a t for he r se l f and sa id tha t these 
exerc ises are t a r g e t t e d aga ins t Pakis tan. 
In order to meet the challenges a r i s ing out of 
the suspension of U.S. m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance and Indo-U.S, 
18 Independent,(Bombay) Ju ly 27, 1992. 
19 Dawn, July 30, 1992. 
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close cooperation, Pakistan first took some active diplo-
matic initiative in search of alternative sources of 
spare parts as well as military equipments, Pakistan 
developed her relations with Prance and China more and 
more. Syed Ghous Ali Shah, Pakistan's Defence Minister, 
visited Paris at the invitation of French Defence 
Minister, Pierre Joxe. Both Defence Ministers signed an 
important agreement on defence cooperation on June 25, 
1992, to strengthen French-Pak links in the fields of re-
search and development, production and acquisition of 
defence system and equipment. By early September 1992, 
there were talks about supply of defence eqxiipment by 
France to the Pakistani Air Force and Navy and a bilateral 
20 
arms deal worth about ^  900 million. Pakistan Air Force 
also gave her consent to purchase Mirage-2000 aircraft 
from France. France on the other hand decided to sell 
four diesel-powered submarines of the Agosta 9 0 class to 
21 
Pakistan. • 
Pakistan turned to China too i n order to s t reng-
then i t s s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s and Pakistan, i n August 199 2, 
sought Chinese F-7P a i r c r a f t amidst the controversy over 
20 Hindu, September 15, 199 2 , 
21 Mahapatra Chin tamani , "U.S . -Pak R e l a t i o n s . Inching 
Back t o Normally", S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s , Vol . XV, No,9, 
December 199 2, p , 867, 
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t h e F-16 dea l w i th t h e Uni ted S t a t e s . There was a l s o 
22 
d e a l i n g of M-^ 11 m i s s i l e s supply and pu rchase of ground 
t o ground m i s s i l e s supply from China t o P a k i s t a n , which 
was equal i n range of I n d i a ' s P r i t h v i m i s s i l e , Pak i s t an 
has t h e r e q x i i s i t e deliveiry system i n t h e shape of F- 16 
and Mirage I I I / 5 a i r c r a f t . P a k i s t a n i s c u r r e n t l y 
" 23 
b e l i e v e d t o pas ses s a t l e a s t 6-12 n u c l e a r weapons each 
of approx imate ly 2 0 K . T , y i e l d v a r i e t y . P a k i s t a n ' s 
Foreign S e c r e t a r y Shahryar Khan openly admi t t ed on February 
1, 199 2, t h a t h i s coun t ry had t h e c a p a c i t y t o assemble a t 
l e a s t one n u c l e a r dev ice whenever i t d e s i r e d t o do s o . 
This i s t h e f i r s t t ime t h a t any P a k i s t a n i o f f i c i a l has 
p u b l i c a l l y acknowledged t h e e x t e n t of P a k i s t a n ' s n u c l e a r 
programme. 
Thus, i t becomes c l e a r t h a t P a k i s t a n always 
t r i e d t o improve h e r defence s y s t a n and t h e n u c l e a r 
asymmetry adverse t o I n d i a was i n t e n s i f i e d . P a k i s t a n ' s 
p o l i c y has been t o s t a b l i s h i n g s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s wi th 
t h o s e c o u n t r i e s who can prove t h o n s e l v e s as a danger f o r 
I n d i a o r who can suppor t P a k i s t a n du r ing t h e c o n f l i c t 
between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . The n u c l e a r diplomacy of 
P a k i s t a n and t h e P a k i s t a n ' s p o l i c y t o deve lop s t r a t e g i c 
22 I b i d . 
23 Jasjit Singh, Qp.cit., p. 1351. 
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t i e s with France and China induced a change i n the Indian 
perception of pol icy and India joined the American s i de . 
The arms agrandisement and nuclear programme of Pakistan 
i s s t i l l i n the race . The difference i s t h a t e a r l i e r 
Pakistan was having a l l i a n c e with U.S. and was taking 
help from U.S. but a t p resen t she has changed her t rack 
of a l l i a n c e from America t o China and Prance. Whatever 
the danger India was having from Pakistan e a r l i e r , the 
same danger India i s s t i l l facing from Pakistan s ide be-
cause Pakistan i s i n no mood to suspend her nuclear 
programme and arms purchase. 
2, I n d i a ' s Objections t o Pak i s t an ' s Pogtr-jLjiyasjLon Jfolicy 
P r io r to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Soviet r o l e i n South Asia was at a lov/ except for Indo-
Soviet f r iendship . But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
changed the p o l i t i c a l scenar io of t h i s region leading to 
improvement i n Pak-U.S. r e l a t i o n , and fu r the r d e t e r i o r a t -
ing the India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , Pakistan 
thought her secur i ty problems on three f ron t s j 
(a) from India , 
(b) from r e g i o n a l i s t s and d i s s iden t groups within Pakistan, 
and, 
(c) froiii the Soviet presence on the border of Pakistan. 
Having the above points i n mind, Pakistan made 
her policy and r e l a t i o n s with other c o u n t r i e s . 
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The S o v i e t i n v a s i o n compeled P a k i s t a n t o s e a r c h 
h e r s e c u r i t y , and provided t h e oppor txani t ies t o Pak i s t an 
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l sympathy, P a k i s t a n ' s p o l i c i e s s t r e n g -
thened t h e founda t ion f o r much c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s n o t on ly 
w i t h t h e Afghan r e s i s t a n c e b u t a l s o w i t h B e i j i n g , 
Washington and impor t an t Muslim c o u n t r i e s i n t h e Middle 
Eas t , wlilch found i t b e n e f i c i a l t o a s s i s t t h e coun t ry as 
much as p o s s i b l e , P a k i s t a n , i n i t i a l l y i n September 1981/ 
a s u b s t a n t i a l economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e amounted 
t o ^ 3.2 b i l l i o n r e c e i v e d from t h e Uni ted S t a t e s t o b o l s t e r 
h e r s e c u r i t y and r e c e i v e d second package amounted t o 
24 
$ 4 b i l l i o n from U.S. 
This markedly s t r e n g t h e n e d P a k i s t a n ' s p o s i t i o n . 
I nd i a expres sed f e a r by say ing t h a t any arms supp l i ed t o 
Pak i s t an under t h e p r e s e n t p r e t e x t v;ould one day be t u r n e d 
a g a i n s t I n d i a . Mrs I n d i r a Gandhi bad ly a s s e r t e d . "Do you 
t 
s e r i o u s l y t h i n k t h a t P a k i s t a n i s going t o s t a n d up t o the 
S o v i e t Union? I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t anybody t h i n k s t h a t a t 
a l l . C e r t a i n l y American o f f i c i a l s themse lves have s a i d 
25 
. . . . t h e s e (arms) v;ould be used a g a i n s t I n d i a . 
24 K e e s i n g ' s Record of World Events , Vol . 3 3, No. 3 , 
March 1987," p . 3499 5 . 
25 George Timothy, S e c u r i t y i n Southern Asia 2: I n d i a 
and t h e Grea t Powers (England: Gov/er Eub l i sh ing 
Company L t d . , ~ 1 9 8 4 ) , p , 117. 
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I n d i a ' s diplomatic compaign aga ins t the enhanced 
m i l i t a r y a id t o Pakistan was not having any e f fec t but i t 
fur ther increased the intimacy between U.S. and Pakistan, 
and U.S. had more doiobt about the continue moral support 
t o Soviet Union by India because India was not c r i t i c i n g 
Soviet invasion i n a s t rong V7ay. So, U.S. , for her own 
i n t e r e s t in tSouth Asia and reducing the dominance of 
Commxinism regime spread by Soviet Union, supported 
Pakistan and appreciated Pak i s t an ' s s teadfas tness against 
Soviet t h r e a t s . Another important ges ture was t h a t the 
American Congress did not apply cut on the adminis t ra t -
ion ' s aid proposal to Pakistan during 1985-86, In addi-
t ion to some other weapons and m i l i t a r y hardvjare, 
26 
Pakistan received 40 F-16 a i r c r a f t between 1985 and 1986. 
Pres ident Reagan's adminis t ra t ion has also 
subordinated i t s concerns about non-pro l i fe ra t ion t o what 
perceives to be l a rge r s ecu r i t y questions i n the region. 
As a r e s u l t , the Pakis tanis have a f reer hand to proceed 
with t h e i r nuclear programme. President Reagon also r e -
affirmed American support to Pakistan under the Mutual 
Securi ty Pact of 1959, when the Soviets i ssued a warning 
t o Pakistan about i t s nuclear programme, the U.S. govern-
ment advised them i n 1986 t o keep hands off 
26 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan ; P o l i t i c a l Roots and 
Development, (New Delhi: S te r l ing Publ ishers Pr iva te 
Ltd. 199 0) , p, 199. 
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27 
P a k i s t a n . With t h i s , t h e P a k i s t a n i were g iven an 
impetus f o r n u c l e a r programme. The n u c l e a r prograitane 
of P a k i s t a n c o n t r i b u t e d t o n u c l e a r arms r a c e on t h e sub-
c o n t i n e n t which posed a danger t o t h e r e g i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t o I n d i a . 
P a k i s t a n ' s suppor t t o Mujahidin of Afghanis tan 
was j u s t i f i e d on t h e ground t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union i s 
28 
p r o v i d i n g t h e suppor t t o d i s s i d e n t e t h n i c groups 
(Baluchi and Pushtun) w i t h i n P a k i s t a n vxhich i s a t h r e a t 
t o the n a t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y of P a k i s t a n , So i n r e t a l i a t i o n 
Pak i s t an p rov ided jsupport t o Mujahideen. Th i s p o l i c y was 
opted by P a k i s t a n having t h e i d e a t h a t Mujahideen w i l l 
come t o P a k i s t a n ' s r e s c u e whenever need w i l l a r i s e i n 
f u t u r e and t h e U.S . w i l l g i v e more and more h e l p t o 
P a k i s t a n . 
A f t e r t h e Sov ie t i n v a s i o n P a k i s t a n wanted t o 
come more c l o s e t o China i n o r d e r t o t a k e suppor t f o r h e r 
s i d e . So exchange of v i s i t s v/ere made betv;een t h e l e a d e r s 
of Pak i s t an and China. The Chinese Prime M i n i s t e r Zhao 
Ziang, i n Jvme 1981, v i s i t e d Pak i s t an and suppor ted 
P a k i s t a n ' s s t and on Afghanis tan i s s u e and emphasised t h e 
27 Ihe Mus l in , January 2, 1986. 
28 Timothy, Q p . c i t . , p . 118, 
15 a 
i d e n t i t y of view- Sino-Pak r e l a t i o n s i n economic, t r a d e , 
s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l f i e l d s have been f i rmly 
e s t a b l i s h e d . P a k i s t a n a l s o got some m i l i t a r y hardware 
from China. F u r t h e r t h e Chinese P r e s i d e n t i n h i s v i s i t 
29 
of ^ r i l 1984 of P a k i s t a n suppor t ed P a k i s t a n ' s s tand 
r e g a r d i n g Russian i n v a s i o n of Afghan i s t an and denanded 
immediate wi thdrawal of Russian army from Afghanistan* 
Ind ia h e r e n o t ' l i k e d t h e m i l i t a r y h e l p of China t o 
P a k i s t a n . Here i t i s Pak i s t an who was more r e s p o n s i b l e 
for t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of I n d i a - C h i n a ' s c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s 
because P a k i s t a n p ropaga ted t h e e f f e c t s of invas ion more 
t han t h e r e a l i t y , and took t h e s u p p o r t from o u t s i d e more 
than t h e r e q u i r e d needs- The Sov i e t i n v a s i o n of Afghan-
i s t a n a l s o provided P a k i s t a n t o come . i n t o c loseness of 
of t he I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s , and P a k i s t a n e35>loited t h e 
s i t u a t i o n and took b e n e f i t from t h e I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s . 
In such a s i t u a t i o n Pak i s t an improved her defence through 
t h e a id g iven by Saudi Arabia and o t h e r I s l amic c o u n t r i e s 
which posed a danger t o Ind ian s e c u r i t y . An I s l amic 
Conference was c a l l e d i n Islamabad from January 26-29, 
30 
1980 i n which a l l t h e member of 36 I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s 
denounced t h e Sovie t i nvas ion of Afghanis tan i n t h e 
s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e language, as a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of 
29 Safdar Mahmood, O p . c i t . . p . 186-
30 I b i d . , p . 118. 
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the U-N- and Islamic Conference Charters. They also 
demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
all Soviet troops from Afghanistan- When in Mid-July 
1980 Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited New 
31 
Delhi, appraised the Indian Prime Minister, Indira 
Gandhi, of the steps taken during the Conference of 
Islamic Foreign Minister in Islamabad to deal with the 
Afghan crisis. He also made it clear that Pakistan 
wanted a political solution to the problem and that 
India would not be able to escape the consequences of 
any external threat to the security of Pakistan* Mrs-
Gandhi was opposed to the calling of a Conference of 
32 
Islamic Foreign Minister to discuss the Afghan situation. 
Her contention was that the Soviet presence in Afghanis-
tan should be viewed in the context of the overall 
situation in the region and the growing presence of 
various powers in the Indian Ocean and Gulf area. She 
was obviously refering to the American naval presence in 
33 
the Indian Ocean- Here the national interest oriented 
policies of India and Pakistan further deteriorated their 
cooperative relations and both have doubt about each 
31 Ibjd., p. 87. 
3 2 Dawn. July 20, 1980. 
3 3 Ibid. 
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o t h e r ' s defence systems* Thus the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan have not only compeled the count r ies of 
t h e region to change t h e i r p o l i c i e s but had a l so upset 
t he balance in the sub-continent* 
With the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghan-
i s t a n , t he Afghan conf l i c t took a d i f f e ren t turn* Now 
Pakistan through her p o l i c y game i s not going t o rece ive 
anything from Islamic count r ies and U.^. espec ia l ly 
which had made Pakistan m i l i t a r i l y and economically 
strong during Afghan c r i s i s . U*S« a l so has suspended 
her economic and m i l i t a r y a id thinking t h a t Pakistan i s 
not having s t r a t e g i c importance for America especia l ly 
a f t e r the vanishing of Soviet Union from the ea r th as 
one sovereign nation* So, i n these circumstances, 
Pakistatn i s hardly ge t t i ng any success in securing any 
support on her po l icy towards Afghanistan which may help 
Pakistan in strengthening her defence capab i l i ty , and 
which may lead any danger to I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y and 
s t a b i l i t y * 
3* Pakis tan ' s Alleged Involvement in Punjab Insurgency 
Punjab problem i s one of the recent development 
i n the way of blocking fac tors of India-Pakis tan r e l a -
t ions* The dysfunctional a c t i v i t i e s carr ied by Sikh 
ex t remis t s in Punjab in co l labora t ion with the Pro-
154 
Pakistan elements and the Pakistani hands in extremist 
a c t i v i t y has created an atmosphere of d i s tu rbance and 
suspicions in India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s - The t r a in ing 
given hy Pakistan to Sikh t e r r o r i s t s a t various p laces 
in Pakistan and supplying weapons t o thou has d e t e r i o -
ra ted the process of normalisation between the two 
countries* 
There has been evidence to show Pakis tan i 
connection in t he Khalistan demand by Sikh extremists* 
In July 1983, a spec ia l team of r epo r t e r s from t h e 
statesman came out with reveal ing information about 
Pakis tan ' s "Khalistan" connection* They repor ted that 
t h e Pakistan government was in touch with t he protagon-
34 
i s t s of "Khalistan" in Br i ta in , U.S.A. and Canada* But 
a f t e r the blue operat ion, the Pakis tani a c t i v i t i e s 
against India and her support to Sikh came out openly* 
The Pakistani T. V. had shown and had been showing highly 
exaggerated account of the happening in Punjab* I t d i s -
to r t ed the vedio-tapes by superimposing photographs* I t 
showed various p a r t s of the Golden Temple of Amritsar 
34 P.S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Confl ict i n South Asia 
(New Delhi: Manohar Publ icat ion, 1988), p« 45. 
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as having been damaged by g u n f i r e - The T-V- a l s o showed 
o l d p i c t u r e s of Bhindrawala making f i r y speeches i n c l u d -
ing t h e one i n which he exhor t ed t h e Sikhs t o f i g h t t i l l 
35 
t h e l a s t . I t was made t o appear as i f he was speaking 
t o h i s community dur ing t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n . The 
purpose o b v i o u s l y was t o i n c i t e t h e Sikhs l i v i n g wi th in 
t h e r ange of P a k i s t a n T-V. on I n d i a n s i d e of the b o r d e r . 
The P a k i s t a n i media made e v e r y possible e f f o r t s 
t o i n c i t e t h e Sikh community. The P a k i s t a n i Press had 
been indu lg ing i n c i r c u l a t i n g news about t h e happenings 
i n Amris tar i n p a r t i c u l a r , p i c t u r e s of armed S ikhs , 
i n j u r e d and being deseased , marching Sikh army, p i c t u r e 
and s t a t e m e n t s of some of t h e " m i n i s t e r s " of t h e s o -
c a l l e d Kha l i s t an government, supplements on Kha l i s t an 
were a common th©:ne i n almost a l l t h e P a k i s t a n i news-
p a p e r s dur ing t h e month of June 1984 and even a f t e r w a r d s . 
A l a r g e number of a r t i c l e s and e d i t o r i a l s were pub l i shed 
which showed sympathy for t h e s e s s i o n i s t s cause* The 
army a c t i o n i n t h e Golden Temple was c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
t h e equa len t of an army s t ^ m i n g t h e Ka'aba or t h e 
35 See Chopra, " Indo-Pak i s t an R e l a t i o n s " i n B«M» J a i n , 
e d . . Re f l ec t ions on I n d i a ' s Fo re ign P o l i c y ( J a i p u r : 
RBSA P u b l i s h e r s , 1989), p - 9 2. 
36 I b i d . 
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Va t i can . The e d i t o r i a l of newspaper ^ffaslim*^ c h a r a c t e r -
i s e d t h e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n as a v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t s 
38 
of t h e Sikh community. The Jung c a r r i e d c e r t a i n s t a t e -
ments of Bhindrawal which were h i g h l y i n f l a m a t o r y i n c l u d -
ing one i n which he had s a i d t h a t by arming Hindus "you 
39 
cannot t u r n j a c k a l s i n t o l i o n s - The same paper c a r r i e d 
a c a r t o o n on t h e f ron t page i n which Mrs- I n d i r a Gandhi 
was named "General" I n d i a Gandhi wearing two medals , one 
for k i l l i n g Jfiislim and t h e o t h e r for k i l l i n g Sikhs* Mrs 
Gandhi was shown i n t h e company of "General Dyer and 
40 
General H i t l e r . With t h e p a s s a g e ' o f t ime , more f a c t s of 
P a k i s t a n ' s c o m p l i c i t y wi th t h e e x t r o n i s t s i n Pxinjab came 
t o l i g h t . In North America and U.K., P a k i s t a n i jo ined 
t h e marches o rgan i sed by Jammu and Kashmir L i b e r a t i o n 
41 
Front ( J . K ' L ' F . ) and t h e Sikh e x t r e m i s t s . In Jammu and 
Kashmir P ro -Pak i s t an e lements jo ined hands wi th t h e 
d e s e r t e r s and e x t r e m i s t elements and r a i s e d p r o - P a k i s t a n 
and p r o - K h a l i s t a n s l o g a n s . Worse s t i l l a P a k i s t a n i p r e s s 
o f f i c i a l pos ted i n London Snbacy, Qutbuddin Aziz despa tch -
ed news from London t o t h e United Press of P a k i s t a n 
37 The Muslim, June 8, 1984. 
38 I b i d . 
39 Jung. June 8, 1984 
40 I b i d . 
41 Hindustan Times. J u l y 3, 1984. 
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r e g a r d i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e S i k h s e c e s s i o n i s t s . The 
news g o t a wide c o v e r a g e i n t h e P a k i s t a n i p r e s s , some 
p u b l i s h i n g t h e i r e d i t i o n s i n London. I t had a l s o been 
r e p o r t e d t h a t s u c h n e w s p a p e r s were d i s t r i b u t e d i n t o t h e 
42 
S i k h o r g a n i s a t i o n s and Gurdwaras i n U.K. I n 1986, an 
i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t b y I n d i a Today r e v e a l e d t h e mora l 
43 
and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e t h a t t h e S i k h e x t r e m i s t s were 
r e c e i v i n g from t h e P a k i s t a n i a u t h o r i t i e s . I n September 
1987, R a j i v Gandhi r e i t e r a t e d s e r i o u s c o n c e r n over 
P a k i s t a n ' s c o n t i n u i n g c o m p l i c i t y i n p r o v i d i n g a rms , 
t r a i n i n g , funds and s a n c t u a r y t o t e r r o r i s t s i n d u l g i n g 
44 
i n s u b v e r s i v e and a n t i - n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s i n Punjab-
Var ious m e e t i n g s were o r g a n i s e d b e t w e e n I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n r e g a r d i n g t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s b u t t h e r e s u l t 
p roved c o m p l e t e l y f u t i l e . I n May 1988, t h e Home 
S e c r e t a r i e s of b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s met f o r t h e second 
t i m e t o d i s c u s s i s s u e s a b o u t c r o s s - b o r d e r t e r r o r i s m * 
The I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n p r e s e n t e d a 21 p a g e s t a t e m e n t 
e n t i t l e d " I n v o l v e m e n t of P a k i s t a n i n T e r r o r i s m i n P u n j a b " 
c o n t a i n i n g d e t a i l s o f t r a i n i n g c a m p s , e t c , i n P a k i s t a n . 
4 2 For d e t a i l s of t h e s e e x p o s u r e s s e e I n d e r j i t , 
" P a k i s t a n ' s Hand i n P u n j a b " . The T r i b u n e . May 
1986. 
43 Ghosh, O p . c i t . . p . 4 5 . 
44 The Times of India. September 14, 1987. 
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The l a t t e r , hovever , denied t h e cha rges and dismissed 
then as something "intended t o p l a y t o t h e g a l l e r y " . 
Even tua l ly b o t h t h e d e l e g a t e s agreed t o unde r t ake j o i n t 
p a t r o l s a long t h e bo rde r . But t h e r e was no agreement on 
t h e I n d i a n i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e j o i n t p a t r o l s under take 
45 
hot p u r s u i t of t e r r o r i s t s t o t h e i r b a s e s . This agreement, 
i n t h e r e a l s e n s e , did noth ing fo r r e d u c i n g t h e help 
suppl ied t o e x t r e m i s t s of Punjab by P a k i s t a n . I t was 
an i n s u l t i n g agreement for Ind ia because Pak i s t an had 
not accep ted any proposa l of Ind ia and i t was a king of 
warning t o I n d i a n Government t h a t i t would s imply d i s -
c r e d i t t e d I n d i a ' s l e g i t i m a t e cha rges a g a i n s t Pak i s t an . 
During h i s t o u r abroad of May-June 1988, Rajiv 
Gandhi unleashed a ba r r age of a c c u s a t i o n a g a i n s t Pak i s t an 
46 
for i t s r o l e i n Punjab tu rmoi l - In August 1988, Indian 
a l l e g a t i o n assvimed s e r i o u s p r o p o r t i o n s when i t charged 
P a k i s t a n i a u t h o r i t i e s of keeping S ikh t e r r o r i s t s t o t h e 
e x t e n t of p l o t t i n g t o Ki l l Rajiv Gandhi and h i s Home 
M i n i s t e r Buta Singh. In a long s t a t e m e n t p r e s e n t e d t o 
bo th t h e Houses of Par l i ament , t h e Government made c a t e -
g o r i c a l a l l e g a t i o n s a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n i n t h i s r ega rd based 
45 Ind i a Today. June 15, 1988, p . 9 6 . 
46 M«J- Akbar, "Diplomatic Salvoes Agains t Exporter of 
T e r r o r " . Te legraph. June 10, 1988. 
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on documentary evidence captiired from the Golden Temple 
following Operation Black Thunder, t h e p o l i c e act ion to 
f lush out t e r r i o r i s t s from the premises of the Golden 
47 
Tenple conduct in May 1988. Rajiv Gandhi on August 15, 
1988, de l iver ing his Independence Day address from the 
ramparts of Red Fort in Delhi , v i r t u a l l y threatened 
Pakistan with d i r e consequences i f i t did not d e s i s t 
48 
from e f fo r t s t o des tab l i se t h e Punjab- This was a c l ea r 
hardening posture on the p a s t of India against Pakistan-
The Pak i s tan ' s support t o Sikh s e p a r a t i s t s has 
V 
become a source of tens ion between t h e two countr ies-
Pak i s t an ' s in te r ference i n I n d i a ' s i n t e rna l a f f a i r s 
have become a serious hindrance i n the proces of normal-
i s a t i o n - This has a l so created problems in economic as 
well as p o l i t i c a l cooperation-
4. Pak is tan ' s Alleged Involvenent in Kashmir Insurgency 
Kashmir has been one of the major blocking factor 
i n India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s s ince p a r t i t i o n - Since p a r t i -
t i o n , Pakistan ra ised Kashmir i s s u e many time at various 
forums and many conf l ic t took p l ace between the two 
countr ies but Kashmir i s s t i l l dwendling as a problem 
47 Hindu. August 6, 1988-
48 Hindu. August 16, 1988-
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between the two coun t r i e s . The m i l i t a r y e f fo r t s by the 
Pakistan leadership f a i l ed t o generate adequate response 
and support from the Kashmiri people both in 19 47-48 and 
1965 war. Pakistan, a f t e r the defeat i n Bangladesh war 
of 1971, a l so r e a l i s e d her weakness, a fee l ing had grown 
i n Pak i s tan ' s m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s t ha t no 
m i l i t a r y act ion could separa te Kashmir from India or 
could make Kashmir an independent s t a t e . Thus, Pakistan 
changed her s t r a t egy t o one of c rea t ing a cl imate for 
unlawful a c t i v i t i e s , i n su r rec t ion by giving support and 
t r a in ing t o e x t r a n i s t s of Kashmir. 
The S ta t e of Jammu and Kashmir i s influenced 
g r e a t l y by p o l i t i c s and pronouncements of the ru l ing 
e l i t e s of Pakistan. The problen of t h i s Muslim dominated 
S t a t e i s charac ter i sed by two pa ra l l ed and equal strong 
elements-
a) i t s demand for autonomy and, 
b) i t s pro-Pakistanism. 
Together these elements are supported by Pakistan 
through various means and tactics* These means and tac-
tics, which are against India, have serious implications 
for India-Pakistan relations. 
The tactics of interference by Pakistan in Indian 
internal affairs namely inciting Kashmiri, training them 
161 
and giving f inancia l help to them have damaged b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s of two count r ies . 
After the Indo-Pak war of 1971, i t was General 
Zia-ul Haq who b u i l t up a psychological base for taking 
revenge of the *^ 1971 defeat" , by quoting "Begin what 
Indians d id in East Pakistan". After t h e assass inat ion 
of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1984, Pakis tan selected Punjab 
and Kashmir as the most l i k e l y area where ter ror ism 
followed by low level insurgencies could be ful ly exploi-
ted t o Pakis tan ' s advantage. While the Indian government 
was busy in handling the t e r ro r i sm i n Punjab, Pakis tan ' s 
area of inf luence" shif ted t o Kashmir. With a vulnerable 
border, l a rge gaps between pos t s on the l i ne of control , 
t he Pakis tani put i n to effect p lans for i n f i l t r a t i o n of 
m i l i t a n t s in to Kashmir. Cadres were t r a ined and equiped 
with weapons supplied by the U.S. adminis t ra t ion for the 
Afghan Mujahidin. The la rge q u a n t i t y of arms seized from 
the Kashmiri extremists by Indian Army many times indicates 
t ha t t he r e was considerable flow of weapons i n t o the val lev 
49 
from Pakistan. A la rge number of m i l i t a n t s of the J.K.L-F-
were gradually i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o t h e va l l ey a f te r 1967,when 
49 I l l u s t r a t e d Weekly of India . March 10, 19S5, P. 10-11, 
13. 
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t h e I n d i a n Army ( I n d i a n Peace Keeping Force) was busy 
50 
i n S r i Lanka. I n d i a n a rmy 's b u s i n e s s i n S r i Lanka gave 
P a k i s t a n tvx) t h i n g s : 
1. One i s tha t Pakistan got chance t o supply weapons to 
m i l i t a n t s i n India and sending t r a i n e d mi l i t an t s in 
India more f ree ly , and, 
2. Second i s t h a t I n d i a ' s image as a peaceable country 
was d i s to r t ed by Pakistan because Pakistan projected 
India in the image of "Big b u l l y " .of South Asia. 
« 
The Pak is tan ' s help t o Kashmiri m i l i t a n t s created 
continue turmoil in Kashmir. M i l i t a n t s supported by 
Pakistan performed many unlawful a c t i v i t i e s such as murder-
ing and kidnapping many important o f f i c i a l s of the S ta te 
including the kidnap of Rubaiya Sayeed ( the daughter of 
then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohd. Sayeed). When 
Indian Government operated more p o l i c y forces for cont ro l l -
ing a l l these a c t i v i t i e s then i t was vehmentally c r i t i c i s -
ed by Pakistan. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sahib-
zada Yakub Khan said t ha t force was being used to "supp-
ress the freedom movement" in Kastmir and t h i s pained the 
Kashmiri very much". Our heart i s bleeding for t he i r 
miseries* He said adding the ob jec t ive for v^iich the 
50 Chandra B. Khanduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir 
Problan and an Approach to Solu t ion" S t ra teg ic 
Analysis. Vol. XEII, No. 6, September 1990,p« 626-
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Kashmiri have waged the s t ruggle c a n ' t be crushed l ike 
t h i s - Giving the highly exaggerated account of the 
happening i n the Kashmir va l ley , Yakub, s a id , "hundreds" 
of people had been k i l l e d , "many more" in jured and 
51 
thousand were being arrested* 
The Prime Minister o£ Pakistan Mrs Benazir 
52 
Bhutto 's opening a fund of Rs. 100 mi l l i on ( $ 4.65 
mil l ion) for the r e l i e f and welfare of Kashmiri has 
further created confusion for India . Because the fund 
was not a c t u a l l y for the r e l i e f of Kashmiri but through 
t h i s , Mrs. Benazir Bhutto wanted t o show sympathy for 
Kashmiri and wanted t o e s tab l i sh her p r e s t i g e in the 
in te rna t iona l scene. 
The t a c t i c a l manoeuvring in t he occupied Kashmir 
region by Pakis tan arroed forces and some of t h e i r radar 
formations c loser t o the borders with India have further 
created tens ion between India and Pakis tan . Seeing t h i s 
hec t ic m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y t o the border . Prime Minister 
of India V. p. Singh warned Pakistan in a speech in the 
Lok Sabha, "Our message to Pakistan i s t h a t you can ' t get 
away with taking Kashmir without a war, " Two days l a t e r 
Home Minister Mufti Mohd. Sayeed was of the view that a 
51 Hindustan Times. January 31, 1990-
52 Ib id . , i ^ r i l 2, 1990. 
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war v^ith Pakistan would be j u s t i f i e d i f i t v/ould break 
"the s t ranglehold of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s . 
The Pak i s t an ' s exc i t i ng a t t i t u d e t o Kashmiri 
m i l i t a n t for crossing the l i n e of control again and 
again brought the p o s s i b i l i t y of an outbreak of v/ar 
betaveen the two c o u n t r i e s . On February 5, 199 2, 
Pakistan observed a t o t a l s t r i k e . t o demonstrate s o l i -
d a r i t y -.-jith the people of Kashmir in the v/ake of Jamnu 
and Kashmir Liberat ion F r o n t ' s (J .K.L.F.) proTx>sed 
• 54 
march of 50/000 people across the l i n e of con t ro l . 
Eight months l a t e r / the s imi l a r s i t u a t i o n arose with 
the threatened cross ing of the l i n e of control on 
October 24, 1992. Pakistan not only supported the 
Kashmiri march e a r l i e r but propagated i t a l so v/ith 
the aim t h a t : 
i ) Pakistan wi l l have an specia l ro le for the cause 
of Muslims i n the world. 
i i ) Through t h i s support/ Pakistan also wanted to take 
help from Muslim c o u n t r i e s . In t h i s v/ay Pakistan 
got success upto some extent because some of the 
53 Keesing's Record of World Events/ Vol. 35, No. 4/ 
Apri l / 199 0/ p . 37377. 
54 Hindustan Times/ November 10/ 199 2/ p . 13. 
165 
55 
Saudis and I ranians promised a l l supports to 
Kashmiri m i l i t a n t s agains t Ind ia . 
i i i ) PaJcistani ru l ing leaders did a l l these s teps for 
d iver t ing the a t t e n t i o n of the people from the 
r e a l cause, for suppressing i n t e r n a l unrest which 
was posing a t h r e a t t o t h e i r sea ts* 
Though with t h i s march, no war took p lace between 
India and Pakistan but the environment t h a t Pakistan 
made was such tha t the people l i v e in a s t a t e of war 
psychosis which prevented any improvement i n t h e r e l a -
t i o n s . Pak i s tan ' s support of insurgency i n Punjab and 
KaslTTiir was r a i s ed by Indians and Indians blamed Pakistan 
t h a t i t has been conducting a proxy war by funding, arm-
ing , t r a in ing and i n f i l t r a t i n g m i l i t a n t s i n t h e hope 
t h a t the va l l ey would secede t o Pakistan* 
5. Dispute Over Siachin g lac ie r 
^ a r t from Kashmir, the d i spu te over Siachin i s 
another cause of f r i c t i o n between India and Pakistan • 
The Siachin Glacier (75 km. long and 2.8 km. wide) i s 
s i tua ted in the most inhospi tab le t e r r a i n i n 640 Ian. 
55 Asian Recorder. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 16 November 11-17, 
199 2, p . 22714. 
166 
56 
l o n g K&rakoram r a n g e . Access t o t h i s g l a c i e r from 
P a k i s t a n ' s s i d e i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t . The S i a c h i n G l a c i e r 
a d j o i n s t h e l a r g e chunk of Kashmir t e r r i t o r y t h a t was 
ceded by P a k i s t a n t o China a s p a r t o f P a k i s t a n - C h i n a 
b o r d e r a g r e e m e n t i n 1963. The A k s a i C h i n a r e a under t h e 
i l l e g a l o c c u p a t i o n of China i s a l s o c l o s e t o t h e g l a c i e r . 
I n t h e e v e n t o f combined p r e s s u r e from P a k i s t a n and China 
i n t h e a r e a , I n d i a ' s a c c e s s t o Kcirakoram p a s s c o u l d b e -
come d i f f i c u l t -
There h a v e been c l a s h e s i n t h e S i a c h i n g l a c i e r 
a r e a s i n c e 1984. The f i r s t s k i r m i s h e s had t a k e n p l a c e 
i n i ^ r i l 1984 wh ich was p r i m a r i l y a p r o b l i n g o p e r a t i o n 
b u t t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f I n d i a n t r o o p s p r e - o c c u p a t i o n i n 
t h e s t a t e of P u n j a b , I s l a m a b a d t r i e d t o o c c u p y i t . A 
s e r i o u s c l a s h t o o k p l a c e on J u n e 2 3 , 1984 and P a k i s t a n ' s 
f o r c e s were b e a t e n b a c k . Once a g a i n , d u r i n g t h e month 
of F e b r u a r y 1985, " f i r e f i g h t s " l a s t e d 17 d a y s a t a 
57 
s t r e t c h . F u r t h e r Zia a c c u s e d I n d i a o f v i o l a t i n g Simla 
Agreement b y u n i l a t e r a l l y o c c u p y i n g S i a c h i n G l a c i e r and 
58 
c a u t i o n e d t h a t i t would mar t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s . 
56 For d e t a i l s , s e e Gen. P»M. P a s r i c h a , "The S i a c h i n 
G l a c i e r : An G r a p h i c o f f e n s i v e b y P a k i s t a n . " 
S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s . Vo l . IX , No. 9 December 1985, 
p . 8 5 5 . 
57 J a n e ' s Defence Week ly . J u l y 6 , 1985 , p . 9 . 
58 S t a t e s m a n . A p r i l 7 , 1986. 
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The P a k i s t a n ' s P r e s i d e n t Z ia -u l Haq, changing h i s s tand 
on t h e s t a t u s and ownership of t h e S i a c h i n G l a c i e r , i n 
September 1986, d e s c r i b e d S iach in QLacier as a "no man's 
l a n d " which Ind i a had t aken one f i n e morning. But Z i a ' s 
s t a t e m e n t was c r i t i c i s e d by many P a k i s t a n i s . The 
Re t i r ed Air Marshal Asghar Khan s a i d , "If we accep t 
t h i s as a no man's l a n d , t h e n our t r i b a l a r e a s a r e a l s o 
59 
not P a k i s t a n i t e r r i t o r y , s h a l l we g i v e them away"? This 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t i f sometimes Zia and o t h e r l e a d e r s t r i e d 
t o nomal i se t h e s i t u a . t i o n then t h e y could not do so b e -
cause of t h e i r domes t ic p r e s s u r e s * 
In thie l a s t week of September 1987, Pak i s t an 
launched an a t t a c k on t h e I n d i a n p o s t i n t h e S iachin 
r e g i o n . I n d i a a l s o r e t a l i a t e d . I n t h i s c l a s h , both 
t h e c o u n t r i e s su f f e red heavy l o s s of l i f e , p r o p e r t y . 
The magnitude of t h i s a t t a c k by P a k i s t a n was making a 
60 
determined e f f o r t t o overrun t h e g l a c i e r . The a t t a c k 
and counter a t t a c k between t h e two c o u n t r i e s bad ly d i s -
rup ted t h e i r mutual c o o p ^ a t i o n many t ime-
59 Sxarendra Chopra, "Indo-Pak R e l a t i o n s " i n B-M- J a i n 
e d . , R e f l e c t i o n s on I n d i a ' s Fore ign P o l i c y ( J a ipu r 
RBSA P i i b l i s h e r s , 2989), p . 100. 
60 See Kaiim Bahadur, " I n d i a - P a k i s t a n R e l a t i o n s " i n 
S a t i s h Kumar, e d . , Yearbook on I n d i a ' s Foreign 
P o l i c y 1987/88. (New D e l h i : Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
1988), p . 9 1 . 
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In order to get peaceful se t t l ement , both the 
countr ies a t o f f i c i a l and non-off ic ia l l eve l have several 
meetings but found no adquate so lu t ion- In the f i f t h 
round of t a l k s in Islamabad i n 1989 on Siachin Glacier 
i s s u e , the tvo countr ies reached an agreement concerning 
the "redeployment of t roops on both s ides but i t could 
not be signed and thus not implemented because of change 
in the Governments in New Delhi and Islamabad then- The 
recen t s i x round of India-Pakis tan ta ' lks on the Siachin 
61 
Glacier Issue , held a t New Delhi i n e a r l y November 199 2 
a f t e r t he gap of more than th ree years had not jiroved 
any amicable solut ion for resolv ing the disputes between 
the two countries except d i scuss ingto end the e ight year 
old confrontation in the area, d i scuss ing the d e m i l i t a r i -
sa t ion of the Glacier area only i n sentences . Since 
i ^ r i l 1984, the Defence s e c r e t a r i e s of India and Pakistan 
have met several times t o resolve d i f fe rence on the ques-
t i o n of "ownship of Siachin G lac i e r . " The meetings 
yielded no agreed so lu t ion although they were considered 
useful . 
Conclusion 
From the above discussion i t i s known tha t no 
doubt some of the b i l a t e r a l fac tors of both the coxintries 
61 Hindustan Times. November 3 , 199 2. 
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have been the blocking f a c t o r s in mutual cooperation 
of India and Pakistan but i n s p i t e of these the ro le 
of external fac to rs are a l so not l e s s i n making the 
s i t u a t i o n tense i n South Asia (Pa r t i cu l a r ly betv/een 
India and Pak i s t an ) . 
The policy of Pak i s t an ' s purchase of arms from 
U.S./ China and o ther coun t r i es i s d i r ec t ed against 
India . Pakistan/ for the agrandisement of arms/economic 
and nuclear progrfibnme/ t r i e d to exp lo i t every s i tua t ion 
which had occured i n South Asia region. I t v;as 2 i a -u l -
Haq v;ho made Pakistan very important to U.S. overnight 
v/hen Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan i n December 1979, 
and Pakistan became "a f ron t l i ne s t a t e " i n U.S. jjercep^ 
t i o n . Through t h i s t a c t i c s , Pakistan received a l o t of 
arms and economic a id from America and o ther count r ies , 
and bxxilt up her defence system. The aim of Pakis tan ' s 
purchase of arms and improving r e l a t i o n s v/ith China i s 
to bring China's ro l e as a counterva i l ing power i n South 
Asia espec ia l ly aga ins t I n d i a . Pak is tan ' s a l l i ance with 
U.S. and China compelled India to have an a l l i ance with 
U.S.S.n. At t h i s j u n c t u r e , India with an a l l i a n c e of 
U.S.S.R had to face Pakistan + U.S. and China in t h i s 
region. But a f t e r the Sovie t d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , t h i s burden 
of India was reduced because U.S. sh i f t ed her p e r i o r i t i e s 
towards India i n place of Pakistan. 
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Punjab, Kaslmir and Siachin Glacier are also the 
major blocking factors in India-Pakistan relations. 
Kashmir has been one of the problems since partition. 
Before 1971, Pakistan tried to take Kashmir through 
military efforts but after the defeat in Bangladesh war 
of 1971 realised that no military action could separate 
Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent 
state. Thus, Pakistan changed her strategy to one of 
creating a climate of unlawful activities, insurrection 
by giving support and training to extremists of Kashmir. 
Pakistan also opted the same attitude towards the Sikh 
separatists of Indian Punjab that has become a source of 
tension between India and Pakistan. 
C H A P T E R V I I 
THE QUEST FOR PROGRESS; 
FORMATION OF IND0-PAKI5TAN JOINT COMMISSION 
An a n a l y s i s o f I n d i a - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s i n c e 19 47 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e b i l a t e r a l i m p r o v e m e n t s o f t h e two 
c o u n t r i e s a r e t h e s u r r e s t g u a r a n t e e o f economic p r o s p e r i t y 
and l o n g t e r m p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
Bo th s u b j e c t i v e a n d , o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s p l a y an i m p o r t a n t 
r o l e i n t h e p r o c e s s o f n o r m a l i s a t i o n and i m p r o v i n g r e l a -
t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
Many s t e p s b e t w e e n t h e two c o t i n t r i e s w e r e t a k e n 
f o r i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s . A m a j o r b r e a k t h r o u g h was made 
by t h e a g r e e m e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a J o i n t Commiss ion t o promote 
b i l a t e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n . B u t b e f o r e h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e c o n t r i -
b u t i o n of J o i n t Commission i n t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f I n d i a -
P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p o i n t o u t t h e 
c i r cxams tances i n w h i c h i t came i n t o e x i s t e n c e . A p r o p o s a l 
by P a k i s t a n i P r e s i d e n t Z i a - u l Haq f o r a n o n - a g g r e s s i o n 
p a c t be tween P a k i s t a n and I n d i a , and I n d i a n c o u n t e r p r o -
p o s a l f o r a t r e a t y o f f r i e n d s h i p and c o o p e r a t i o n were 
d i s c u s s e d a t a m e e t i n g i n New D e l h i on J a n u a r y 2 9 / F e b r u a r y 
1, 1982 . As a p r e l i m i n a r y s t e p , I n d i a p r o p o s e d t h e s e t t i n g 
1 K e e s i n g ' s C o n t e m p o r a r y Archi^i .ves, O c t o b e r 8 , 1982, 
P . 3 1 7 4 6 . 
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up of a Joint Commission, The Indian proposal for a 
permanent Joint Commission was reportedly accepted in 
principl.e by the Pakistani side on January 31, 1982. 
Mrs, Gandhi also made it known that India was prepared 
to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation with 
Pakistan such as India had signed with the Soviet Union 
in 1971, She also reaffirmed that India had no inten-
2 
tion of attacking Pakistan, 
A Joint Statement issued after the talks on 
February 1, 1982 noted that "the air was cleared suffi-
ciently to facilitate specific consideration of the ele-
ments which could constitute the substance of such an 
agreement," 
1, The Agreement signed 
The Draft Agreement for setting up the India-
Pakistan Joint Commission was initiated by the Foreign 
Secretaries of India and Pakistan, M.K, Rasgotra and 
Ejaz Naik respectively, and later formally signed by the 
Foreign Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao and the 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan Lt, Gen, Sahibzada Yaqub 




and Pres ident Zia-ul Haq on March 10, 1983 a t New Delhi. 
Mrs. Gandhi sa id t h a t t he s igning of the Agreement on 
the J o i n t Commission i s important for helping to open 
one by one the doors i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p t ha t has been 
4 
closed for far too long. Reciprocal ly, Zia a lso expressed 
the hope t h a t the two coun t r i e s would proceed along the 
5 
road of c lose r cooperat ion. 
Yaqub Khan pointed out t ha t the signing of the 
Agreement i n the presence "of Mrs. Gandhi and Zia-xil Haq 
demonstrated t h a t i t was backed by the p o l i t i c a l wil l and 
enjoyed the support of t he ttvo l e a d e r s , Yaqub Khan a l so 
said t h a t a no war pact woxild " r e i t e r a t e and reaffirm" 
the two cot in t r ies ' mutual resolve to maintain peace and 
re f ra in from the t h r ea t o r use of force and s e t t l e 
differences exclusively by peaceful means. On the Indian 
proposal for a t r e a t y of f r ienddship, he sa id t ha t i t 
would provide the foundation for the bui lding of an ed i f ice 
of cooperation and good neighbourl iness between the two 
6 
coun t r i e s . 
3 Ibid., Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, March 1986, p. 34240. 
4 Statesman, March ,11, 1983. 
5 Hindustan Times, March 11, 1983. 
6 Ibid. 
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According to the Agreement the tv/o Governments 
have to take necessary legal and administrative measures 
to implement the agreed principles of cooperation as 
suggested by the Commission. It was also specified that 
the Commission may set up as many sub-Commissions as 
necessary. While the Joint Commission will meet annually 
in Islamabad and New Delhi alternatively, the sub-Commiss-
ions may meet as and when desired. 
The Commission was certainly a step forward-in 
strengthening and promoting cooperation between the two 
countries for mutual benefit in economic, trade, indus-
trial, education, health, consular, tourism, travel, 
information, scientific and technological fields. But one 
thing is to be noted that promotion of the good neighbour-
ly relations and economic cooperation were attempted prior 
to a solution of the outstanding political and military 
1' 
problans between the two countries. 
Another important point in the Agreement was that 
for the fxinctional purpose, the work of the Commission at 
the first Joint Commission meeting held in Islamabad on 
June 1-4, 1983, was divided into four sub-commissions each 
7 Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pakistan Relations 
(Nexi^  Delhi: Deep & Deep, Publications, 1988), p.239. 
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8 
deal ing with a specif ied f i e l d s . 
Sxib-Commission I I 
Sub-Commission I I I 
Stab-Commissi on IV 
Sub-Ccanmission I , , , This p a r t of t he Commission i s 
on economic mat ters dea l t with 
i n d u s t r y , a g r i c u l t u r e , communi 
cation' , hea l t h , science and 
technology. 
. . . This Ccxnmission deals with t rade . 
. . . This was en t rus ted with informa-
t i o n , educat ion, cu l tu re , spor ts 
and soc i a l sc iences , 
. . . This was grappled with matters 
r e l a t i n g t o t r a v e l , toxirisra and 
consu l s . 
With t h i s d iv is ion of the Ccanmission in the f i r s t 
meeting nothing much was emerged but one th ing i s to be 
noted t h a t the discussions and dialogue took place i n a 
s p i r i t of amity and t h i s was an achievement in i t s e l f . 
On h i s re turn from the f i r s t meeting of the 
Commission a t Islamabad, Narsimha Rao expressed h i s 
s a t i s f a c t i o n over the outcome of h i s v i s i t , which, he said, 
was a "success*. He said the e f f o r t s made by the Sub-
8 Keesing 's Contemporary Archiaves, March 1986, p,34240. 
176 
Commissions were very successful. They came with several 
9 
useful recommendations in different fields of cooperation. 
Expressing his pleasure at the most useful prog-
ress of the four days meeting (Jxine 1-4, 1983), Rao" said 
that these discussions affect persons who are poor,distant 
and looking for contacts and to v/hose happiness we have 
the responsibility to contribute. On the other hand, 
Sahibzada Yaqub Khan described the discussions as a 
historic endeavour that would foster a conducive climate 
in which the full of cooperation between the two coxontries 
10 
can be realized. 
In this meeting both sides agreed to recommend 
to their Goveimment a cut in the postal rates by 15 to 20 
per cent and improvement in the telecommunication facili-
11 
ties. In the field of science and technology-, it was 
agreed that exchange of delegations may take place bet-
ween the two countries to suggest concrete measure for 
cooperation in such areas as energy, metalurgy, marine 
sciences, genetic engineering and biotechnology, medical 
research, environment and optics. The Sub-Commission 
9 Hindustan Times, June 5, 1983, 
10 Ibid, 
11 Chopra, Op,cit,, p. 241, 
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dealing with information, education, social sciences, 
ciilture and sports , agreed on a programme for cooperation. 
On cultural cooperation, the Indian side presented a draft 
agreement while Pakistan presented adraft regarding ex-
change of archival materials , Duscussions regarding the 
avoidance of double taxation were also held. In the 
field of agriculture the two sides entered into an agree-
ment for exchange of sc i en t i s t s , technologists and experts, 
germ plasm and breeding materials, s c i en t i f i c l i t e ra tu re , 
information, and methodologies. Both sides agreed to 
explore the poss ib i l i ty of cooperation among the speciliz-
ed ins t i tu t ions in the fields of agricul tural research. 
Promotion of tourism and organized groups of professionals 
and academicians, as also collaboration between for se t t -
12 
ing up jo in t projects was agreed t o . The Pakistani 
Delegation proposed expanding the scope of the shipping 
protocol of January 1975, The Indian side suggested that 
carriage of a l l th i rd country cargo should be included 
within the scojje of the protocol. The Indian side also 
suggested tha t the two courtias shoxald explore the possi-
b i l i t i e s of cooperation in the establishment of joint 
venture in thi rd countries expecially in North Africa and 
13 
West Asia, 
12 Ibid, , p, 241, 
13 Hindustan Times, June 5', 1983, 
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2. The Working of the Commission 
The India-Pakis tan J o i n t Commission e m e s t l y 
embarked on expanding b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . But t rade 
received j o l t when the r ep resen ta t ives of p r iva te sec tor 
i n Pakistan became eager for resumption of p r iva te t rade 
with India/ i n the f i r s t m i n i s t e r i a l meeting of Indo-
Pakistan J o i n t Commission held i n June, 1983 i n Islamabad. 
Pakistan ru led out restaraption of free p r i v a t e t rade with 
India because free flow of manufactured goods frcxn India 
14 
would g r e a t l y harm the indigenous i n d u s t r i e s of Pakistan. 
V 
Fur ther progress i n Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s was 
seen when a th ree day meeting (January 15-17, 1984) of 
Sub-Commission I (Economic Matters) and I I (Trade) of 
15 
•fche India-Pakis tan Jo in t Commission concluded. The meet-
ing was at tended by the Indian delegat ions headed by 
Commerce Secre tary Abid Husain and Pakis tani delegations 
headed by Pakistan Ccanmerce Secretary Izharul Haq. The 
J o i n t agreement signed by than was descr ibed as a major 
16 
s tep forxirard leading to a q u a l i t a t i v e change i n the t r ad -
ing r e l a t i o n s of the two coxmtries . 
14 Sa tyabra t i Rai Chaudhari, " Jo in t Commission Pailture: 
Shrinking Trade with Pak", National Herald, December 
14, 1983. 
15 India , Lok Sabha, Debates', XLIX (6 ) , March 1*, 1984, 
p . 213. 
16 DQwn Overseas', January 26, 1984. 
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In order to further increase the level of trade, 
nineteen items were identified for bulk trading between 
the twD countries. Ten of them for exoort to India and 
17 
nine of then to Pakistan. The list of items are given 
as follows: 
The Items for Exports 
frcan Pakistan to India 
The Itens for Exports from 
India to Pakistan 
1. F e r t i l i z e r (Urea) 
2. Low grade coal 
3. Pig i ron 
4. Soda Ash 
5. Fresh and dried f r u i t s 
6. Petrolexim products 
7 . Fish 
8 . Rock s a l t 
9. Onyx 
10. Industrial alcohol 
Iron ore 
Steel Mill Rolls 
S ta in less s t e e l sheds 
Mica and Mica products 
Selected Chemicals 




Both sides a lso agreed, i n t e r a l i a , t o find ways 
and means for gradual ly inducting the p r i v a t e sec tor in 
the t r ade between the two count r ies and t o make a l l 
poss ib le e f for t s t o meet each o t h e r ' s requirements of 
17 India^Lok Sabha.Debates. XLIV ( 7 ) , March 2, 1984, 
P. 207. 
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essen t i a l conunodities• Leaders of both delegat ions 
expressed t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n vidth the outcome of the 
meeting* But, according to Abid Husain, t h e r ea l t e s t 
l a y in how the proposa ls were put i n t o p r a c t i c e . Izhar-
ul Haq expressed h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n descr ibing t h e agreed 
formulation as a "good beginning". 
In Sub-Commission I on economic mat te r s , the 
most important point discussed in t roduc t ion of advance 
booking of passengers , t r a v e l l i n g between India and 
Pakistan, t o and fro c e r t a i n nominated p a i r s of s t a t i o n s . 
This schene was proposed to be implemented with effect 
1984 
from July !,£ Under t h i s system, passengers t r a v e l l i n g 
between India and Pakis tan wTOXold be able t o buy through 
t i c k e t s in t he i r own currency to seven designated r a i l -
18 
way s t a t i o n s in e i t h e r country. 
The India-Pakis tan Sub-Commission on economic 
matter which concluded i t s de l ibe ra t ions i n Islamabad 
on January 17. 1984, decided t o c o n s t i t u t e a Working 
Group consist ing of Secre ta r i es of Planning and two 
senior o f f i c i a l s of t he Planning Commission of both the 
countr ies to formulate suggestions for economic coopera-
t i o n . I t a lso f i n a l i z e d the exchange of v i s i t s between 
18 India, Lok Sabha. Debates XLVII (31), <?^ril 5, 1984, 
p . 293. 
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t h e i r p l a n n e r s , s c i e n t i s t s , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and h e a l t h 
managers . S teps were d i s c u s s e d t o improve telecommuni-
c a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e 
coax i a l c a b l e l i n k between Lahore and Amris ta r - In t h e 
f i e l d of s h i p p i n g , i t was agreed t h a t i t would mutually-
b e n e f i c i a l t o expand t h e scope of t h e 1975 p r o t o c o a l on 
resumption of s h i p p i n g s e r v i c e s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s 
19 
t o cover t h e t h i r d c o u n t r y c a r r i a g e cargo* 
Apart from t h e meeting of t h e above two Sub-
Commissions, a t h r e e - d a y meeting of o t h e r two Sub-
Commissions ( I I I & IV d e a l i n g with i n f o r m a t i o n , educa t ion , 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , c u l t u r e and s p o r t s , and t r a v e l , tour i sm 
and consu la r m a t t e r s r e s p e c t i v e l y ) of I n d i a - P a k i s t a n 
J o i n t Commission a t t h e o f f i c i a l s l e v e l was he ld i n New 
20 
Delhi (from J a n u a r y 19 t o 21 , 1984>• The meet ing was 
inaugura t ed by t h e t h e n Foreign S e c r e t a r y of I n d i a , M. 
Rasgotra whose speech i n Hindi was i t s e l f a r e f l e c t i o n 
of the c o u n t r y ' s composite c u l t u r e t h a t was t h e mixture 
of S a n s k r i t i z e d Hindi and Chas te Urdu* Rasgotra a l s o 
19 Times of I n d i a . J anua ry 18, 1984• 
20 Ind ia , Lok Sabha Debates . March 1, 1984 (The t e n -
manber d e l e a a t i o n l e d by c u l t t i r e and J o i n t 
Sec r e t a ry M. A. Beg for t h e Sub-Commission I l l . v r t^ i l e 
Tourism J o i n t S e c r e t a r y Mohsin Kamal l e d P a k i s t a n i 
team for Sub-Commission IV. The Sub-Commission I I I 
was l e d by In fo rmat ion and Broadcas t ing J o i n t 
S e c r e t a r y J .K. Bhat tacherya and Sub-Cbmmission IV 
by Home M i n i s t r y J o i n t S e c r e t a r y S u r j i t S i n g h ) . 
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r e c a l l e d I n d i r a Gandhi ' s comment t h a t t h e s e t t i n a UD of 
t h e I n d i a - P a k i s t a n J o i n t Commission as a forum for forq-
ing c o n s t r u c t i v e and mutua l ly b e n e f i c i a l coope ra t i on 
between t h e two c o u n t r i e s would he lp i n t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e 
21 
d i f f e r e n c e s and misunders tand ings of t h e o a s t . 
In t h e New Delhi meeting of t h e Siib-Commission, 
b o t h Ind ia and P a k i s t a n decided t o i s s u e double t r a n s i t 
v i s a s t o f a c i l i t a t e t r a v e l . For t h e promotion of group 
t o u r i s m , a p r o t o c o l was a l s o f i n a l i z e d * They decided 
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be coopera t ion i n t h e f i e l d of p u b l i s h -
ing t h e Urdu t e x t b o o k s , and between museums and a r c h i v e s 
of t h e two c o u n t r i e s . There w i l l be c o n s u l t a t i o n b e t -
ween a r c h e a o l o g i c a l e x p e r t s and exchange v i s i t s for 
c o n s e r v a t i o n of monuments. Exchange of a r c h i v a l m a t e r i a l s 
had been sugges t ed . I t was agreed t o c o n s i d e r measxires 
t o i n c r e a s e t h e number of s h r i n e s t h a t can be v i s i t e d by 
p i l g r i m s i n both c o u n t r i e s . Fresh p r o p o s a l s were made 
t o g i v e an impetus t o t h e tempo of exchanges i n t h e 
f i e l d of s p o r t s , r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n * I t was dec ided 
t h a t P a k i s t a n i Radio and Te lev i s ion Programmes w i l l be 
made a v a i l a b l e fo r All Ind ia Radio and Doordarshan for 
s e l e c t i o n and u s e . The Ind ian s i d e was a l s o asked for 
22 
ghaza l s and music r e c i t a l s on audio and v^diJo-tape§. 
21 Times of I n d i a . January 20, 1984. 
22 Hindustan Times. January 22. 1984. 
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India and Pakistan discussed various i ssues in 
these Sub-Comitdssions' meetings, and good progress was 
e3?)ected between the two countr ies* The pr inc ipa l 
r e s u l t s of the meetings of the four Sub-Commissions of 
India-Pakis tan he ld in January 1984 vere : an agreement 
on through rai lway booking e f f e c t i v e from July 1, 1984, 
between seven designated s t a t i o n s i n the two countries/ 
f i n a l i s a t i o n of the t ex t of a Protocol on Group Tourism 
to be signed soon; an agreement on providing doxible 
entry t r a n s i t v i sas between the two count r ies ; a decision 
to ' ' e s t ab l i sh a x^orking group i n the f i e l d of planning; 
prepara t ion of a draf t agreement on cooperation in a g r i -
cu l tura l research; i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of spec i f i c items for 
bulk t rad ing between the txvo countires^ a decision to 
increase t h e tempo of exchanges i n the f i e l d of spor t s ; 
and e^qjansion of the scope of the shippina protocol of 
1975. 
The Protocol on Group Tourism signed at Islamabad 
23 
on May 20, 1984 which was proposed by both the countr ies 
in the previous Indo-Pakistan J o i n t Corimission's meeting 
of January 1984, further imoroved t h e r e l a t i o n s between 
India and Pakistan- The Indian and Pakis tani Foreign 
23 India , Lok Sabha, Debates. J u l y 27, 1984, p . 46. 
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S e c r e t a r i e s M. Rasgotra and Niaz A. Naik s igned t h e 
P ro toco l and s a i d t h a t t h e new v i s a r u l e s vrould he lp 
24 
i n renoving t e n s i o n i n Indo -Pak i s t an t i e s * 
The main p o i n t s covered i n t h e P r o t o c o l were 
as fo l l ows : 
1. Both s i d e s agreed on t h e Development of Group 
Tourism between t h e two c o u n t r i e s on t h e b a s i s of 
r e c i p r o c i t y . 
2. I t was ag reed t h a t promotion of group t ou r i sm 
would' be for a maximum p e r i o d of 15 days for 
groups of 30 t o 100 p e r s o n s . 
3 . The P r o t o c o l a l lowed t h e movement of UD t o 8000 
n a t i o n a l s of each coun t ry every year -more s p e c i -
f i c a l l y 2000 i n each q u a r t e r . 
4 . The m o d a l i t i e s of group tou r i sm w i l l be handled by 
t h e Government Corpora t ions v i z (ITEC) Ind ian 
Tourism Development Corpora t ion and P a k i s t a n 
Tourism Development Corpora t ion (PTDC). 
5. I t v;as dec ided t h a t i n i t i a l l y t h e group could go by 
a i r on ly . 
24 Statesman. May 21, 1984. 
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6. The t o u r i s t s t r a v e l l i n g i n groups wi l l not be 
required t o personal ly r epor t t o the pol ice s ta t ion . 
7. Nationals of the t;vo countr ies were granted visa 
only t o v i s i t friends or r e l a t i v e s or for pi lgr im-
ages* Visa wi l l be appl ied for one month in advance* 
8. A v i s i t o r ' s v isa , i ssued for t h r e e months, can be 
extended upto one year. 
9. The diplomatic s taf f wi l l be given visa for the 
e n t i r e duration of t h e i r assignment. Although i t i s 
being done, there i s no agreement sanctioning i t . 
10. The non-diploma t i c s ta f f , whose visa are pe r iod i -
ca l ly renewed wil l a lso got them for t h e duration of 
assignment. 
11. For businessmen, who are r equ i red t o t r ave l f r e -
quently between the tvo coun t r i e s , t r i p l e ent ry 
visa will be issued up t o a maximum period of s i x 
months. 
12. There wi l l be exchange of experience bet\<een the 
two countr ies in s t a t i s t i c s , r e sea rch and p u b l i c i t y 
materialso 
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13. The Pro toco l w i l l remain i n f o r c e fo r a p e r i o d of 
one year but can be revoked by e i t h e r p a r t y g i v i n g 
v / r i t t en n o t i c e . Af ter one yea r t h e r e w i l l be a 
review* 
14. The P ro toco l w i l l no t cover n a t i o n a l of t h i r d 
c o u n t r i e s . 
After s i gn ing t h e P r o t o c o l of May 20, 1984, 
under t h e a e g i s of Indo-Palc is tan J o i n t Conunission, some 
p r o g r e s s was seen between Ind i a and Pakis tan* Two groups 
c o n s i s t i n g of 38 and 19 t o u r i s t s from P a k i s t a n v i s i t e d 
25 
I n d i a i n March 1985. A group of 100 p a s s e n g e r s h a s ^ 
been booked by Ind i a Tourism Development Corpora t ion t o 
a t t e n d a Conference i n Karachi and v i s i t p l a c e s of 
t o u r i s t i n t e r e s t . 
The second meeting of I n d o - P a k i s t a n Commission 
26 
was he ld i n New Delhi on J u l y 2-4, 1985. The Commission 
was e^qsected t o have met 12 months be fo re bu t i t was 
pos tponed because of d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n s fo l low-
ing I n d i a n acciosations of P a k i s t a n i involvement i n 
25 I n d i a , Lok Sabha, Debates . VII , ( 2 ) , J u l y 24, 1985, 
p . 120. 
26 Kieesinq's Contemporary Arch ives . Vol. XXXII, No.3, 
March 1986, p . 34240* 
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d i s t u r b a n c e s i n t h e Ind i an S t a t e of Punjab. Thus, t h e 
second meet ing was concluded on J u l y 4 , 1985 i n New-
D e l h i , by t h e M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e and r u r a l Develop-
ment Buta Singh and Foreign M i n i s t e r of P a k i s t a n , 
Sahibzada Yaqub Khan on beha l f of t h e i r c o u n t r i e s . The 
27 
outcome of t h e meet ing of t h e Sub-Commissions were; 
1- The s i g n i n g of an a g r i c u l t u r a l c o o p e r a t i o n agreement. ' 
2. C u l t u r a l exchange programmes. 
3 . F i n a l i s a t i o n - o f th rough r a i l w a y booking f a c i l i t i e s 
between d e s i g n a t e d r a i l w a y s t a t i o n s wi th e f f e c t from 
1 s t October, 1985. 
4 . Waiver of t h e requi rement of p o l i c y r e p o r t i n g i n 
r e s p e c t of bonaf ied businessmen and h o l d e r s of 
t r a n s i t visas* 
5. Agreement on s e t t i n g up of a working group for co-
o p e r a t i o n i n t h e f i e l d of p l a n n i n g . 
6. The exchange of r a d i o and T.V. programme. 
7 . Tb curb t h e smuggling of n o r c o t i c s a c ro s s t h e Indo-
P a k i s t a n b o r d e r . 
Both c o u n t r i e s have s i m i l a r p e r c e p t i o n s of v a r i o u s 
m a t t e r s , Yaqub Khan and t h e t h e n I n d i a n M i n i s t e r of 
Exte rna l A f f a i r s Khurshid Alam Khan s a i d "The j u s t con-
28 
e luded second meeting i s one more s t e p forward'* i n Indo-
27 I n d i a , Lok Sabha.Debates , V l l (2 ) J u l y 24, 1985 
p . 7 5 . 
28 I n d i a n Express . J u l y 5, 1985, p . 1. 
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P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s . 
In s p i t e of t h e l a r g e a r e a s of c o l l a b o r a t i o n , 
t h e coope ra t ion i n t h e f i e l d of b i l a t e r a l t r a d e was 
t a r d y . Khxirshid Alam Khan i n h i s concluding remarks 
s a i d , "while we have made p r o g r e s s i n some a r e a s , v»e 
a r e y e t t o r e g i s t e r any p o s i t i v e movenent i n a r e a s l i k e 
29 
t r a d e . P a k i s t a n ' s s t a n d on b i l a t e r a l t r a d e was r e j e c t -
ed by Ind ia as d i s c r i m i n a t o r y , when Ind ia o f f e r e d for 
wheat, Pak i s t an s a i d t h a t t h e r e was arrangement of 
30 
supp ly of wheat from U.S. and A u s t r a l i a . Now, i t be -
comes c l e a r t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s r i g i d a t t i t u d e towards 
I n d o - P a k i s t a n t r a d e i s p a r t l y de termined by t h e bus iness -
men having l i n k s with m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s who a r e 
e a r n i n g super p r o f i t s and p a r t l y by t h e wes te rn manu-
f a c t u r e r s . 
The deadlock between I n d o - P a k i s t a n t r a d e , which 
was s t a g n a t e d s i n c e l a s t e i g h t y e a r s , came a t t h e end 
x>dth t h e d i s cus s ion of Finance Min i se r V-P- Singh and 
h i s c o u n t e r p a r t Mahbubul Haq a t I s lamabad on Janua ry 10, 
1987, when Pak i s t an a l lowed p r i v a t e s e c t o r iniports from 
29 Times of I n d i a . J u l y 5, 1985, p . 1. 
30 I b i d . 
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Ind ia i n 42 i t e m s . Under t h e agreement , t h e p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r i n P a k i s t a n was a l lowed t o import t h e i tems i n -
c lud ing t e a , books , v i s c o s e f i b r e and y a r n , f e r r o a l l o y s , 
c a l c u l a t o r s , c a l c u l a t i n g machines , o n i o n s , b i d l l e a v e s 
and r i g s e t c . While I n d i a can main ly impor t from 
P a k i s t a n f e r t i l i s e r (Urea) c o t t o n , i r o n and s t e e l i t e m s . 
Both Singh and Haq t o l d a j o i n t news conference t h a t 
32 
t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s had been " f r u i t f u l and p o s i t i v e . 
A l i t t l e impt»vement was seen i n I n d o - P a k i s t a n 
r e l a t i o n s when Zia i n February 1987 came t o see c r i c k e t 
a t J a i p u r and r e sponded by say ing t h a t he would l i k e t o 
see t h e meet ings of Sub-Commissions on t r a d e and 
economic m a t t e r s . I t was dec ided t h a t t h e twD Sub-
Commissions on t r a d e and c u l t u r e should meet a f t e r t h e 
n e c e s s a r y ground work was p r e p a r e d . This had de layed 
t h e meoting and t h e meet ing of I n d o - P a k i s t a n Sub-
Commission-I on economic m a t t e r s and Sub-Commission-II 
33 
on t r a d e was h e l d i n New Delhi i n e a r l y August 1987. 
In t h i s meeting bo th t h e c o u n t r i e s , for expanding 
coope ra t i on , t a l k e d i n t h e f i e l d of i n d u s t r y , a g r i c u l -
t u r e , communications, h e a l t h , s c i e n c e , t e chno logy and 
t r a d e . 
31 I n d i a , Lok Sabha, Debates X7(28) / ^ r i l 4, 1986, 
p . 26 2. 
3 2 Hindustan Times. J a n u a r y 11, 1986. 
33 I n d i a , Lok Sabha Deba tes . XXX(69), August 21, 1987, 
pp. 13 2-134. 
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A major improvement i n Ind ia -PaJc is tan r e l a t i o n s 
was seen when a l l t h e foxir Sub-Committees of t h e Indo-
P a k i s t a n J o i n t Commission met i n Is lamabad on J u l y 17-
34 
19, 1989 for t h e f i r s t t ime s i n c e 1985. This was t h e 
t h i r d meeting of a l l four Sub-Commissionso In t h i s 
meet ing both t h e c o u n t r i e s t o o k conc re t e s t e p s t o 
s t r e n g t h e n c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e f i e l d of t r a d e , c u l t u r e 
and in fo rmat ion , e a s i n g v i s a and t r a v e l r e s t r i c t i o n s 
and p r a n o t i n g t o u r i s m . 
Some new d e c i s i o n s were t aken i n t h e meet ing of 
t h e Commission 'A/hich was c o - c h a i r e d by t h e t h e n Ind ian 
Ex te rna l Affa i rs M i n i s t e r P-v- Narsimha Rao and the then 
P a k i s t a n Foreign M i n i s t e r Sahibzada Y&qub Khan. Some of 
t h e new dec i s ions t a k e n by t h e Commission were a s 
35 
f o l l o w s : 
( i ) The two s i d e s agreed t o exchange d e l e g a t i o n s of 
businessmen i n o rde r t o i n c r e a s e b i l a t e r a l i ndus -
t r i a l c o o p e r a t i o n . They agreed t o exchange medical 
r e s e a r c h d e l e g a t i o n s i n t h e f i e l d of eco logy and 
coronary ( h e a r t ) d i s e a s e s . 
34 Kses ing ' s Contemporary Arch i»ves . Vol . 35 , No.7-8, 
2989, p . 36813. 
35 Pak is tan News. Volume X, No- 2, August 1, 1989 ,p .3 . 
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(ii) Both sides agreed to avoid double taxation and 
adopted a three year cult viral exchange programme 
for 1989-91. The programme provides for coopera-
tion in the field of; 
(a) EcJucation: Including providing fellowship/ 
scholarship to students in either country 
for the first time, exchange of education-
ists, historians, scientists, academicians 
-and other everts in the field of education; 
(b) Art and Culture: Including exchange of 
musicians, artists, folK dance and music 
e3diibition of arts and crafts etc., 
(c) Both sides agreed to exchange radio, T.v. 
and its programme; agreed to encourage 
exchange of sportsmen, athlets etc. 
(iii) In the field of travel and toiirism, both sides 
agreed to increase the number of places that can 
be visited by national of either country from 
four to eight. Both sides agreed that persons 
with visas valid upto 14 days will be exempted 
from police reporting on reciprocal basis. Both 
the sides agreed to increase the number of 
19 2 
36 
pilgrxms and places of pilgramages and other 
many issues were discussed between the two 
countries. 
These postive steps definitely contributed to 
boosting cooperation in the economic and other fields, 
and both countries tried to improve 'their relations by 
discussing various matters and have accepted almost all 
the recommendations of the Joint Commission since its 
inception. But the important point is that both the 
countries should adhere conscientiously to the genuine 
objectives of the Commission, i.e., overall improvement 
of economic, trade, tourism and cultxoral relations bet-
ween India and Pakistan, and this can't be achieved in 
a day or two but it is a long process and both sides 
should sincerely cooperate each other for bringing the 
aims and objectives of the Commission into real practice. 
3. An Assessment of the Wprldnq of the Joint Commission 
The India-Pakistan Joint Commission's agenda 
consists mainly of two broad issues: 
1. To improve mutual cooperation between India and 
Pakistan; 
36 Ibid., pp. 3-7 
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2. To normalize r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan 
by discussing econoinic, t r a d e , tourism and cu l tu ra l 
f i e l d s . 
In the p a s t , severa l agreements were concluded 
between the two coiontries but none" of then proved as 
useful t o advance mul t i fa r ious cooperations as' t h i s 
one. Now, t h e quest ion a r i s e s how far India-Pakis tan 
Jo in t Commission d i f f e r s with the r e s t of t h e agreenents 
and t o whBt extent i t i s authent ic in br inging both the 
countr ies c lose to each o ther . 
V 
Here, I make an e f f o r t t o ejqslain t h e impor tance 
of J o i n t Coramission by quot ing from t h e s t a t e m e n t s of a 
few p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s from bo th c o u n t r i e s * 
I n d i r a Gandhi s a i d " the s i g n i n g of J o i n t Commi-
s s i o n i s impor tan t fo r he lp ing t o open one by one t h e 
doors i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i o t h a t has been c l o s e d f o r f a r 
37 
t o o long . 
The then Fore ign M i n i s t e r of P a k i s t a n Sahibzada 
Yaqub Khan s a i d " J o i n t Commission c o n s t i t u t e d an 
impor tan t m i l e s t o n e on t h e road t o a f u t u r e of harmony 
and coopera t ion between our ne ighbour ing c o u n t r i e s . 
37 Statesman. March 12, 1983. 
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This w i l l be an i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame work f o r s t r e n g t h e n -
i n g b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . We s h a l l now a b l e t o e x p l o r e 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a b e n e f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
i n a number of ag reed f i e l d s " "Through J o i n t Commission, 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s would be a b l e t o b r i d g e any gaps of 
communication which have a t t i m e s , i n t r u p t e d o r impeded 
38 
t h e growth of t r u s t and con f idence" he s a i d . 
Speaking a t t h e ceremony t h e t h e n Fore ign 
M i n i s t e r of Ind ia P»V» Narsimha Rao s a i d , " I t i s a cause 
for s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t c o n s u l t a t i o n s between t h e govern-
ments of Ind ia and P a k i s t a n have cu lmina ted t h i s morn-
ing i n t h e formal s i g n i n g of t h e J o i n t Commission Agree-
ment. " He s a i d , " I t i s my s i n c e r e hope t h a t as t h e 
tempo of a c t i v i t i e s of t h e J o i n t Commission end t h e s\ib-
commissions s e t up under i t p i c k up many more worthwhile 
i d e a s about m u l t i f a c e t coope ra t ion between t h e two 
39 
c o u n t r i e s w i l l s u r f a c e -
In a t h r e e day meeting (from 19-21 J a n u a r y 1984) 
of Sub-commission a t New D e l h i , t h e t h e n I n d i a n Foreign 
S e c r e t a r y M. Rasgotra r e c a l l e d t h a t I n d i r a Gandhi had 
sugges ted t h e s e t t i n g up of I n d i a - P a k i s t a n J o i n t Comnii-
s s i o n a s a forum fo r fo rgo ing c o n s t r u c t i v e and mutua l ly 
38 Dawn, March 11, 1983. 
39 I b i d . 
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b e n e f i c i a l coope ra t i on be tv^en t h e two c o u n t r i e s which 
would he lp i n t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s and misunder-
40 
s t a n d i n g s of t h e p a s t * 
Both t h e Fore ign M i n i s t e r of P a k i s t a n and t h e 
I n d i a n Min i s t e r of Ex t e rna l A f f a i r s Yaqub Khan and 
Khursheed Alam Khan r e s p e c t i v e l y i n t h e second meet ing 
of t h e J o i n t Coiranission s a i d , "Once more s t e p forward 
had been taken a t Just-con e luded second meet ing of t h e 
41 
J o i n t Commission• 
Now, we s e e t h a t v a r i o u s meet ings and d i s c u s s -
i o n s have taken p l a c e t o implement t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 
t h e Agreement on t h e J o i n t Commission and almost a l l 
t h e p r o v i s i o n s were p r a c t i c a l l y accep ted by t h e two 
c o u n t r i e s . 
Good neighboxjr l iness i s an e s s e n t i a l requ i rement 
fo r t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and soc io-economic deve lop -
ment of bo th t h e c o u n t r i e s . The Conmission p r o v i d e s a 
framework for c r e a t i n g an a l t o g h e t h ^ r new r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between Ind ia and P a k i s t a n , as bo th s i d e s have agreed 
t h a t t h e b a s i c i s s u e s and c a u s e s of c o n f l i c t between 
them can be r e s o l v e d ob ly t h r o u g h d i a l o g u e , n e g o t i a t i o n s 
and mutual cooperat ion* 
40 Hindustan Times. J a n u a r y 20, 1984. 
41 Ind ian Express . J u l y 5, 1985. 
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For bringing India and Pakistan c loser t o each 
other various methods can be adopted and t h e e s t a b l i s h -
ment of a common market i s one of them. But the question 
a r i s e s what should be t h e nature of socio-economic 
contact between than. Shouldi t .be of the na ture of 
European Conrmon Market? or a new method should be evolved? 
If there i s a need for a new method, then what should be 
i t s nature? The answer t o t h i s question i s t h a t the re 
shovild be free exchange of goods -and free movement of 
the businessmen a t t h i s s tage and t h e final 'method should 
be evolved af te r some esqjerience. The main, problem 
r e l a t e d t o t h i s i s t h a t of exchange of currency and i t s 
s tandard. However, t h i s can be resolved through payments 
in foreign ciirrency acceptable t o both the count r ies , 
such as pound or d o l l a r . 
For t he proper functioning of t h e J o i n t Commission 
and improving the Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , the re i s need 
to control arms race and t o develp economic, t r a d e , toxir-
ism and cultxiral r e l a t i o n s . So for t he p o l i c y makers of 
both countr ies i t i s necessary tha t they should adopt 
b i l a t e r a l cooperation and t h e peace-race ins t ead of the 
arms race , s t h e i r major ob jec t ive of t h e i r foreign 
p o l i c i e s . 
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In spite of bilateral talks and negotiations of 
India and Pald-stan there are some regional and inter-
national organisations v*ich have provided an opportun-
ity to both India and Pakistan to develop their politi-
cal as well as economic relations. In this field, SAARC 
has played a very important role-
4. SAARC and Indo-Pakistan Cooperation 
It is in the SAAIC where the leaders of India and 
Pakistan and other member countries realized that, " 
regional cooperation among countries of Soth Asia is 
mutually beneficiaj.| desirable and necessary for prcanot-
ing the welfare and improving the quality of life of the 
people in the region«««'. Economic, Social and technical 
cooperation among the countries of Soth Asia would 
contribute significantly to national and collective self 
reliance*••• increased cooperation, contacts and exchanges 
among the countries of the region will contribute to the 
promotion of friendship and understanding among their 
42 
peoples. This realization of the leaders of the region 
has compelled to cooperate one another. Mrs Gandhi in 
1983 said that South Asian Regional Cooperation is allied 
solely to development and to the strengthening of the 
42 Sumit Chakravarti, "Sotith Asian Regional Cooperation" 




economics of our individual countries. In Banglore 
Summit, the leaders of the member countries refering 
to the "global economic crisis" agreed to consult and 
cooperate in international economic conferences and 
institutions to achieve the objectives of enlarged 
44 
concessional assistance* 
Another development in economic cooperation and 
other field betv^en India and Pakistan and other member 
countries, is the SAARC convention of Supression of 
terrorism and the agreement establishing a Food Security 
Reserve at the Kathmandu Summit. Economic sectors was 
given a push up when the leaders of SAARC , at Katlsnandu 
agreed that a study be undertaken on the trade flows 
betveen the countries of the region, their trade regimes 
45 
and their industrial protection systems. 
The fourth Summit of SAARC held at Islamabad 
from December 29-31, 1988 is more important for India 
and Pakistan because it provided an opportunity to Ms. 
Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi to discuss various 
43 I b i d . 
44 Kees inq ' s Contemporary A r c h i v e s , Vbivime XXXII, No. 
2, 1986, p . 34815. 
45 Foreign A f f a i r s Record. Volume 34, No. 8 August 
1988, pp . 273-274. 
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b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . R a j i v ' s v i s i t of t h i s SAARC meeting 
i n Is lamabad was a l s o t h e f i r s t o f f i c i a l v i s i t by an 
I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r s i n c e P a n d i t Nehru ' s v i s i t t o 
s i g n t h e 1960 Indus Waters T r e a t y . Three b i l a t e r a l 
accords were s i g n e d between t h e two l e a d e r s on December 
46 
3 1 , 1988. They a r e : 
1. To exchange d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on n u c l e a r power 
and r e s e a r c h f a c i l i t i e s and t o r e f r a i n f ron 
a t t a c k i n g each o t h e r ' s n u c l e a r i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
2. To end t h e 'doxoble t a x a t i o n ' of each o t h e r ' s 
a i r l i n e s , and 
3 . To i n c r e a s e c u l t u r a l c o o p e r a t i o n and exchange. 
At a j o i n t p r e s s confe rence on December 3 1 , 1988 
Rajiv Gandhi observed t h a t t h e meet ing would he lp i n 
normal iz ing r e l a t i o n s . Benazir Bhutto s a i d t h a t both 
Pak i s t an and I n d i a were p r e p a r e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i -
47 
b i l i t y of r e d u c t i o n i n m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . She a l s o 
a s su red t h a t P a k i s t a n had no i n t e n t i o n t o i n t e r f e r e i n 
I n d i a ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . R e a l i s i n g t h e impor tance of 
t h e SiOTmit meeting Rajiv s t a t e d t h a t t h e p o l i c i e s 
pursued by t h e P a k i s t a n ' s Peop le P a r t y (PPP) were b e t t e r 
48 
than t h o s e of p r e v i o u s regime. 
46 teesinq's Contemporary Arch ives . Volume 35 , No. 2, 
1989, p . 36485. 
47. I b i d . 
48 Hindtxstan Times. January 1, 1989. 
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Refer r ing t o t h e SAAFC Summit of December 1988. 
The Fore ign S e c r e t a r y , Niaz A. Naik s a i d i t gave an 
e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y fo r I n d o - P a k i s t a n d e l i b e r a t i o n s 
a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l . I t was f e l t t h a t t r a d e could be 
promoted t h rough g r e a t e r c o n t a c t s between t h e peop le . 
I t was i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t t h e SAARC Passpo r t for 
judges and p a r l i a m e n t a t i o n s was agreed upon which could 
49 
be extended t o businessmen and j o u r n a l i s t s . 
The r e c e n t SAARC Summit h e l d i n Colombo on 
50 
December 21, 1991, f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d an oppor tun i ty to 
t h e l e a d e r s of I n d i a and P a k i s t a n a s well as t o t h e 
o t h e r member s t a t e for improving t h e b i l a t e r a l and mul t i -
l a t e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n among t h e member count r ies» I n d i a -
P a k i s t a n and o t h e r member s t a t e s committed t o s u p r e s s 
t e r r o r i s m i n t h e r e g i o n and h i g h l i g h t e d t h e importance 
of human r i g h t s . The member s t a t e s committed for t h e 
c r e a t i o n of an i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l group t o seek ag ree -
ment on t r a d e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n among c o u n t r i e s and t o 
e s t a b l i s h a SAARC p r e f e r n t i a l t r a d e agreement by 1997. 
Member S t a t e s a l s o under took t o form an independent 
"South Asian Pove r ty A l l e v i a t i o n Committee" t o conduct 
an i ndep th s t u d y of d i v e r s e e:<periences of t h e seven 
n a t i o n g r o u p i n g s . 
49 Tr ibune . J a n u a r y 29, 1989. 
50 Kees inq ' s Vol . 37, No. 12, December 1991, p . 38684. 
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5. The Non-aligned I-lovgnent and Indo-Pakistan 
Cooperation 
Like SA?vRq, t h e Non-aligned Movement (NAI-l) has 
a lso provided oppor tun i t i es ( to both India and Pakistan) 
for meeting and discussing various matters* This had 
played an e f fec t ive r o l e in easing t h e s i t u a t i o n and has 
denigrated t he r o l a of nuclear weapons in world a f f a i r s -
I t i s t h e non-aligned movement tha t has provided the 
leaders of India and PaDcistan to d iscuss various b i l a -
t e r a l i s sues in 1983 at New Delhi and f i n a l l y they 
signed India-Pakis tan Jo in t Commission in Vigyan Bhawan 
\^^lich has played an e f fec t ive ro l e in improving economic 
cooperation and other r e l a t i o n s of India and Pakistan. 
In non-aligned Summit of Dellai, t he Indian draf t for 
t he f inal dec la ra t ion of t he conference, divided between 
an economic and p o l i t i c a l p a r t , gave p a r t i c u l a r emphasis 
to economic mat ters with proposals for inimediate 
meas\ires to tac)cle the global economic c r i s i s and to 
51 
promote development. Indira Gandhi, i n her inaugural 
keynote address , s t r e ssed the urgent necess i ty for nuclear 
disarmament and sa id t ha t t he non-aligned countr ies shall 
seek "not cha r i t y or philanthrophy but sound economic 
51 KSesinq's. Volume XXIX, No, S, 1983, p . 32349< 
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s e n s e " wi th s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s on r e s t r u c t i ir ing t h e 
52 
world economic sys tem. The economic d e c l a r a t i o n was 
backed up by : 
1. A comprehensive "'action programme f o r economic 
coopera t ion? 
2. A d e c l a r a t i o n on c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n f o r g loba l 
p r o s p e r i t y ; and 
3 . A d e c l a r a t i o n on c o l l e c t i v e s e l f r e l i a n c e among 
53 
n o n - a l i g n e d and o t h e r developing c o u n t r i e s . I t 
i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s e some new d e c l a r a t i o n and t h e 
b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of non-a l ignment , though t h e y 
a r e not on ly r e l a t e d t o Ind ia and P a k i s t a n , have 
p e n e t r a t e d t h e new s p i r i t i n t h e mind of Ind ians 
and P a k i s t a n i t o coope ra t e each o t h e r i n d i f f e r e n t 
f i e l d s . 
The non-aligned Summit held at Belgrade in 
September 1989 has worked a lot in economic as veil as 
political development. The declaration of the meeting 
onphasized that a 'new international economic order' 
54 
remained the central goal of the organisation. The 
meeting also provided opportxinity to Indian and Pakistani 
53 Ibid. . p. 3 2353. 
54 Kfeesinq's. Volume, 35, No. 9 , 1989, p . 36907. 
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leaders to discuss their bilateral issues. Mrs Nusrat 
Bhutto, Senior Minister of Pakistan, referred to 'trust 
building exercise' with India. She said Pakistan had 
advanced several proposals to promote peace, security 
and arms control in the region of South Asia. The agree-
ment signed, last December between Pakistan and.India 
not to attack each other nuclear facilities constitutes 
a confidence building measure, we also hope that India 
will respond to our proposals, including the proposal 
55 
to keep south Asia free of nuclear weapons. A 15-nation 
econanic Summit was planned to strengthen South Coopera-
56 
tion and an open dialogue with North, and the Rajiv's 
calling on September 5, 1989 for the establishment of a 
'Planet Protection Fund', under U.N* auspices, to develop 
or purchase conservation-compatible technologies and to 
be financed by a contribution by each country (with the 
exception of the poorest) equavelent to 0.1 percent of 
57 
their gross domestic product, have further improved the 
intimacy between India and Pakistan as well as among 
other countries. 
55 Patriot, September 7, 1989. 
56 Ibid.. September 10, 1989. 
57 Keesinq's, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1989, p. 36907. 
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The r e c e n t 10th Non-al igned Summit he ld a t 
58 
J a k a r t a ( I n d o n e s i a ) i n t h e f i r s t week of September 
. 199 2 f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d on occas ion fo r Ind ian and 
P a k i s t a n i l e a d e r s t o d i s c u s s t h e i r b i l a t e r a l p rob lems , 
and fo r improving r e l a t i o n s . But n o t h i n g much was 
ach ieved be tveen Ind ia and P a k i s t a n because Pak i s t an 
r a i s e d t h e Kashmir i s s u e i n t h e Summit. Mr. P»V» 
Narsimha Rao, i n r e t a l i a t i o n , made an o b l i q u e r e f e r r e n c e 
t o P a k i s t a n and reminded t h e Summit t h a t Non-al igned 
Movement had moved on because i t c o n c e n t r a t e d on g loba l 
59 
i s s u e s , " r a t h e r t han f r i t t e r i n g away i t s ene rg i e s i n 
b i l a t e r a l d i s p u t e s w i t h i n i t s e l f which would have s p e l t 
d i s a s t e r t o i t s ve ry e x i s t e n c e long ago . " In t h e 
Summit t h e new dimension t o t h e e f f o r t t o improve t i e s 
wi th P a k i s t a n was t h a t I n d i a t o l d P a k i s t a n t h a t i t was 
a g r e e a b l e t o b i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s on conf idence b u i l d -
60 
ing measures i n t h e n u c l e a r a r ena . 
In a d d i t i o n t o t h e SAARC and t h e Non-Aligned 
Movement t h e r e a r e some o t h e r o r g a n i s a t i o n s such as 
Group of 77 and t h e United Nat ions which have p l ayed 
impor t an t r o l e i n b r i n g i n g c l o s e n e s s not on ly between 
58 Asian Recorder , Vol . X3QCVIII, No. 4 2, October 14-
20, 199 2, p . 22642. 
59 I b i d . . p . 22643. 
60 I b i d . . p . 22646. 
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India and Pakistan but among other countries also* But 
it is the Group of 77, non-aligned movement and parti-
cularly the SPARC which have provided a global forum 
for the South to come together and develop a collective 
perspective on global affairs. With the wide range of 
meetings of foraign secretaries! foreign minister, 
specialised working groups and heads of state or govern-
ment at various regional and international forums,India 
and Pakistan, and other countries have come to realise 
that the major responsibility for their development lies 
with thonnselves and 'they must try to achieve this goal 
through mutual cooperation* 
For promoting bilateral cooperation between 
India and Pakistan, many bilateral talks, meetings, and 
agreements have been arranged. By and large, they have 
also been friiitful. 
Conclusion 
The Joint Commission is certainly step forward 
in promoting cooperation between the two countries for 
mutual benefit in economic, trade, industrial, education, 
cultural, consular, tourism, travel, information, 
scientific and technological fields. The Commission 
also suggested for the exchange of academicians from 
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each other country. Another important point is the 
division of commission into four sub-commissions each 
dealing with specified fields, which have provided an 
opportunities to both Indian and Pakistani leaders to 
have a meeting for discussing some particular matters 
entrusted to a particular sub-cimmission* The neigh-
bourly relations and promoting cooperation in the agree-
ment were maintained with the exception of political and 
military questions. The rigid attitude adopted by India 
and Pakistan and having the trade relations with some 
other countries had disturbed the normal functioning of 
the agre©nent. 
The formation of SAARC of which India and 
Pakistan are the two major partners, and some other 
regional and international organisations held out some 
hope of not only multilateral cooperation but also 
bilateral imorovement between India and Pakistan. 
PART I I I 
LOOKING AHEAD 
C H A P T E R VI I I 
THE STALEMATE AND PROSPECTIVE TRENDS 
Prom t h e above d i s c u s s i o n , i t becomes c l e a r t h a t 
t h e c o n f l i c t between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n has a r i s e n p a r t i -
cx i l a r ly i n t h e ways of p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s , on 
t h e Kashmir i s s u e and i n t h e t r a d e and economic r e l a t i o n s . 
In f a c t , t h e major e lements i n t h e c o n f l i c t over t h e above 
i s s u e s a r e t h e images , i n v i t i n g e x t e r n a l powers i n t h e 
r e g i o n and improving economic and t r a d e r e l a t i o n s v/ith 
o t h e r s r a t h e r t han between t hemse lve s . No doubt , t h e 
e x t e r n a l r o l e i s t h e r e i n c r e a t i n g t h e above 'problems b e t -
ween I n d i a and P a k i s t a n b u t t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s a r e a l s o 
themselves r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e problems. 
The problems of c o n f l i c t s betv^een t h e two c o u n t r i e s a r e 
n o t new b u t t h e i r o r i g i n s cou ld be t r a c e d back t o t h e 
days be fo r e t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e s u b - c o n r i n e n t , a t t h e 
t ime of d i v i s i o n and a f t e r p a r t i t i o n . In o r d e r t o avoid 
from t h e n e t of c o n f l i c t , b o t h I n d i a and P a k i s t a n should 
t a k e fo l lowing s t e p s : 
1 , Ways of Bui ld ing P o l i t i c a l and S t r a t e g i c Consensus 
Af t e r P a r t i t i o n bo th I n d i a and P a k i s t a n have 
improved a l o t i n armaments and n u c l e a r f i e l d s e i t h e r by 
purchas ing from someone o r by making t h e m s e l v e s . Thus, 
t h e s i t u a t i o n i n South Asia e s p e c i a l l y between Ind i a and 
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Pakistan can be i d e n t i f i e d more as a pos t -p ro l i f e ra t ion 
s t a t e r a t h e r than a non-pro l i f e ra t ion s t a t e . Both the 
countr ies now face nuclear t h r e a t to t h e i r nat ional and 
secur i ty i n t e r e s t s from each o the r . Here, i t must be 
noted t h a t ftandamentally a non-nuclear environment would 
serve the s t r a t e g i c and na t iona l i n t e r e s t s of both India 
and Pakis tan. The cur ren t period of the major powers 
e spec ia l ly by U.S. have presented the v/orld v/ith a unique 
opportunity not to move towards nuclear f i e l d . The time 
has come t o s t a r t the same process on the Indian sxib-
cont inent e spec i a l l y between India and Pakis tan. If the 
East Germany and West Gemiciny can reunite^ U.S. and USSR 
can come t o the negot ia t ing t a b l e and o the r major powers 
can ta lk about peace, then why India and Pakistan can not 
do the same process . Both the na t ions share ce r t a in 
common concerns. On the foundations of these i t can be 
bxailt an ed i f f i ce of secur i ty which wi l l i n the long run 
bring peace and prosper i ty not only t o India and Pakistan 
but the e n t i r e South Asia. In the process , i t wi l l 
s t rengthen the global s ecu r i t y system which i s gradually 
acquiring d i sce rn ib l e contours . So, both the countr ies 
shoxild opt the following s teps for the improvements of 
r e l a t i o n s : 
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(a) The Avoidance of War; Recent reports indicate that 
the threat of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan 
exists. Prof, Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin 
nuclear arms control, said if fighting did erupt beti-reen 
India and Pakistan, each side must assume that the other 
1 
would deploy and possible use an atom bomb. These atom 
bomb will not only destroy each other popxilation, propert-
ies but it v/ill destroy the ecological balance also. Thus, 
it is in the interest of both India and Pakistan that they 
should not avoid only nuclear war but conventional war 
also. Because it is an accepted and obvious fact that 
any nuclear armed nation on the verge of losing a conven-
tional war will most likely resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons to avert defeat. This being a distinct possibili-
ty in the case of India and Pakistan, it is imperative 
that both should avoid a conventional exchange to avoid 
escalation and also outside interference, 
(b) Prevention of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Proli-
feration: The proliferation of nuclear and chemical 
weapons betx>?een India and Pakistan, no doubt, will be a 
danger for each other and both countries will have a doubt 
about the strength of each other. The agrandizement of 
nuclear and chemical weapon will also affect the other 
1 Indian Express, June 11, 1990, 
210 
coxontries of the region. Other countr ies of the region 
which are comparatively small i n s i z e , vxilnerable m i l i -
t a r i lyv r e l a t i v e l y l e s s advanced i n terras of resources 
and economic well being, would thought to opt for 
nuclear/chemical weapons to meet the challenges offered 
by India and Pakistan, For them, i t v/ould be cheaper t o 
acquire a bomb or two to d e t e r than to en te r i n to an 
expensive arms race with India and Pakistan, The acquis i -
t i o n of such armaments by small nat ions of the region i s 
l i k a l y to c r ea t e problems and fur ther compound already 
ex i s t ing problems for India and Pakistan, There i s a lso 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of t e r r o r i s t groups acquiring such arms 
c landes t ine ly . With the t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y r i s i ng in the 
region, i t i s important t h a t both India and Pakistan 
should avoid esca la t ion of h o s t i l i t i e s . 
(c) Reduction i n Defence Budget: Both India and Pakistan 
are economically poor and are depend on some other countries 
i n one or the o ther way. Both the countr ies are over 
burdened with debt, supporting one-sixth of the world 's 
populat ion. Thus, both the countr ies need to d r a s t i c a l l y 
reduce spending on armaments and war machine i n order to 
inv igora te t h e i r a i l i n g economies. The funds", thus, 
re leased can be used for not only reducing the debt burden 
but a l so for providing e s s e n t i a l resources for new and 
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urgent xindertakingsv for education, housing, heal th , 
a l l e v i a t i o n of poverty and for the environment. 
(d) Combating Drug Traf f icking , Terrorism and Weapons 
Culture; These a c t i v i t i e s together have assumed menacing 
proport ions and have spread t h e i r i n s i d i o u s t en tac les a l l 
over the world. Prevai l ing condit ions i n India and 
Pakistan provide the i d e a l breeding ground for subversive 
a c t i v i t i e s which der ive s t reng th and sustenance from the 
above mentioned elements. Both the count r i es need to 
t ack le the problem toge the r . 
The long term goal of both India and Pakistan are 
almost same which are s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y i n the stib-
cont inent , economic advancement, freedom from outside 
in te rven t ion , unint rupted peace and p rospe r i t y , end of 
drug menace', t e r ror i sm and weapons cxi l ture. These goals 
can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o r e a l i t y only when both India and 
Pakistan choose t o confront the i s sues toge the r ins tead 
of confronting each o t h e r , Hov/ever, no amotint of peace-
keeping and implementation of various forms of confidence-
bui lding measures and c r i s i s management techniques can 
form a sTibstitute for c o n f l i c t reso lu t ion and set t lement . 
I t i s important not t o loose s igh t of these longer-term 
objectives ' , when addressing the immediate problems of end-
ing h o s t i l i t i e s . I t i s necessary, neve r the le s s , to f i r s t 
t ack le the main sources of c o n f l i c t between India and 
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Paid. Stan. 
(e) Ctombating Coniniunali.sm; Communal ism has acquired a 
special place in both India and Pakistan against the 
positive forces which stands for the v/orld freediom, 
democracy, xonity and tolerance. I t must be realised that 
modem c iv i l i s a t ion , because of the advancement in techno-
logy and means of communication, has acquired a peculiar 
character which i s marlced by great intermingling of 
religions', cultures and diverse ethnic soc ie t ies . Theo-
cra t ic s ta tes are a vest ige of the past and are not 
relevant any more. Instead of working as a cementing 
force, religion has acquired divisive tendencies over the 
years. I t i s high time s ta tes identifying themselves 
with rel igion came out of the i r antiquated mindsets and 
discarded what i s i r re levant in the present context, and 
forged ahead taking in to account human r ights which are 
more relevant. So India and Pakistan should also use 
religion only for beneficial purpose and should discard 
which are i r re levant , 
(f) Non-interference: Both India and Pakistan should 
take in te res t in se t t l ing the i r domestic matters rather 
than taking i n t e r e s t in each other. Both countries should 
come together and agreed not to interfere in each other 's 
affairs by way of providing military and material ass is t -
ance to Individuals or groups attempting to estcibilise 
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the other. India also must stop blaming Pakistan for 
everything. The mismanagement of Kashmir and Punjab by 
successive governments i s not the responsibi l i ty of 
Pakistan. I t i s responsible ordy for fishing in troubled 
waters. 
I t i s the time for Indian government to take 
stock of the s i tuat ion in Kashmir especially and s t a r t 
from the vea^^ beginning. The moment i s also full of 
opportunity and hope for India, The prevailing condi-
tions in Pakistan proved to the people of J & K that 
2 ' 
they have no future in Pakistan. Those who can ' t look 
after the i r o\\m Muslim brethren and continue to d iscr i -
minate vTill do precious l i t t l e for them i f Kashmiris 
choose to join Pakistan where the ethnic and sectarian 
conflict i s on the increase. With pasions and determina-
tion, India will be able to bring home to the people of 
J & K the fact that t he i r legitimate r ights and aspira_ 
tions will be met within the framework of the Indian 
s t a t e . Even i f these outstanding issues are not resolved, 
major i r r i t a n t s will be removed i f the s ta tus quo i s 
maintained. Simple agreements arrived a t in that respect 
could form the nucleus of an overall f lexible pattern of 
security. 
2 Economic and Pol i t ica l Weekly, March 31', 1990, 
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(g) Non-Frovocative Defence (N,F«D.): Non-provocative 
defence i s a lso termed as defensive defence, non-offensive 
defence and j u s t defence. Non-provocaid.ve Defence gained 
a l o t of importance during the 1980s. As the term suggests , 
s t r a t e g i s t s and defence t h e o r i s t s a l l over the world have 
designed a niimber of m i l i t a r y and non-mil i tary s t r a t e g i e s 
which are weak i n t h e i r offensive po ten t i a l and exception-
a l l y s t rong i n t h e i r defensive s t rength , A number of 
count r ies have used t h i s concept to devise a defence 
or ien ted model of s ecu r i t y for themselves. The outstand-
ing ones being Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia, Their 
N.F.D. (Non Provocative Defence) systems are b r i e f l y 
3 
explained below: 
( i ) Switzerland; I t has for cen tur ies pract iced and 
perfected a pol icy of armed n e u t r a l i t y . The weapons 
maintained by the Swiss are e s s e n t i a l l y of a defensive 
na tu re . 
( i i ) Sweden; Uhlike Switzerland, Sweden maintains a 
l a rge s tanding de fendve army. Their s t r a t egy i s termed 
as "marginal c o s t de te r rence" i n v/hich defence need not 
be powerful enough t o defea t any aggressors but simply 
s u f f i c i e n t l y r e s i s t them for giving a lesson t o the 
3 S t r a t e g i c Analysis , Vol. XIII , No, 6, September 1990 
pp. 654—655, 
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aggressor. Sweden supplements i t s defensive capabil i t ies 
with an active peace policy, consistently promoting dis-
armament and development at the U.N, and other interna-
tional force. 
( i i i ) Yoqoslavia; Yugoslavia's defensive defence 
strategy called the General People's Defence combines a 
sizeable standing Army, a fall back capacity for partisan 
and gueri l la warfare, a people's resistance taking many 
forms and envoiving the ent i re population in a variety of 
tasks and a no-surrender clause in i t s const i tut ion. The 
Yugoslavs have developed a broad range of non-military 
forms of resis tance, including moral', po l i t i ca l and 
psychological resistance techniques and economic and 
cultural res is tance. 
In order to arrive a t an integrated defence plan 
or model stiited to meet India and Pakistan's security 
concerns', inspira t ion could be drawn from the models men-
tioned above. Therefore both India and Pakistan, in 
order to bring peace and prosperity, shotild decide to : 
i ) non f i r s t use of nuclear weapons; 
i i ) move forces away from the border, 
i i i ) i n i t i a t e development and exploitation of defensive 
weapons technology while discarding offence 
oriented weapons system; 
iv) discourage interference in each o ther ' s t e r r i to ry 
v) impede war-making capability of both the coTontries 
to a great extent. 
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v i ) Induce expenses on weapons thereby re leas ing 
ftmds for development, 
v i i ) induce arms control i n the region; 
v i i i ) discourage t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y ; 
i x ) con t r ibu te t o an overa l l global s ecu r i ty ; 
x) br ing economic advancement. 
(h) Denuclearization; Nuclear disarmament, no doubt, 
i s the r e l i a b l e and v iab le non p r o l i f e r a t i o n regime. But 
the re should be denuclear iza t ion of whole region includ-
ing t h a t of China and the withdrawl of nuclear weapons 
from the region by the U.S. and o ther nuclear powers 
coiontries. This option would requi re e spec ia l ly U.S. t o 
take a^ vay her naval ships f i t t e d with nuclear weapons 
from these pa r t s of Indian ocean adjoining t h e region. 
For global disarmament, in te r im s teps could be 
considered to remove the t h r e a t of nuclear weapons bet-
ween India and Pakistan as well as from Asia. A search 
for regional (as d is t inguished from global ) solut ion wi l l 
need to meet two essen t i a l c r i t e r i a : 
i ) U r s t , i t must meet the l eg i t ima te i n t e r e s t s of a l l 
coxontries of the region; 
i i ) Second, i t must form an i n t e g r a l in te r im el^nent of 
the l a r g e r vmiversal nuclear disarmament process. 
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Por formulating xrorkable so lu t ions to the t h r e a t 
of nuclear weapons and p r o l i f e r a t i o n in the region, a 
cont inenta l approach based on the p r inc ip les and norms of 
disarmament a l ready accepted ( in the^ INP Treaty) shotdd 
be adopted. In t h i s context', a Tr ip le Zero Option for 
Asia offers the g r e a t e s t po ten t i a l for a t t a i n i n g the 
u l t imate objec t ive of global nuclear disarmament, and in 
the interim', achieveing st ibstantive denuclear isa t ion of 
Asia as well as mee-ting the legi-timate s e c u r i t y concerns 
of a l l s t a t e s a t l e a s t of Asia . The Zero Option for India 
4 
and Pakistan as well as for Asia would imply. 
i ) elimina-tion of a l l medium to shor te r range (5500 
to 500 km. range) , 
i i ) Corresponding commitment by the na t ions of Asia 
not to develop or acqtiire nuclear weapons of the 
non-s t ra teg ic ca tegory , 
i i i ) S t r a t eg i c nuclear weapons i n Asia and elsewhere t o 
be brought witliin the framework of nego-tiations to 
reduce the s t r a t e g i c weapons, 
i v ) Mul-bilateral verifica^tion and inspec t ion mechanism 
to ensure compliance with non-deployment, and non-
development of nuc lear weapons by every s t a t e . 
4 J a s j i t Singh, "Nuclear Weapon Pro l i f e ra t ion i n Asia", 
S t r a t eg i c Analysis , Vol. XIV, No. 12, March 1992, 
P. 1357. 
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In the beginning, no doubt, many di f f icxi l t ies 
w i l l come i n reaching such an agreement between India 
and Pakistan as well as among other c o u n t r i e s . However, 
the fundamental s t r eng th of an Asian Zero Option l i e s in 
the fac t t h a t , unl ike o ther m u l t i l a t e r a l / b i l a t e r a l 
proposals ( including the N,P.T. and NWPZs) and short of 
universal and complete nuclear disarmament, i t i s the 
way in v;hich the e s s e n t i a l l eg i t ima te s e c u r i t y concerns 
of a l l count r ies can be adquatsly met v/hile moving to -
wards the u l t imate objec t ive of global nuclear disarmament. 
At the sub-regional l e v e l , i t v/ould meet the parameters of 
Pak is tan ' s proposals on nuclear i s sues r e l a t e d to t h i s 
par t of the world and Pakistan, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t i s 
s incere about i t s ov/n proposals , shoxild v/elcorae the Zero 
Option and support i t . Adoption of an Asian Zero Option 
i s perhaps the benef ic ia l option l e f t open for India 
before going to choose the nuclear weapon opt ion. 
At the same time, there i s need t o i n s t i t u t e 
spec i f ic measures to support and r e in fo rce s t r a t e g i c 
s t a b i l i t y beta/een India and Pakistan as well as i n the 
whole reg ion . These would have to be constructed around 
confidence bui ld ing measures - both i n r e l a t i o n to nuclear 
i s sue as well as conventional fo rces . With t h i s , b i l a -
t e r a l s teps between India and Pakistan could be progressed. 
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2, Towards A Sett lement of Kashmir Problem:, 
Kashmir had been the problem bet^-zeen India and 
Pakistan s ince p a r t i t i o n , and i t c rea ted problans bet -
ween the two i n many shapes. In the f i r s t pi ace, Pakistan 
claimed t h a t the r e l i g ious a f f i n i t y of the people of 
Kashmir made i n p o t e n t i a l l y a Pakistani province,because 
the p a r t i t i o n of India was based on the recognit ion of 
the separate nationhood of the Indian Muslims, This was 
the opinion of Pakistani leaders and peoples . But on 
the o ther hand, the Indian l eade r s did not agree t h a t 
Kashmir v;ould inev i t ab ly become a pa r t of Pakistan, j u s t 
because the S t a t e ' s population was oven^rhelmingly Muslim, 
because Indian leaders bel ieved t h a t I n d i a ' s nationhood 
was based on secular c r i t e r i a and a l l the re l ig ion , 
cas tes and communities can i n t e g r a t e v;ith India and i t 
would be f a t a l for India to accept r e l i g i o n as the 
fundamental element of p o l i t i c s , Pakistan should note 
t h i s thing i n her mind t h a t the people of a l l the 
communities and of a l l the r e l i g ionsa r e l i v i n g in India^ 
Another mat te r i s t h a t India had put no pressure upon 
the Kashmir r u l e r to accede to India, notwithstanding 
i t s keen i n t e r e s t i n the mat te r . Nehru sa id "we did not 
5 
encourage any rapid decision*'. Having t h i s background, 
5 Si sir Qrv^piiL; Kashmir; A Study i n India-Pakistan 
Relat ions (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), 
P. 445. 
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Pakistan should not think about Kashmiri and Kashmir 
problems, 
(a) Control of Terrorism; After the Bangladesh v/ar of 
1971, Pakistan real ised tha t Kashmir or any part of India 
can ' t be separated from India and Pakistan herself also 
can ' t fight with India, Thus Pakistan opted the tac t ics 
of supporting t e r r o r i s t s of different provinces of India. 
Some of the developments that have caused the present 
s i tuat ion of Jammu and Kashmir in general and of the 
valley in part icular have already explained in previous 
chapters. The full th ro t t l ed suppoirt by Pakistan to 
militancy and terrorism in Janinu and Kashmir led a so-
called revolution in Indian province. So Pakistan must 
be accredited full capabi l i ty to fight a long drawn war 
in the shape of insurgency and engage in a ftill flaged 
confrontation, Pakistan supported Kashmiri mili tants 
with t\-70 reasons. One i s tha t whenever the Pakistani 
leaders are facing any domestic problems from the side 
of public then they are trying to divert the public mind 
from the main domestic issues to such type issues as 
Pakistan raised against India. Other reason i s that 
Pakistan t r i e s to in ternat ional ise the Kashmir issue and 
t r i e s to show herself tha t she i s the follower and 
supporters of hximan r ights by showing the sympathy towards 
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KashntLrl and t r i e s to jeopardise India 's image in the eye 
of the world. 
So in order to bring the closeness between India 
and Pakistan, Pakistan shoxild not ra i se t h i s issue and 
should not support t e r r o r i s t s of Kashmir, The Pakistani 
leaders should also not play with neighbouring coxintry 
l ike India for the i r domestic gain. On the other hand 
India should not only see the on going si tuat ion in 
Kashmir s i l en t ly that i s k i l l ing select ively xinarmed, un-
protected government employees^ pulverise the administra-
t ion, t e r ro r i se the population of Jammu and Kashmir, 
controll ing the media by t e r r o r i s t s , boycott of Indian 
norms such as Friday being the weekly holiday as against 
Sunday e t c . , but India should make the plans and projects 
that must take the full dimension of the threat into 
account and evolve s t ra tegies and plans to handle the 
problems on a war footing. The fundamental requirement 
for the government, therefore, i s to improve the ground 
s i tuat ion by resorting normalcy in administration, law 
and order, the mil i tants have to be tamed by strong 
counteractions', flow of trained armed i n f i l t r a t o r s have 
to be controlled. 
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(b) Organisation of Special Forces; The Government of 
India shoiild organise Special Forces to handle the situa-
tion in the Valley, to face the large number of Pakistan 
trained infiltrators with arms and fairly large ntamber 
of mines, rockets and explosives so that Indian forces 
in such a way can give defeat to militants, infiltrators 
trained by Pakistan. With this', both militants and 
Pakistani will receive a jolt in their aim and peace can 
be brought in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Valley. This 
peace v/ill also improve the relations between India and 
Pakistan. 
(c) More Autonomy to Kashmiris* India consists of many 
regions, ethinically and culturally different to one an-
other. It has many languages and customs differing from 
region to region. Its religious practices vary even 
under the all-embracing umbrella of Hinduism. Likewise 
Jammu and Kashmir has different language and culture and 
the Kashmiri also want to maintain it. The Central 
Government of India, in order to divert Kashmiri from 
Pakistan and make them busy in their own culture, should 
give greater freedom to choose their system, control being 
exercised only over major matters such as defence, foreign 
policy and finance. It should be asked them to utilise 
the Article 370, because with this the Kashmiri will think 
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tha t they have been given more autonomy so that they will 
t ry to maintain the i r ov/n s ta tes and v/ill segregate them-
selves from the false promises of Pakistan that she i s 
giving from time to time. Perhaps Kashmiri might them-
selves ask for i t s abrogation. 
(d) Controls of Commxinal Factors; Controlling coramanal 
factors i s also one of the important matter for both India 
and Pakistan. The f-undamentalists groups and parties in 
both the countries are prevalent today who are creating 
disturbance in the i r respective countries as well as in 
each other countries, and playing a iinique role in creat-
ing a gap between India and Pakistan. So, the government 
of both the countries should stop the ac t iv i t i e s of such 
fundamentalists forces. Part icularly India should take 
much in t e r e s t in this field because of i t s secular 
character. 
(e) Not Allowing Separation; The other solution for 
Kashmir problem i s tha t Indian government should not allow 
the s i tuat ions that favour separation. Because the sepa-
ration of Jammu and Kashmir frcm India and i t s accession 
to Pakistan will further make the s i tuat ion tense bet-
ween India and Pakistan. The key to a possible solution 
in Kashmir l i e s in the s p l i t between Kashmir Islamic 
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fundamentalist groups favouring accession to Kashmir, and 
the Jammu and Kashmir Libera t ion Front, which represents 
the longstanding a sp i r a t i ons of Kashmir va l ley Muslims 
for autonomy and advocates fu l l independence. This 
s p l i t between the txi^ o groups, no doubtf,~ was burs t i n t o 
6 
the open i n laid-lQgo. Ind ia should t r y more and more to 
c r e a t a gap betxi^een these tv/o groups i n order to weaken 
them. 
On the other hand,Pakistan shotild not think to 
take Jammu and Kashmir on her own side and should not 
think to make it an independent state. First thing is 
that Pakistan is standing no v^ here before India in any 
field and if war would take place, PaJcistan will be the 
suffere/and most probably will lose the v/ar. Second 
thing is that if Jammu and Kashmir becomes an independent 
state then only India will not be loser but Pakistan also 
because Kashmiris are having affinity with all the Kashmiris 
and major portion of their majority .;is living in Azad 
Kashmir situated in Pakistan, 
Pakistan will not get any support from 
major powers particularly from U.S. because after the 
Soviet disintegration many Soviet Republics have become 
independent Muslim countries and some of them are also 
6 Selig S, Hartison, "South Asia and the United States* A 
Chance for a Fresh Start", Strategic Digest, Vol. XXII, 
No. 12 December 1992, p, 1610. 
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having nuclear power. So, America a t p resen t has more 
t h r e a t from Muslim coxintries than Communists o r any-
o ther b loc . Therefore America herse l f by making Kashmir 
an independent s t a t e did not v/ant t o c r e a t e ar^ other 
fundamentalist Muslim country. Ihus Pakistan must forget 
the idea of making Kashmir an independent S t a t e , 
( f ) Psychological Reor ienta t ion; The Pak is tan i s were able 
to project the darker s ide of the so -ca l l ed an t i - Ind ian 
Kashmiiri r e b e l l i o n . Their media put out d i s t o r t e d 
fa l l ac ious and orches t ra ted s to res t h a t inflamed the 
Kashmiri Muslims. India should not s e t he r se l f only about 
cor rec t ing the impression created by pro-Pakistan mi l i t an t 
elements amongst the people of the va l l ey , but should t ry 
to search the answers of the factors such as Pakistani 
in t rans igence and e x p l o i t a t i v e opportunism, adminis t ra t ive 
def ic ienc ies and the a l i ena t i on of the people . Solutions 
have to be f ine ly tuned and harmoniously blended to off-
s e t the estrangement of the people and n e u t r a l i s e the 
militcincy of a c ross - sec t ion of the pro-Pakis tani elements. 
Much of the psychological e f fo r t would, t he re fo re , have to 
be d i rec ted a t winning the euphemistic "hear ts and minds" 
of the people. Tv^ o ba s i c i s sues t h a t seem to have hear t 
the Kashmiris i . e . I z z a t (d igni ty) and Islam?, need to be 
reassured, I n d i a ' s p u b l i c i t y based on truthfxal expositions 
should be more convincing. Some of the t r u t h s t h a t the 
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peple of Kashmir need to know a re : 
i ) The purpose of Pakis tani propaganda and support 
to the Kashmiri m i l i t a n t s i s t o d i v e r t t h e i r 
peop le ' s a t t en t ion frcxn the domestic problems 
of Pakis tan, 
i i ) The problems i n Punjab and Kashmir are created 
by Pak is tan i s ; they are nonethe less , temporary, 
and would be s e t t l e d , 
i i i ) The world has understood the foolhardiness of 
Pak i s t an ' s e f fo r t s to foment mi l i tancy and an 
upr i s ing i n Kashmir, Thus Pakis tan has fa i led 
i n receiving moral, mater ia l and diplomatic 
assurances on the Kashmir i s sue from these 
coun t r i e s who were s id ing her e a r l i e r . 
In s p i t e of the above points India should not 
allow the m i l i t a n t s and ext remis ts supported by Pakistan 
to shout p o l i t i c a l slogans from across the Line of Control 
for so-ca l led Azadi; shoxild not eiLlow to organise prepos-
terous organisa t ions such as "World Kashmir Freedom 
Movement", The present s i t u a t i o n of Kashmir needs to be 
handled on a war fooling by enforcing e f fec t ive media 
control measures, by reorganis ing pa rami l i t a ry forces to 
undertake law and order and ccsnbat the growing militancy? 
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by restoring faith through good> clean ac3inini strati on 
and by introducing social services among the people, by 
mobilising Indian Muslims in the cause of " Saving 
Kashmir, " 
3, Expanding Indo-Pakistani Economic Cooperation 
The history of blocking factors in India -
Pakistan economic cooperation as well as political rela-
tions make it clear that many timesv their relations have 
received a big jolt by their bilateral disputes as v/ell 
as by external envolvement. In order to give carefiiL 
consideration to the future prospects for economic 
expansion betv/een India and Pakistan, there are some 
points which are necessary to keep in mind: 
(a) The Imperative of Interdependence; A careful study 
of many factors involved in social', political and 
economic relationship between India and Pakistan shov/s 
that their best interest can be achieved by expanding 
the areas of cooperation and acknov/1 edging the importance 
of interdependence. So, it is necessary for both the 
Goxintries that they should forget their past experiences 
of wars and of some other irritant factors, whatever the 
trials of strength have taken place beta-;een the two 
countries have not given any thing to any side except 
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loss of l i ve s , properties and time. So, there i s need 
to improve mutual cooperation in every f i e lds . 
(b) Leadership Cris is in India and Pakistan: Both the 
countries have been suffering from the fundamentalist 
leaders and these leaders for the i r prest ige and parties 
i n t e r e s t s , have issued many slogans against each other 
(Pakistani, against India and Indian, against Pakistan). 
So, these leaders have to change the i r a t t i tude against 
each other ' s countries and the pol i t i cs shoxold be based 
on mutual cooperation rather than f ra t r i c ida l struggle 
and ftindamentalist approach. The leaders of both the 
coxintries should plan to take those measures and i n i t i a -
t ives which can transform even dedicate and complicated 
question', through a new pol i t ica l bas is , for construc-
t ive , responsible', and reciprocal re la t ionship . For 
reducing vulnerabil i ty to economic exploitat ion, the 
"new polities'* of Indian and Pakistani leaders shotild be 
related to the economic cooperation and econcsnic develoi>-
ment, 
(c) Economic Compulsions: An i n i t i a t i v e for reduction 
of trade barr iers emanating from India might make i t 
suspect in the eyes of Pakistan, because Pakistan cannot 
countenance any loss of revenues result ing from a reduc-
tion of t r a f f i s . Nor can i t ranove quanti tat ive 
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restriction on imports, if that is the only or most 
effective v/ay of protecting its balance of payment. The 
best course, therefore, is to let trade grow at its 
natural pace in response to the free play of the forces 
of demand and supply. India and Pakistan are likely to 
trade only in those items, which they can buy at rela-
tively cheaper prices consistent with minimtjm standards 
of quality, especially as this involves expenditure of 
scarce-foreign exchange. Under such a dispensation, 
neither country could legitimately complain either of 
exploitation or xinnecessary sacrifices, 
(d) Information Flow; Except for traditional items of 
trade, the business and industrial communities of the two 
countries are not aware of what the other can offer in 
quantity value and quality terms. There are thousands 
of item in which India and Pakistan can have trade with 
each other but adequate information is not available 
regarding these items. Some steps shoxild be taken to 
improve the information system through delegation, 
exhibition, fares', exporters-importers, directories,news 
letters, product catalogues etc. A study of the roles 
being played by the government agencies', chamber of 
commerce, industry and trade', specific associations, 
consultants', economists and freelance individuals, banks. 
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industrial agencies like UITIDO etc. in the area of 
bilateral trade are necessary. Steps taken by such 
agencies will sharpen areas of business cooperation 
and Indo-Fak trade coiold be expanded over the next 
few years. 
Despite major items of imports and exports 
of India and Pakistan being identical, there are 
still scores of items in which the coxmtries can trade 
with each other. If the respective governments take 
steps to facilitate intra-regional trade, the trade 
between the two countries would surely expand and 
reach a higher level, 
(e) Development of Trading Organisation; India and 
Pakistan both should develop trading organisations. 
The Chanels of trade should be strengthened both in 
public and private sectors, so as to effectively 
promote trade and evolve various forms of trading 
activities. These organisations shotild have regular 
flow of informations, 
(f) MaximiMn Imports and Exports: For the economic 
expansion between India and Pakistan, both cotmtries 
shoxiLd import goods from each other rather than from 
distant countries because the import from distant 
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coxintries will raise the cost of freight and insurance 
for India and Pakistan', which will constitute a signi-
ficant proportion of each other's total import bill. 
Greater bilateral trade cooperation woiild reduce the 
foreign exchange payment on account of these two items 
(freight and insurance) and thereby produce some bene-
ficial effects on balance of payments position of each 
other, 
(g) Improving Tntegrated Bilateral Trade; Both India 
and Pakistan are facing xinforseen pressures on balance 
of payments caused freguently by draught or xmtimely 
rainfall which raises the cost of production due to 
shortage of raw materials, intermediate goods and 
fertilizers. These can be largely overcome by an inte-
grated bilateral trade practices. This would not only 
allow domestic industries to realize their grov/th targets 
but also achieve greater economies of scale, 
(h) The Imperative of Balanced Trade; Since any form of 
cooperation involves close understanding of the situa-
tion, it may be kept in mind that difficulties will be 
formidable. One of the most important problem will be 
in terms of trade balances. While both covintries will 
have to examine business opportunities it should be kept 
within the framewoj^ of the countries economic priorities 
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and pol i t i cs and in the s p i r i t of equali ty. This will 
build mutual t r u s t and c red ib i l i ty which i s a pre-
condition for economic cooperation, 
( i ) Need for Research: The coordination of research 
services can play another possible area of cooperation 
between the two countries. For \in.dening the field of 
experiment^ both the countries should establish common 
research i n s t i t u t e s and the resul ts obtained through 
research could be u t i l i s ed for the benefit of the 
people of both the countries. But, i t i s necessary 
tha t the equality in the dis t r ibut ion of benefits should 
also be ensured through location of the ins t i tu t e s and 
the i r f ield s tat ions in the tivo countries in an almost 
equal proportion. Pr ior i ty should be given to the 
establishment of the follov/ing i n s t i t u t e s , 
1, Agriciiltural and forestry Research Organisa-
t ion, 
2, Leprosy Research Centre. 
3, Virus, Research In s t i t u t e . 
4, Ins t i tu te of Malaria and 
5, Tuberclesis Research Centre. 
( j ) Coordination of Educational and Training Programmes; 
We knov; that both the countries have invested a large 
sums of money in the creation of univers i t ies and other 
educational inst i tut ions ' , but they have not developed 
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upto mark. So, both the coiintries shoiild agree to co-
ordinate the i r educational and training f a c i l i t i e s in 
the f ie lds of administration, management, agricxilture, 
engineering and medicine, and forestry e tc . 
One thing should be kept in mind that both 
India and Pakistan must learn to do every thing step-by-ste 
with time bound and coordinated action-programmes. They 
should follow the way of Mao Tse Tung who used to say 
tha t "in a long journey of a thousand miles, one must 
take the f i r s t s tep ." 
Conclusion 
Prom the above discussion, i t becomes clear 
tha t both India and Pakistan after par t i t ion improved 
a l o t in armaments and nuclear f ield, so the situation 
beta-;een India and Pakistan can be ident i f ied as a post-
prol iferat ion s ta te rather than non-proliferated s ta te . 
Now boch the coTintries face the nuclear threat for 
the i r national in te res t s and security from each other. 
In bringing a consensus betv/een India and Pakistan, 
there i s need for some reorientat ion of policies to 
take in to account in th is changed circumstances of 
South Asia. At present i t i s d i f f icu l t to visualise 
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any meaningfxol process which could lead to a reversal 
and denudearisat ion. So early consultations to work 
for s t ra tegic s t ab i l i t y in the post nuclearisation 
s ta te are necessary. 
In the ultimate analysis , proliferation dangers 
do not emanate from the mere e^cistance or possession of 
nuclear weapons, but essent ia l ly from the belief in 
the i r use and usabi l i ty which vroxild influence intensions. 
I t would be unreal is t ic to expect a dramatic change in 
the pol i t ica l context of Indo-Pakistan re la t ions , or to 
ignore the post-prol i f ierat ion s ta te of the nucleai^ 
environment around India, Thus', i t i s necessary to 
rapidly move tov/ards s tab i l i s ing the si tuat ion in a 
manner that lowers the risk factors and reduces the 
dangers of threa t or use of nuclear weapons. 
The si tuat ions that has been developed in 
Kashmir are needed to be reversed not by force and 
sentimental a t t i tudes but through multidirectional 
approach such a po l i t i ca l , economic, psychological and 
diplomatic. The measures of control need to conform 
to a strategy which would imply tough measures against 
the mil i tants and varying degrees of pressure on 
others . Jammu and Kashmir can not be allowed to dr i f t 
away from India because Kashmir separation from India 
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will further escalate the conflict beti/een India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan shoiild not opt suicidal path about 
Kashmir issue again and again. 
As far as economic relations is concerned, it 
received a joilt by bilateral disputes and by external 
involvement both. Hence, one thing should be kept in 
mind that the bilateral cooperation of India and 
Pakistan received a jolt whenever political relations 
became strained. Thus the economic expansion bet^ -reen 
the tf.-io countries are possible only v;hen thair political 
relations are normal and are improved. 
C H A P T E R IX 
CONCLUSIONS hlW FINDINGS 
This s tudy l e a d s us t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e 
I n d i a - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s have been t h e v i c t i m of psycho-
l o g i c a l ma la i se^ and both t h e c o u n t r i e s have been sus -
p e c t i n g about each o t h e r ' s mot ives s i n c e 1947. So, 
P a k i s t a n ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been I n d i a - o r i e n t e d and 
I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , P a k i s t a n - o r i e n t e d . Pak i s t an 
always f e a r e d t h a t I n d i a would d e s t r o y i t s ve ry e x i s t -
ence e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r th rough i n t e r n a l subvers ion i n 
P a k i s t a n . This k ind of psyche was t h e r e s u l t of h i s t o -
r i c a l , domes t ic v a r i o u s complexes and d e f i c i e n c i e s , a n d 
e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s . In o r d e r t o secure h e r s e l f a g a i n s t 
t h e supposed Ind i an t h r e a t ^ Pak i s t an t r i e d t o seek 
f r i e n d s h i p of China, West Asian c o u n t r i e s and had been 
t h e s a t e l l i t e of t h e Uni ted S t a t e s up to October 199 0, 
And when Uni ted S t a t e s withdrew h e r hand from suppor t ing 
P a k i s t a n t h e n P a k i s t a n sea rched o t h e r one t o have a 
c l o s e a l l i a n c e i n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n h e r s e l f i n each 
and every f i e l d . The purpose of t h e P a k i s t a n ' s f r i end -
s h i p with t h e s e c o u n t r i e s was t o s h i f t t h e ba lance of 
power i n h e r own favour . As L iaqua t Al i Khan, t h e f i r s t 
Prime M i n i s t e r of P a k i s t a n , remarked: 
" In f a c t one of t h e main o b j e c t i v e s of t h e 
Muslim League which brought P a k i s t a n i n t o 
e x i s t e n c e ; was t o cement and s t r e n g t h e n 
f r a t e r n a l t i e s between Muslim of t h e sub-
c o n t i n e n t and t h o s e of t h e o t h e r p a r t s of 
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the v/orld. The imderlying idea of the movement 
for the achievement of Pakistan was not jus t t o 
add one more country to the conglomeration of 
countries in the world, or to add one more path 
of colour to multi-coloured global map, Pakistan 
came into being as a resu l t of the urge fe l t by 
the Muslims of th i s sxjb-continent to secure a 
t e r r i t o r y , however limited, where the Islamic 
ideology and way of l i f e coxild be practiced and 
demonstrated to the v/orld", 1 
Pakistan's policy of to ta l alignment with the 
western bloc during 19 54-58 gave a chance to the United 
States to have a foothold in South Asia. United State 
tooks benefits of Pakistan's i n i t i a l weaknesses, and 
helped Pakistan's view of agression. United States 
through al l iance with Pakistan and military supplies not 
only disturbed the normal relat ions of India and 
Pakistan but also brought cold v;ar to South Asia region. 
So, did China during the s ix t ies in order to se t t l e i t s 
scores with India. 
Thus, i t i s apparent that Pakistan had all along 
adversarial relat ionship with India. There had been 
different i r r i t a n t s of many occasions. In the i n i t i a l 
stages, the question of minorit ies, evacue properties, 
division of mili tary s tores , currency problems, border 
1 Cited by Surendra Chopra, "Evaluation of Pakistan's 
Foreign Policy and i t s Relations with India", VJ3 . 
Chopra, ed. . Studies in Indo-Pak Relations ( New-
Delhi: Pat r io t , 1984)^ P. 232. 
238 
problem and future of Indian s ta tes jiLagued i t s rela-
tions with India and worked as a blocking factors in 
the re la t ions of the two cotintries. I t i s apparent 
tha t the close complementarity between the two countries 
(India and Pakistan) meant tha t both the cotmtries had 
suffered a loss during the period of c r i s i s . 
Ti l l 1965, both India and Palcistan had gained 
substantial combat experience, the Pakistanis in fight-
ing the Indians and the Indian fighting both the 
Pakistanis and the Chinese, Additionally, the armed 
forces of both sides had acquired substantial amounts 
of mil i tary hardware', some of i t very sophisticated. 
The arms build up, coupled v/ith Pakistan's membership 
in CENTO and SSATO, had drawn both superpowers into the 
sub-continent. Finally the Chinese invasion of 1962 on 
India had led to a major infusion of U.S. arms into India 
and had strained U.S.-Pakistani re la t ions . 
By 1965 the respective foreign policy stands 
and at t i tudes of the two countries had hardened. India 
had fiimly embarked on the secular path while Pakistan 
followed the road to an ideal Islamic State that would 
incorporate a l l Muslims on the sub-continent. Thus, i t 
was necessary for the Pakistani regime to keep alive 
i t s claim on Kashmir, i t s " lost" t e r r i to ry with a pre-
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dominantly Muslim populat ion. Inevi tab ly / t h i s aroused 
a n t i - i r r e d e n t i s t sentiments i n India x^rith i t s strong 
commitment t o hold on t o Kashmir. Indian an t i i r reden-
t ism by 1965 stemmed from more complex fac tors than i t 
had i n 19 47. Now, i n addi t ion to defending the notion 
of Indian sectilarism, the defence of Kashmir had come 
to symbolize the government's commitment t o preserving 
the n a t i o n ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and nat ional secur i ty . 
Thus the 1965 war had important consequences for Pakistan 
because t h i s war demonstrated t h a t Pakistan was not hav-
ing any ground t o support i t s claim on Kashmir amongst 
the Muslim population of the S t a t e . This war also 
showed t h a t , much to Pak i s tan ' s dismay the Indian armed 
forces v/ere able to fend off a Pakistani a t t ack . Thus 
the Pakistani leaders learned t h a t the Indian armed 
forces could not be e a s i l y routed and had become a long 
way from the Chinese debacle of 1962. 
A new hope of mutual improvements between the 
two covintries was seen when Tashkent Agreement was signed 
through the mediation of Soviet Union. But as far as 
permanent set t lement of India-Pakis tan i problems are 
concerned, Tashkent Declarat ion achieved nothing new a t 
a l l . I t brought a temporary r e s p i t e to India-Pakistan 
h o s t i l i t i e s . India and Pakistan remained suspicious 
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and unyielding towards each o ther , and the Kashmir 
remained as iinre solved as ever . 
Further , the war of 1971 disrupted the r e l a -
t i ons beta-7een India and Pakis tan. In t h i s war, 
Pakistan v/as more suf fe re r because she l o s t her East-
e m wing. The break up of Pakistan and I n d i a ' s un-
questioned m i l i t a r y might es tab l i shed I n d i a ' s superi-
o r i t y not only over Pakistan but i n the whole South 
Asia region. Recognising i t s i n f e r i o r i t y i n conven-
t iona l v;ar, Pakistan f e l t the t h r e a t for her secur i ty 
i n the sxib-continent. So, i t made a sense for Pakistan 
to develop some nuclear capab i l i t y and the programme of 
nuclear armaments of Pakistan a f t e r 1971 received a 
considerable impetus a f t e r the Indian nuclear explosion 
of 1974 a t Pokhran, 
As Pakistan came apar t , i t s claim on Kashmir 
also eroded i n a major way. The i n a b i l i t y of the West 
Pakistan to convince t h e i r brethren i n the East to 
remain in the same p o l i t y , made i t exceedingly difficxilt 
for the Pakis tani l eader sh ip t o l a y a claim on Kashmir 
on the bas is of i t s r e l i g ious composition. Naturally, 
India took advantage of the discrepancy betx;een fact 
and theory . 
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With the signing of the Simla Pact, a nev/ era in 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s began, ^jie g r e a t e s t meri t of the 
Simla Pact was t h a t the two count r i es decided to renounce 
the use or t h r e a t of use of force aga ins t each other, to 
put an end to the era of c o n f l i c t and confrontation, and 
commit themselves to s tanding cooperation and peacefxol 
coexis tence . Further , the coming of Janata Party in 
pofifer i n New Delhi generated nsw hopes of cooperation 
betx-zeen the two coun t r i e s . The Janata Government and 
i t s policy crea ted a c l imate of confidence and gooA/ill 
betv/een India and Pakistan. The l eaders of both 
coun t r i e s , through the exchange of v i s i t s beti'/een India 
and Pakistan, d i spe l led the apprehensions of the funda-
menta l i s t organizat ions i n both c o u n t r i e s . Many out-
standing disputes were also resolved between the t;-/o 
count r ies and the areas of mutual cooperation in \'cirious 
f i e lds were expanded. 
But the above hopes and s p i r i t of cooperation 
received a j o l t \vhen the Soviet Union occupied Afghanis-
t a n . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced a 
c r i s i s not simply for Afghan people but for the South 
Asian region as a whole. I t confronted the main regional 
ac tors - Pakistan and India with a new p o l i t i c a l and 
s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n to which they reacted i n d i s t i nc t i ve 
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ways. For India and Pakistan, the s o v i e t invasion 
se r ious ly changed the regional balance of pcn^er, and 
put them i n the uneviable s i t u a t i o n of having t o 
respond to t h i s new development and cope with i t s conse_ 
quenpes i n t h e i r own ways. Their responses , however, 
came to be formxilated not so l e ly on the ba s i s of the 
needs and a sp i r a t ions of the Afghan people but they 
took i n t o account t h e i r ovm i n t e r e s t s . Their responses 
d i f fe red from each o t h e r . Pakistan chose to pursue 
ac t ive opposi t ion to the Soviet invas ion , and India made 
no public condontination of the SovieJ: invas ion . 
Pakistan also showed a number of reasons to be-
come very fearful of the impl ica t ions of Soviet occupa-
t ion of Afghanistan for her na t iona l i n t e g r i t y and 
secur i ty as well as regional s t a b i l i t y . The whole 
development of the Afghan c r i s i s generated in te rna t iona l 
sympathy for Mujahideen and provided i n t e rna t i ona l a s s i s -
tance which began t o pour in to Pakistan for the Afghan 
refugees and Mujahideen. From t h i s , Pakistan benefi t ted 
a l o t . I t was Zia-ul Haq who made Pakistan very impor-
t a n t to U.S. overnight when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan became a f r o n t l i n e S ta te i n 
the U.S. percept ion. Through t h i s t a c t i c s , Pakistan 
received a l o t of arms and economic a id from America and 
other countr ies and b u i l t up her defence system more 
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s t rong . This v/as a danger for I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . In t h i s 
way/ India opposed more to the supply of arms to the 
Pakistan from U.S. and China than t h a t of Soviet invas ion. 
On the o ther v/ay, India wanted t o make the Indo-Soviet 
t r e a t y of 1971, a l ive for cont inuing her r e l a t i o n s with 
Soviet Union. Inc3ia with an a l l i a n c e of Soviet Union 
had to face Pakistan + U.S. and China i n t h i s region, 
Pakistan was important t o the U.S. as a s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
i n the context of America' s cold war aga ins t the Soviet 
Union, But with the vrithdrawal of Soviet froces and 
f i n a l l y with the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of Soviet Union, the 
cold war ended. "Thus, P a k i s t a n ' s usefulness to U.So 
pol icy ca lcu la t ions was changed. The U.S. , v/hich was 
be l i ev ing b l ind ly i n P a k i s t a n ' s nuclear programme during 
Afghan c r i s i s and cold war, quickly changed i t s policy 
and suspended i t s mi l i t a ry and econcardc ass i s tance to 
Pakistan under the p r e s s l e r Amendment, U.S. not only 
suspended her economic and m i l i t a r y aid t o Pakistan but 
a l so sh i f t ed her p r i o r i t i e s towards India i n place of 
Pakis tan . Thus, whatever t he burden India was facing 
during Afghan c r i s i s and cold war from the s ide of 
Pakistan helped by U.S. was reduced and t h i s burden i s 
sh i f t ed to Pakistan. Thus i n order to br ing balance of 
power i n her own favour, Pakis tan t r i e d to improve her 
r e l a t i o n s more with China, France and o the r s . 
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Further, the Kashmir*, Punjab and Siachin glacier 
issues have been major irritants in India-Pakistan rela-
tions. Kashmir remains the one unresolved problem since 
Partition. Before 1971, Pakistan tried to take Kashmir 
through military efforts but after the defeat in Bangla-
desh war of 1971, realised that no military action could 
separate Kashmir from India or coxild make Kashmir an 
independent State, Thus, Pakistan changed her strategy 
to one of creating a climate of unlawful activities, in-
surrection by giving support to extremists and militants 
of Kashmir and Punjab. This attitude of Pakistan has 
created tension betv;een the tv70 countries. 
Our analysis leads to somewhat pessimistic 
assessment of possibilities of conflict-avoidance between 
India and Pakistan. Since Partition, both India and 
Pakistan have been at loggerheads in all fields, parti-
cularly in arms bi.iild up and acqufeition of nuclear 
technology. At present, both India and Pakistan have 
larger forces and more sophisticated v/eapons than in the 
past. So, the cost of a nev; vmr v/ill be substantially 
greater than that of the previous throe v;ars. 
All in all, an analysis of the events and 
happenings of the period under review sho\/s that the 
prospects of a TModus vivendi. in the sub-contient are 
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bleak indeed. The Indo -Pak Cold War is continxaing 
with increasing ferocity. There can be no hope of 
normalization of relations or resumption of normal 
cooperation without the resolution of the outstand-
ing bilateral disputes and eventual political-strategic 
consensus. 
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